Russia's Prospects in Asia

Russia's Prospects in Asia

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

These three chapters originated in an SSI conference in January 2010 and go to the heart of a question of vital significance for both Asia and Russia, namely what are Russia’s prospects in Asia. The three chapters outline the challenges Russia faces in Asia, the nature of the dynamic and complex Asian security environment, and the extent to which Russia is or is not meeting those challenges.

Rising Powers and Domestic Attitudes on Hard Power

Rising Powers and Domestic Attitudes on Hard Power (PDF)

Source: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University

Examining domestic foreign policy debates within rising powers provides insights into how these countries will behave as they rise. Five important rising powers in the critical Asian and Eurasian regions today are China, Japan, India, Iran and Russia. An international research team under the direction of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, is in the process of analyzing the foreign policy debates and schools of thought within these countries. This research is part of the Sigur Center’s project on “Worldviews of Aspiring Powers” sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation, and led by Sigur faculty members Henry R. Nau and Deepa Ollapally.

This Policy Brief draws from the presentations of the research team at a project conference held in Beijing, China in May 2010. It examines the attitude of the five rising powers toward hard power, specifically economic power and military power.

The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment

The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment

Source: RAND Corporation

Terrorism is not new to Southeast Asia. For much of the Cold War, the activities of a variety of domestic ethnonationalist and religious militant groups posed a significant challenge to the region’s internal stability. Since the 1990s, however, the residual challenge posed by substate militant extremism has risen in reaction to both the force of modernization pursued by many Southeast Asian governments and the political influence of radical Islam. Building on prior RAND research analyzing the underlying motives, drivers, and capabilities of the principal extremist groups that have resorted to terrorist violence in the Philippines, southern Thailand, and Indonesia, this study examined the historical roots of militancy in these countries to provide context for assessing the degree to which local agendas are either being subsumed within a broader ideological framework or shaped by other extremist movements. Moving beyond simple terrorism analysis, this research also examined national and international government responses to militant movements in the region, including counterterrorist initiatives, military and policing strategies, hearts-and-minds campaigns, and funding and support from international organizations and governments (including the United States). Finally, the study broke new ground in assessing Cambodia as a potential future terrorist operational and logistical hub in Southeast Asia.

Backgrounder: Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict

Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Analysis

• Russia has announced a unilateral ceasefire because its operations have achieved their aims.
• Medvedev and Sarkozy have drafted a document that encapsulates all of Russia’s demands in return for a ceasefire—but not a final settlement, which must still be negotiated. Sarkozy is discussing that deal with Saakashvili right now.
• So the situation on the ground now legally is that there are two unilateral ceasefires, although the Georgians claim that Russian forces continue their attacks, and the Russian military has laid the predicate for those and further attacks in public statements today. The Russian military has also made plain that if a formal ceasefire agreement is not reached, then Russian forces will not withdraw from Ossetia or Abkhazia.
• The Russian military has clearly stated that the objective of its operations was to reduce Georgia’s overall military capability so that Georgia could not again conduct an operation similar to the one it launched in South Ossetia, and for that reason has been attacking targets throughout Georgia.
• Russian leaders repeatedly say that they will not deal with Saakashvili.
• The Russian Attorney General has announced that Russian law permits the trial of Saakashvili for crimes under the Russian Federation Criminal Code.
• The Russian Foreign Minister has called for an investigation of Georgian war crimes and the punishment of those ultimately responsible by international tribunals, and has said that Russian citizens victimized by Georgians will be bringing individual actions in appropriate European human rights courts.
• The Russian aim is to force Saakashvili from power, preferably using international legal maneuvers (a la Milosevic), but possibly using Russian law instead or in addition.
• The Russians are maintaining their excessive forces in South Ossetia, and continuing to control Georgia’s airspace and conduct periodic attacks in a flagrant effort to compel an immediate Georgian agreement to their armistice terms, conveyed by Sarkozy.
• Russia will not permit South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to Georgian control, and will move one way or the other to have their independence recognized, and probably soon.