Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists

Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists

Source: RAND Corporation

Considerable effort has been devoted to understanding the process of violent Islamist radicalization, but far less research has explored the equally important process of deradicalization, or how individuals or groups abandon extremist groups and ideologies. Proactive measures to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and to rehabilitate those who have already embraced extremism have been implemented, to varying degrees, in several Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and European countries. A key question is whether the objective of these programs should be disengagement (a change in behavior) or deradicalization (a change in beliefs) of militants. Furthermore, a unique challenge posed by militant Islamist groups is that their ideology is rooted in a major world religion. An examination of deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe assessed the strengths and weaknesses of each program, finding that the best-designed programs leverage local cultural patterns to achieve their objectives. Such programs cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another. They need to develop organically in a specific country and culture.

Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones

Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones

Source: Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University

The report is a timely primer on an emerging threat to Western states, dramatically evidenced in the recent news of an alleged plot by foreign fighters to stage a number of coordinated "Mumbai-style" attacks in Europe and possibly the United States.

The joint report of HSPI and SNDC surveys the sources, destinations and impact of Western jihadi foreign fighters. It also highlights key bridge figures who act as catalysts for radicalization and recruitment. The authors identify key vulnerabilities in the foreign fighter network, arguing that more must be done to exploit the security challenges faced by global jihadists.

Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

Source: RAND Corporation

Since 2001, Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups, including al Qa'ida, that directly affect U.S. national security. Despite some successes, militant groups continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and a range of other countries. Numerous militant networks — including al Qa'ida and other foreign fighters — exist in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province. Pakistan will not be able to deal with the militant threat over the long run unless it does a more effective job of addressing the root causes of the crisis and makes security of the civilian population, rather than destroying the enemy, its top counterinsurgency priority. In addition, Pakistan needs to abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign and domestic policy; it sends a confusing message internally and has a large potential to backfire

New ASP Report Shows Declining Levels of Islamist Terrorism since July 2009

New ASP Report Shows Declining Levels of Islamist Terrorism since July 2009

Source: American Security Project

Today, the American Security Project released the mid-year update to their annual “Are We Winning?” Report, which showed a marked decrease in Islamist terrorism in the last two quarters of 2009 outside of the on-going conflict theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. Even though Islamist terrorist incidents still remain at historically high levels, the decrease at the end of 2009 was the largest since 2004, when National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) started tracking Islamist terrorist incidents. The report, authored by ASP Senior Fellow Bernard Finel and Researcher Germain Difo measures America’s progress in the fight against terrorism according to metrics that are designed to be both reproducible and objective.

According to the report, much of the decline in Islamic terrorist incidents is due to decreasing terror incidents in Pakistan. Though there have been several high profile attacks in Pakistan, Islamist terrorism in that country is down 60% from the first six months of 2009. This decline is likely due to increased military pressure by the Pakistani military on radicals within that country. In addition, the report found that Al Qaeda is increasingly marginal to the broader radical Islamist movement, and remains under significant pressure due to drone strikes and other forms of military pressure. This continues to demonstrate the tactical effectiveness of military counter-terrorism activities, though according to Senior Fellow and report author Bernard Finel, “it is unlikely that military pressure alone will provide a long-term solution to the terrorism challenge. We should be cautiously optimistic about the ability of military efforts in areas such as Pakistan and Afghanistan to dislodge some terrorist groups and keep them on the run. But there is still a significant chance that terror groups may rebound.”

U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Basic Questions — Strategic Choices

U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Basic Questions — Strategic Choices

Source: RAND Corporation

On October 29, 2009, the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy convened a half-day symposium of experts — including Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Ambassador James Dobbins, Senator Carl Levin, and others — and journalists to address assumptions and alternatives for U.S. policy in Afghanistan. In the first session, panelists spoke about counterinsurgency strategy. Among the topics they addressed were military troop levels needed to support a counterinsurgency strategy, the role of Afghan security forces, and potential costs of increased military operations.

The second session covered counterterrorism, including the degree to which the U.S. should consider Afghanistan a national security interest, the nature of military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaida, regional political stability, and military troop levels in the region. The final panel was on containment. Foreign policy experts spoke about strategic options and U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Among the issues they addressed were military disengagement, regional security and political stability, as well as pitfalls and challenges in any sustained military presence in the region. Each panel also answered questions from the audience

The Saudi Terror Problem on the Rise Since September 11

The Saudi Terror Problem on the Rise Since September 11

Source: Institute for Gulf Affairs

The Institute for Gulf Affairs issued a report today highlighting the Saudi Arabian regime’s continued support of terrorism despite the passing of eight years since September 11.
The report titled, “The Saudi Terror Problem on the Rise Since September 11,” concludes that the Saudi regime openly supports its citizens’ engagement in terrorism. The kingdom has claimed throughout the past eight years it has worked to weed out terrorism, but in reality they have supported, financed, and actively produced new recruits for Al-Qaeda and similar groups.
The Saudi government continues to be a key supporter of international terrorism. The government encourages men to contribute to terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. The effects of the Saudi regime’s support are obvious in light of the number of Saudi fighters that are operating in these countries.

After eight years of international pressure on the Saudi government to eradicate terror, contrastingly the number of Saudis involved in terrorism has increased to its highest levels. The Saudi officials give speeches and fatwas encouraging Saudis to join and fund the insurgency in Iraq. They also allow Al-Qaeda recruiters and websites to function and recruit countless numbers of young Saudis.

Saudi Arabia remains the prime source of thousands of Al-Qaeda militants and tens of millions of dollars the organization uses to fund its activities. The Taliban has also been receiving its largest funds from Saudi Arabia. However, The United State government has neglected to change Saudi policies and programs that continue to produce waves of militants and suicide bombers. This failure has resulted in the deaths of thousands of people including American soldiers and civilians.

The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment

The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment

Source: RAND Corporation

Terrorism is not new to Southeast Asia. For much of the Cold War, the activities of a variety of domestic ethnonationalist and religious militant groups posed a significant challenge to the region’s internal stability. Since the 1990s, however, the residual challenge posed by substate militant extremism has risen in reaction to both the force of modernization pursued by many Southeast Asian governments and the political influence of radical Islam. Building on prior RAND research analyzing the underlying motives, drivers, and capabilities of the principal extremist groups that have resorted to terrorist violence in the Philippines, southern Thailand, and Indonesia, this study examined the historical roots of militancy in these countries to provide context for assessing the degree to which local agendas are either being subsumed within a broader ideological framework or shaped by other extremist movements. Moving beyond simple terrorism analysis, this research also examined national and international government responses to militant movements in the region, including counterterrorist initiatives, military and policing strategies, hearts-and-minds campaigns, and funding and support from international organizations and governments (including the United States). Finally, the study broke new ground in assessing Cambodia as a potential future terrorist operational and logistical hub in Southeast Asia.

Terrorism: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)

Terrorism: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)

The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System is the National Counterterrorism Center’s database of terrorist incidents.

Direct to Database

Source: National Counterterrorism Center

National Counterterrorism Center: 2008 Report on Terrorism

National Counterterrorism Center: 2008 Report on Terrorism

Source: National Counterterrorism Center

Approximately 11,800 terrorist attacks against noncombatants occurred in various countries during 2008, resulting in over 54,000 deaths, injuries and kidnappings. Compared to 2007, attacks decreased by 2,700, or 18 percent, in 2008 while deaths due to terrorism decreased by 6,700, or 30 percent. As was the case last year, the largest number of reported terrorist attacks occurred in the Near East, but unlike previous years, South Asia had the greater number of fatalities. These two regions were also the locations for 75 percent of the 235 high-casualty attacks (those that killed 10 or more people) in 2008.

Strategic Counterterrorism

Strategic Counterterrorism

Source: The Brookings Institution

Terrorism is a real and urgent threat to the American people and our interests; a threat that could become far more dangerous if terrorists acquire nuclear or biological weapons. An effective counterterrorism policy must go beyond uncompromising efforts to thwart those who seek to harm us today—we must engage other countries whose cooperation is essential to meet this threat, and we must ensure that new terrorist recruits do not come to take the place of those we have defeated.

The policies pursued by the Bush administration have too often been counterproductive and self-defeating. In the name of an “offensive” strategy, they have undermined the values and principles that made the United States a model for the world, dismayed our friends around the world and jeopardized their cooperation with us, and provided ammunition for terrorist recruitment in the Middle East and beyond.

To achieve our long-term objective we must go beyond narrow counterterrorism policies to embed counterterrorism in an overarching national security strategy designed to restore American leadership and respect in the world. This leadership must be based on a strong commitment to our values and to building the structures of international cooperation that are needed not only to fight terrorists, but also to meet other key challenges of our time: proliferation; climate change and energy security; the danger of pandemic disease; and the need to sustain a vibrant global economy that lifts the lives of people everywhere.

More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World

More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World

Source: RAND Corporation

In the wake of September 11 through the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a key tenet of U.S. foreign policy has been that promoting democracy in the Arab world is an important strategy in reducing terrorism; at the same time, some policymakers and analysts have held that democracy has nothing to do with terrorism — or even that the growth of democracy in the Middle East may exacerbate political violence. However, scant empirical evidence links democracy to terrorism, positively or negatively. This study examines whether such links exist by exploring the effects of liberalization processes on political violence in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco from 1991 to 2006. Drawing on data on the incidence of terrorist violence, extensive fieldwork and interviews in each of the six countries, and primary and secondary literature from and about each country, Kaye et al. find that political reforms have, in some instances, helped to marginalize and undercut extremist actors, but that these effects tend to be short-lived if reforms fail to produce tangible results. Moreover, when regimes backtrack on even limited openings, the risks of instability and violence increase.

A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare, Where They Strike

A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare, Where They Strike

Source: National Institute of Justice

Although we know a great deal about the behavior of traditional criminals, little information has been available about terrorists. Are they much different from conventional criminals, who tend to commit their crimes close to home? Research has shown that traditional criminals are spontaneous, but terrorists seem to go to great lengths preparing for their attacks — and may commit other crimes while doing so. How long does this planning take? And do different types of terrorist groups vary in preparation time?

To help answer these questions, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) launched a series of projects to explore patterns of terrorist behavior. In the first of these projects, a panel of experts was assembled to examine 60 case studies involving terrorist incidents in the U.S. during the past 25 years. These cases involved the four major types of U.S. terrorist groups: left wing, right wing, single issue and international. The panel — including this author — looked at the homes of the terrorists, the locations of planning and preparation, and the sites of the terrorist incidents to discover whether any patterns emerged.

What we learned was intriguing: The cases of McVeigh, the Sept. 11 hijackers and Rudolph are actually unusual. In fact, we found that most terrorists live close to their selected targets, and they engage in a great deal of preparation — some over the course of months or even years — that has the potential of coming to the attention of local law enforcement.

The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism

The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism

Source: The Brookings Institution

The U.S. approach toward state sponsorship of terrorism rests on a flawed understanding of the problem and an even more flawed policy response. The U.S. Department of State’s current formal list of state sponsors includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. But Cuba and North Korea have done almost nothing in this area in recent years, and Sudan has changed its ways enough that elsewhere the Bush administration credits Sudan as a “strong partner in the War on Terror.” Of those on the list, only Syria and Iran remain problems, and in both cases their involvement in traditional international terrorism is down considerably from their peaks in the 1980s.

What seems like a brilliant policy success, however, is really an artifact of bad list management, because much of the problem of state sponsorship today involves countries that are not on the list at all. Pakistan has long aided a range of terrorist groups fighting against India in Kashmir and is a major sponsor of Taliban forces fighting the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. Hugo Chavez’s government in Venezuela is a major supporter of the FARC. And several other governments, such as those in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian territories, create problems by deliberately looking the other way when their citizens back terrorist groups.

These new state sponsors are actually more dangerous to the United States and its interests than the remaining traditional state sponsors, because some of them are tied to Sunni jihadist groups such as al-Qa‘ida— currently the greatest terrorist threat facing the United States. The nightmare of a terrorist group acquiring nuclear weapons is far more likely to involve Pakistan than it is Iran or North Korea.

Country Reports on Terrorism 2007

Country Reports on Terrorism 2007

Source: U.S. Department of StateFrom Strategic Assessment:

Responding to terrorist groups that have many of the characteristics of a global insurgency – propaganda campaigns, grass roots support, and political and territorial ambitions, though ill-defined, requires a comprehensive response. Successful methods include a focus on protecting and securing the population; and politically and physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted political and development measures, and conducting precise intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal collateral damage.

There were significant achievements in this area this year against terrorist leadership targets, notably the capture or killing of key terrorist leaders in Pakistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, and the Philippines. These efforts buy us time to carry out the most important elements of a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy: disrupting terrorist operations, including their communications, propaganda and subversion efforts; planning and fundraising; and eliminating the conditions that terrorists exploit. We must seek to build trusted networks of governments, multilateral institutions, business organizations, and private citizens and organizations that work collaboratively to defeat the threat from violent extremism.

Working with allies and partners across the world, we have created a less permissive operating environment for terrorists, keeping leaders on the move or in hiding, and degrading their ability to plan and mount attacks. Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Jordan, the Philippines, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many other partners played major roles in this success. Dozens of countries have passed new counterterrorism legislation or strengthened pre-existing laws that provide their law enforcement and judicial authorities with new tools to bring terrorists to justice. The United States has expanded the number of foreign partners for the sharing of terrorist screening information, which is a concrete tool for disrupting and tracking travel of known and suspected terrorists. Saudi Arabia has implemented an effective model rehabilitation program for returning jihadis to turn them against violent extremism and to reintegrate them as peaceful citizens.

Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Source: The Brookings Institution

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of violent groups over the years. Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. This support remains strong even today: the U.S. government regularly contends that Iran is tied to an array of radical groups in Iraq.

Yet despite Iran’s very real support for terrorism for more than the last 25 years and its possession of chemical weapons for over 15 years, Tehran has not transferred unconventional systems to terrorists. Iran is likely to continue this restraint and not transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, it is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation.

This article begins by reviewing how Iran has used terrorism in the past and how this has changed over the years. The article then assesses U.S. attempts to press Iran with regard to terrorism and why they have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, the article argues that, while the author believes Iranian terrorism remains a threat, Tehran is not likely to pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists. The article concludes with recommendations for decreasing Iran’s use of terrorism in general and the chances of it transferring chemical or other unconventional weapons to terrorists in particular.

The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment

The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment

Source: Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments

From press release :

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has released a new report, “The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment,” authored by Senior Fellow Robert C. Martinage.
The report concludes that the United States reached a high-water mark in the war on terrorism in 2003. At that time, the Taliban had been overthrown and al Qaeda stripped of its sanctuary in Afghanistan, ten of al Qaeda’s senior-most leaders had been captured or killed, dozens of jihadi cells had been rolled up, and several partner countries had significantly improved their counter- terrorism capabilities.

While the US has had many tactical victories since then, they have been offset by the metastasis of the al Qaeda organization into a global movement, the spread and intensification of Salafi- Jihadi ideology, the resurgence of Iranian influence, and growth in the number and influence of radical Islamist political parties. The threat has, on balance, intensified in Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Europe, according to Martinage.

Report from the Homeland Security Group

Latest report from the Homeland Security Group.

Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations

Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations

Source: RAND Corporation

Understanding how terrorists conduct successful operations is critical to countering them. Terrorist organizations use a wide range of network technologies as they plan and stage attacks. This book explores the role that these communications and computer technologies play and the net effect of their use, the purpose and manner in which the technology is used, the operational actions of terrorists and possible responses of security forces. The authors conclude that future network technologies modestly improve terrorist group efficiency, particularly for their supporting activities, but do not dramatically improve their attack operations. Precluding terrorists from getting the technology they want is impractical; developing direct counters is unlikely to yield high payoffs. Instead, exploiting the technologies and the information such technologies use to enable more direct security force operations are more promising options.

The Terrorism Index

The Terrorism Index

Source: Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress

Surveying more than 100 of America’s top foreign-policy experts—Republicans and Democrats alike—the Foreign Policy/Center for American Progress Terrorism Index is the only comprehensive, nonpartisan effort to mine the highest echelons of the nation’s foreign-policy establishment for its assessment of how the United States is fighting the war on terror. First released in July 2006, and again last February, the index attempts to draw definitive conclusions about the war’s priorities, policies, and progress. Its participants include people who have served as secretary of state, national security advisor, senior White House aides, top commanders in the U.S. military, seasoned intelligence professionals, and distinguished academics. Eighty percent of the experts have served in the U.S. government—including more than half in the Executive Branch, 32 percent in the military, and 21 percent in the intelligence community.

Terrorist Threats in the Horn of Africa: A Net Assessment

Terrorist Threats in the Horn of Africa: A Net Assessment

Source: National Security Outlook (American Enterprise Institute)

The struggle against Islamist extremism has been dubbed the “Long War” by America’s military leadership, but there is no agreed-upon model to forecast the development of this conflict. The challenge of assessing the Long War is exacerbated by the differences between the adversaries: the United States and its allies form the core of the international system, while the Salafist jihadists at the extreme of radical Islam comprise an irregular transnational movement that has adaptively spread throughout the world from its Middle East base. Comparing the structure, goals, strategy, and tactics of these fundamentally asymmetric forces is a chore to which our analytic tools developed during the Cold War do not lend themselves. This National Security Outlook examines whether the “net assessment” concept might serve as an appropriate framework for understanding the Long War and predicting its likely development.