New Report: UK Foreign Policy Goals Cannot Be Achieved by Military Power Alone

New Report: UK Foreign Policy Goals Cannot Be Achieved by Military Power Alone

Source: Chatham House

Strategic communications should become a more prominent component at the highest levels of government, at an early stage in the development of government strategies, during a crisis response or a contingency operation and generally as a critical component of policy-making, says a new Chatham House report.

Recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya have underlined that UK foreign policy goals cannot be achieved by military power alone. Increasingly important are non-military means and ‘soft’ power in order to connect with populations both at home and abroad. Strategic communications, correctly defined, are an integral part of this approach.

Strategic Communications and National Strategy, aims to raise awareness of the role of strategic communications and clarify how it can contribute to facing future security challenges.

The report considers the contribution strategic communications can make to national security strategy in its broader sense as directed, managed and delivered not only by the highest levels of government but by all constituent pillars of governance, including the military, diplomacy and trade, throughout the policy process.

Although the UK government clearly has a good understanding of the importance of strategic communications, this understanding is relatively limited in its sophistication and imagination, and policy in turn proves difficult to coordinate and implement.

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)

Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation slowed, however, in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration has resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate range and long-range weapons. But progress again slowed in the 1990s, as U.S. missile defense plans and a range of other policy conflicts intervened in the U.S.- Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Through these cooperative efforts, the United States now allocates more than $1 billion each year to threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union.

The United States is also a prominent actor in an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This regime, although suffering from some setbacks in recent years in Iran and North Korea, includes formal treaties, export control coordination and enforcement, U.N. resolutions, and organizational controls. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) serves as the cornerstone of this regime, with all but four nations participating in it. The International Atomic Energy Agency not only monitors nuclear programs to make sure they remain peaceful, but also helps nations develop and advance those programs. Other measures, such as sanctions, interdiction efforts, and informal cooperative endeavors, also seek to slow or stop the spread of nuclear materials and weapons.

The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely.

This report will be updated annually, or as needed.

China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position

China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

This monograph examines Chinese military engagement with Latin America in five areas: (1) meetings between senior military officials; (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions; (3) military sales; (4) military-relevant commercial interactions; and, (5) Chinese physical presence within Latin America, all of which have military-strategic implications. This monograph finds that the level of PRC military engagement with the region is higher than is generally recognized, and has expanded in important ways in recent years: High-level trips by Latin American defense and security personnel to the PRC and visits by their Chinese counterparts to Latin America have become commonplace. The volume and sophistication of Chinese arms sold to the region has increased. Officer exchange programs, institutional visits, and other lower-level ties have also expanded. Chinese military personnel have begun participating in operations in the region in a modest, yet symbolically important manner. The monograph also argues that in the short term, PRC military engagement with Latin America does not focus on establishing alliances or base access to the United States, but rather, supporting objectives of national development and regime survival, such as building understanding and political leverage among important commercial partners, creating the tools to protect PRC interests in the countries where it does business, and selling Chinese products and moving up the value-added chain in strategically important sectors. It concludes that Chinese military engagement may both contribute to legitimate regional security needs, and foster misunderstanding. It argues that the U.S. should work for greater transparency with the PRC in regard to those activities, as well as to analyze how the Chinese presence will impact the calculation of the region’s actors in the context of specific future scenarios.

Resolving Insurgencies

Resolving Insurgencies

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations that become committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or they evolve into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. The author concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of U.S. success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns.

Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy

Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy

Source: Mercatus Center (George Mason University)


Over the past two years there has been a steady drumbeat of alarmist rhetoric coming out of Washington about potential catastrophic cyber threats. For example, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last year, Chairman Carl Levin said that “cyberweapons and cyberattacks potentially can be devastating, approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects.” Proposed responses include increased federal spending on cybersecurity and the regulation of private network security practices.

The rhetoric of “cyber doom” employed by proponents of increased federal intervention, however, lacks clear evidence of a serious threat that can be verified by the public. As a result, the United States may be witnessing a bout of threat inflation similar to that seen in the run-up to the Iraq War. Additionally, a cyber-industrial complex is emerging, much like the military-industrial complex of the Cold War. This complex may serve to not only supply cybersecurity solutions to the federal government, but to drum up demand for them as well.

Part I of this article draws a parallel between today’s cybersecurity debate and the run-up to the Iraq War and looks at how an inflated public conception of the threat we face may lead to unnecessary regulation of the Internet. Part II draws a parallel between the emerging cybersecurity establishment and the military-industrial complex of the Cold War and looks at how unwarranted external influence can lead to unnecessary federal spending. Finally, Part III surveys several federal cybersecurity proposals and presents a framework for analyzing the cybersecurity threat.

Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command

Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command

Source: National Defense University

Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, reflects on his tenure as Commander of United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The first Admiral to command Southern Command, Admiral Stavridis broke with tradition from day one, discarding the customary military staff model and creating an innovative organization designed not solely to subdue adversaries, but, perhaps more importantly, to build durable and lasting partnerships with friends. As he has said often, “We are excellent at launching Tomahawk missiles; in this part of the world, we need to get better at launching ideas.”

From his unique perspective as commander, Stavridis uses his engagingly personal style to describe his vision for the command’s role in the Americas, making the most of limited resources to create goodwill and mutual respect, while taking care of the serious business of countering illegal drug trafficking, overcoming a dangerous insurgency in Colombia, and responding to humanitarian crises.

China’s National Defense in 2010

China’s National Defense in 2010

Source: China State Council, Information Office

From Preface:

In the first decade of the 21st century, the international community forged ahead in a new phase of opening up and cooperation, and at the same time faced crises and changes. Sharing opportunities for development and dealing with challenges with joint efforts have become the consensus of all countries in the world. Pulling together in the time of trouble, seeking mutual benefit and engaging in win-win cooperation are the only ways for humankind to achieve common development and prosperity. China has now stood at a new historical point, and its future and destiny has never been more closely connected with those of the international community. In the face of shared opportunities and common challenges, China maintains its commitment to the new security concepts of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination. By connecting the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of other peoples around the globe, connecting China’s development with that of the world, and connecting China’s security with world peace, China strives to build, through its peaceful development, a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. Looking into the second decade of the 21st century, China will continue to take advantage of this important period of strategic opportunities for national development, apply the Scientific Outlook on Development in depth, persevere on the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, map out both economic development and national defense in a unified manner and, in the process of building a society that is moderately affluent on a general basis, realize the unified goal of building a prosperous country and a strong military.

The National Military Strategy of the United States 2011

The National Military Strategy of the United States 2011 (PDF)

Source: U.S. Department of Defense (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

From press release (Admiral Mike Mullen):

"Today, I released the 2011 National Military Strategy which provides a vision for how our Joint Force will provide the military capability to protect the American People, defend our Nation and allies, and contribute to our broader peace, security and prosperity.

While we continue to refine how we counter violent extremism and deter aggression, this strategy also rightfully emphasizes that our military power is most effective when employed in concert with other elements of power. This whole-of-nation approach to foreign policy, with civilian leadership appropriately at the helm, will be essential as we address the complex security challenges before us.

This strategy also acknowledges that while tough near-term choices must be made during this era of broader economic constraints, we will continue to invest in our people and our families. Working with our government and interagency partners, and our friends and allies, they, most of all, will bring this strategy to life as we meet our 21st century responsibilities in a dynamic, yet uncertain, future."

Defense Budgets and American Power

Defense Budgets and American Power

Source: Brookings Institution

In the late 1980s, as U.S. GDP growth slowed, budget deficits remained stubbornly high, and other nations’ economies outperformed that of the United States, arguments that “the Cold War is over—and Japan and Germany won” were heard frequently. Since that time, however, these U.S. allies have encountered their own challenges—Germany in reintegrating its eastern half and then helping establish the viability (and solvency) of the European Union (EU) and Euro systems; and Japan in dealing with a protracted deflating of its earlier financial bubble, combined with demographic challenges that leave its future economic prospects uncertain, at best.

Today, we are witnessing a period of even greater American economic travails, with much larger fiscal deficits. These are coupled with deep concern that less friendly powers—China in particular and perhaps Russia and others—may be poised to benefit from the relative decline of the United States specifically and the West in general. Is this assessment accurate? What do these shifting economic realities bode for the future of American power and ultimately the security of this country and its allies? Most of all, in light of these changes, to what extent can the United States mitigate the downsides of any hegemonic realignment of global power by more responsible fiscal policy? Put most sharply for the purposes of this essay, to what extent should the United States, as part of a broader strategy to reduce its deficits and strengthen its future economic prospects, accept some defense budget cuts now to preserve and enhance its power in the future?

States Of Conflict: An Update on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan

States Of Conflict: An Update on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Source: Brookings Institution

It has been a tough summer on America’s battlefields and those of its key allies, what with political wrangling in Baghdad, violence in Afghanistan and floods in Pakistan. President Obama received a fair dose of criticism for his Aug. 31 Oval Office speech marking the end of combat operations in Iraq, but under the circumstances it was practically impossible to convey a truly uplifting message.

Annual Report to Congress — Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China – 2010

Annual Report to Congress — Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China – 2010 (PDF)

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

Over the past 30 years, China has made great progress in its pursuit of economic growth and development, which has allowed China to achieve higher living standards for the Chinese people and has increased China’s international profile. These economic achievements, combined with progress in science and technology, have also enabled China to embark on a comprehensive transformation of its military. The pace and scope of China’s military modernization have increased over the past decade, enabling China’s armed forces to develop capabilities to contribute to the delivery of international public goods, as well as increase China’s options for using military force to gain diplomatic advantage or resolve disputes in its favor.

Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

Source: RAND Corporation

Since 2001, Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups, including al Qa'ida, that directly affect U.S. national security. Despite some successes, militant groups continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and a range of other countries. Numerous militant networks — including al Qa'ida and other foreign fighters — exist in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province. Pakistan will not be able to deal with the militant threat over the long run unless it does a more effective job of addressing the root causes of the crisis and makes security of the civilian population, rather than destroying the enemy, its top counterinsurgency priority. In addition, Pakistan needs to abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign and domestic policy; it sends a confusing message internally and has a large potential to backfire

United States Institute of Peace Releases Review of Quadrennial Defense Report

United States Institute of Peace Releases Review of Quadrennial Defense Report

Source: United States Institute of Peace

On Thursday, July 29, the co-chairs of a select, bipartisan panel testified that their study of the Defense Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) found that without needed reform the All-Volunteer Force may be unsustainable and that the nation needs a new national security strategic planning process that better incorporates civilian departments and agencies. Former National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry met with the House Armed Services Committee about their now-public report, “The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century.”

In their testimony, they summed up the panel’s warning that:

» “The aging of the inventories and equipment used by the services, the decline in the size of the Navy, escalating personnel entitlements, increased overhead and procurement costs, and the growing stress on the force means that a train wreck is coming in the areas of personnel, acquisition, and force structure.”
» “In addition, our nation needs to build greater civil operational capacity to deploy civilians alongside our military and to partner with international bodies, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations in dealing with failed and failing states.”

Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat

Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat

Source: RAND Corporation

North Korea has been very successful in denying the United States and others information about its nuclear weapon program. The result is a high degree of uncertainty about the size and character of the North Korean nuclear weapon threat, how it might be used, and what impact it might have. This briefing addresses those uncertainties. Estimates of the number and nature of North Korean nuclear weapons depend heavily on how much external help the program has received; there is some evidence that help has included the provision of fissile material and assistance in the design of nuclear weapons, including miniaturization for ballistic missiles. North Korea uses its nuclear weapons actively in peacetime for deterrence and to obtain leverage. It could use them heavily in a war. If its force is as large as the uncertainties suggest it might be, North Korea could establish its nuclear weapon capabilities and intent to use them from early on in a war. Like other countries that have developed small nuclear forces, North Korea could threaten adversary cities (mainly in Japan and the Republic of Korea) to control escalation and the developments in a war, striving for some hope of victory. If North Korea actually attacked a city such as Seoul with a nuclear weapon, it could result in hundreds of thousands of casualties, as well as serious damage to the South Korean economy.

Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?

Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?

Source: RAND Corporation

Describing Pakistan’s likely future course, this book seeks to inform U.S. efforts to achieve an effective foreign policy strategy toward the country. The book forms an empirical analysis of developments in Pakistan and an assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. policy as of August 2009. Drawing on interviews of elites, polling data, and statistical data on Pakistan’s armed forces, the book presents a political and political-military analysis. Primary data and analyses from Pakistanis and international economic organizations are used in the book’s demographic and economic analyses. The book assesses Pakistan’s own policies, based on similar sources, on government documents, and on the authors’ close reading of the assessments of several outside observers. The book also discusses U.S. policy regarding Pakistan, which was based on interviews with U.S. policymakers and on U.S. policy documents. The policy recommendations are based on an assessment of the findings in all these areas. The book concludes with a number of recommendations for the U.S. government and the U.S. Air Force concerning how the United States could forge a broad yet effective relationship with this complicated state.

Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2009

Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2009

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

From the Summary:

The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database now contains information on all international transfers of major conventional weapons from 1950 to the end of 2009. It is the only publicly available resource providing consistent data on international arms transfers for this length of time. This Fact Sheet describes the trends that are revealed by the new data.

The volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons for the period 2005–2009 is 22 per cent higher than for the period 2000–2004. Combat aircraft accounted for 27 per cent of the volume of international arms transfers. These weapon systems are potentially destabilizing, and orders and deliveries have led to arms race concerns in regions of tension in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and South East Asia.

The five biggest arms suppliers for the period 2005–2009 were the USA, Russia, Germany, France and the UK. The five biggest recipients were China, India, South Korea, the UAE and Greece. The volume of arms transferred to the two largest importers—China and India—decreased by 20 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively, in 2005–2009 in comparison with 2000–2004.

Nuke Review Takes Comprehensive Look at Strategy

Nuke Review Takes Comprehensive Look at Strategy

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

The Nuclear Posture Review, released today, is the first overarching look at U.S. nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War, a senior defense official briefing reporters on background said yesterday.

The review builds on President Barack Obama’s promise to take concrete steps toward the goal of achieving the safety and security of a world free of nuclear weapons, the official said.
A second element, the official added, was to maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as those weapons remain, and ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of that deterrent while they remain.

The Nuclear Posture Review provides the basis behind many moves in the nuclear arena in the coming months, the official said. Obama will travel to Prague to sign the new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia on April 8. The treaty mandates further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals, and officials looked to the Nuclear Posture Review guidance as they negotiated the treaty.

The review also will influence U.S. thinking in the nonproliferation treaty, the nuclear security summit and the nonproliferation review conference.

Ballistic Missile Defense Review

Ballistic Missile Defense Review

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) is a review conducted pursuant to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, while also addressing the legislative requirement to assess U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy. The BMDR will evaluate the threats posed by ballistic missiles and develop a missile defense posture to address current and future challenges.

Command and control? Planning for EU military operations

Command and control? Planning for EU military operations
Source: Institute for Security Studies

Summary:This paper assesses the effectiveness of the European Union’s capability for the planning and conduct of military operations. Given the fact that the planning and conduct phases of an operation can never be fully isolated from each other, the paper does include some references to the conduct dimension, i.e. command and control (C2). However, it is with planning issues that this paper is most directly concerned. It argues that the lack of a permanent planning and conduct capability cripples the Union’s planning and C2 performance as well as the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) more broadly. This capability, though, need not adopt the form of a fully-fledged Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The paper explains that the nature and evolution of the Union’s planning and C2 capability is largely the result of compromises between France, Britain and Germany (the Union’s ‘Big Three’) and argues that a coincidence in British-German objectives – the ‘awkward alignment’ – is particularly responsible for the continuing absence of a permanent military planning and C2 capability.

In its policy recommendations, the paper attempts to reconcile the need to address the existing deficiencies in the realms of planning (no flexibility and lack of advance planning capacity) and C2 (the unreliability of the Union’s Communications and Information Systems infrastructure and the lack of situational awareness) with prevailing political caveats – principally, the general resistance to the creation of a fully-fledged and permanent military OHQ. It proposes strengthening the Military Assessment on Planning Branch (currently placed within the EU Military Staff) by setting up a planning skeleton (composed of some 50 officials) devoted to improving the Union’s advance planning performance and increasing flexibility in the Union’s planning process. This skeleton would be inserted within the future Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) structure. Additionally, an ad hoc group of national augmentees (drawn from a wider pool of some 80 to 100 pre-identified augmentees) could join a detachment from the skeleton and plug onto the existing OpsCentre or a national OHQ for operational planning and conduct purposes.

The paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter explains ESDP’s planning cycle and describes the evolution of the Union’s planning and C2 capability. The second chapter proceeds to assess the planning and C2 performance of three military operations; EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR DRC in the Democratic Republic of Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA in Chad and the Central African Republic. The third and last chapter presents the study’s conclusions and offers practical policy recommendations aimed at improving the Union’s planning and conduct capability.

U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Basic Questions — Strategic Choices

U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Basic Questions — Strategic Choices

Source: RAND Corporation

On October 29, 2009, the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy convened a half-day symposium of experts — including Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Ambassador James Dobbins, Senator Carl Levin, and others — and journalists to address assumptions and alternatives for U.S. policy in Afghanistan. In the first session, panelists spoke about counterinsurgency strategy. Among the topics they addressed were military troop levels needed to support a counterinsurgency strategy, the role of Afghan security forces, and potential costs of increased military operations.

The second session covered counterterrorism, including the degree to which the U.S. should consider Afghanistan a national security interest, the nature of military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaida, regional political stability, and military troop levels in the region. The final panel was on containment. Foreign policy experts spoke about strategic options and U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Among the issues they addressed were military disengagement, regional security and political stability, as well as pitfalls and challenges in any sustained military presence in the region. Each panel also answered questions from the audience