States Of Conflict: An Update on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan

States Of Conflict: An Update on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Source: Brookings Institution

It has been a tough summer on America’s battlefields and those of its key allies, what with political wrangling in Baghdad, violence in Afghanistan and floods in Pakistan. President Obama received a fair dose of criticism for his Aug. 31 Oval Office speech marking the end of combat operations in Iraq, but under the circumstances it was practically impossible to convey a truly uplifting message.

Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies

Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies

Source: RAND Corporation

Since 2007, security has improved dramatically in Iraq. The U.S. and Iraqi governments — and most Iraqis — want to see both the U.S. presence there reduced and the Iraqi government and security forces assuming a greater role in providing for public security. The challenge is to effect this drawdown while preserving security and stability in the country and in the region.

In response to tasking from the U.S. Congress, RAND researchers conducted an independent study to examine drawdown schedules, risks, and mitigating strategies. They identified logistical constraints on moving equipment out of the country, assessed trends in insurgent activity and the ability of Iraqi security forces to counter it, and examined the implications for the size of the residual U.S. force and for security in Iraq and the region. This report presents alternative drawdown schedules — one consistent with the Obama administration’s stated intentions and two others, one somewhat slower and another faster — that are responsive to these factors. It also recommends steps that the United States can take to alleviate anticipated constraints, overcome likely resistance, and reduce the potential risks associated with a drawdown.

Iraq in the Obama Administration

Iraq in the Obama Administration
Source: United States Institute of Peace

President-elect Obama has stated his commitment to withdraw combat brigades from Iraq within 16 months, leaving a residual force of unspecified size for counterterrorism operations, training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and protection of Americans. Judging from his statements during the campaign, it appears that the President-elect would like to leave Iraq’s internal problems to the Iraqis and treat Iraq as part of overall regional concerns rather than being his central focus. He aims to reduce America’s Iraq commitments and restore U.S. credibility, prestige and capacity to act worldwide.

Nonetheless, as the president-elect himself has pointed out, the U.S. should get out with more care than we got in. Vital U.S. interests are still at stake in Iraq and the region. U.S. withdrawal should not create a situation even more costly to American interests than the war so far has been. The Obama Administration will have an opportunity to establish with Iraq a relationship that serves U.S. interests in a country with which we will be involved for a long time to come.

SIGIR — Iraq Reconstruction Five Years On

Iraq Reconstruction Five Years On

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

One-page graphic provides info about provincial status, troop training and security incidents, construction funding and completed projects, oil revenue and exports, security funding.

Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath

Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath

Source: Institute for National Strategic Studies (National Defense University)

To date, the war in Iraq is a classic case of failure to adopt and adapt prudent courses of action that balance ends, ways, and means. After the major combat operation, U.S. policy has been insolvent, with inadequate means for pursuing ambitious ends. It is also a case where the perceived illegitimacy of our policy has led the United States to bear a disproportionate share of the war’s burden. U.S. efforts in Iraq stand in stark contrast to the war in Afghanistan, where, to the surprise of many, U.S. friends and allies have recently taken up a larger share of the burden of that conflict. Afghanistan has become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) war, but the war in Iraq has increasingly become only a U.S. and Iraqi struggle. The British drawdown in Basra in the summer of 2007 heightened the isolation of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.

The goal of this case study is to outline how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decisionmaking process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process. The central finding of this study is that U.S. efforts in Iraq were hobbled by a set of faulty assumptions, a flawed planning effort, and a continuing inability to create security conditions in Iraq that could have fostered meaningful advances in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance. It is arguable whether the Iraqis will develop the wherewithal to create ethnic reconciliation and build a coherent national government. It is clear, however, that the United States and its partners have not done enough to create conditions in which such a development could take place. With the best of intentions, the United States toppled a vile, dangerous regime but has been unable to replace it with a stable entity. Mistakes in the Iraq operation cry out for improvements in the U.S. decisionmaking and policy execution systems. In turn, these improvements will require major changes in the legislative and executive branches, as well as in interagency processes.

Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq

Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq

Source: Council on Foreign Relations

General David H. Petraeus gave this testimony on Iraq before Congress on April 8, 2008. Accompanying the testimony is a separate file of charts.

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (March 2008)

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, supported by limited but important gains on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts. Violence levels have declined since the last report and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are gradually assuming responsibility for maintain- ing law and order and promoting stability. New strides have been taken in reconciliation at the national, provincial and local levels, and the Iraqi economy is growing. However, recent security gains remain fragile, and sustained progress over the long term will depend on Iraq’s ability to address a complex set of issues associated with key political and economic objectives.

Sustaining the Peace After Civil War

Sustaining the Peace After Civil War

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. For a small subset of nations civil war is a chronic condition: about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts. This book presents an analytical framework that has been used to identify a set of factors that make civil war more or less likely to recur in a nation where a civil war has recently terminated. The outcome of the previous civil war–whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement–as well as the duration and deadliness of the conflict affect the durability of the peace after civil war. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. The book closes by applying these propositions in an analysis of the civil war in Iraq: what can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?

Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency

Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency

Source: The Brookings Institution

The recent incident involving Blackwater contractors in Iraq has brought to light a series of questions surrounding the legal status, oversight, management, and accountability of the private military force in Iraq. This for-hire force numbers more than 160,000, more than the number of uniformed military personnel in Iraq, and it is a good thing that attention is finally being paid to the consequences of our outsourcing critical tasks to private firms.

An underlying question, though, is largely being ignored: whether it made sense to have civilians in this role in the first place. Regardless of whether the Blackwater contractors were right or wrong in the recent shootings, or even whether there is proper jurisdiction to ensure their accountability or not, there is a crucial problem.

The use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction. If we judge by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can’t win with them, but can’t go to war without them.

Is the “Surge” Working? Some New Facts

Is the “Surge” Working? Some New Facts

Source: The Brookings Institution

There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military “Surge” on conditions in Iraq and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound. Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important, but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper applies modern statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge’s impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of the Iraqi state (including civilian casualties); military casualties; and financial markets’ assessment of Iraq’s future. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about future strategy.

Potentially Constructive Implications of Disaster in Iraq

Potentially Constructive Implications of Disaster in Iraq

Source: Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland

It now appears likely that the invasion of Iraq will prove to be a seminal event in the evolution of international security generally. Legal order has evidently collapsed throughout the country, and the occupying forces have not been able to control the resulting pattern of predatory violence. The central reason is that the United States forfeited at the outset the critical asset of legitimacy necessary to establish and maintain consensual rule, and its continued presence undermines the indigenous institutions it is attempting to nurture. Similar breakdowns have occurred in other parts of the world, and the consequences have been tolerated over extended periods of time. Because of timing, location and the entanglement of the United States, however, intractable violence in Iraq can be expected to have much stronger global resonance. American forces alone are not likely to be able to master the situation but neither can they be withdrawn without intensifying internal violence and extending it into an already volatile region. The potential consequences of that dilemma are ominous, but for that reason the situation presents opportunity as well as danger. Calamity is sometimes a catalyst for greater wisdom.

Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq

Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq

Source: The Brookings Institution

Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Congo, Mozambique, Northern Ireland and countless other conflicts have shown that civil wars require a political solution. In civil wars, military forces can keep a lid on the violence to make a political solution possible, but force alone will not translate into sustainable peace. Understanding this reality gives even greater urgency to understanding Iraq as a failed state. U.S. political strategy for Iraq has amounted to setting political benchmarks demanding that a failed Iraqi nation ensnared in a sectarian civil war fix itself. That will not happen, no matter how much pressure we apply. Nor will Iraq rebuild itself under conditions of war. If the United States could not successfully disburse the $18 billion Congress appropriated for reconstruction in 2003, we should not expect a dysfunctional Iraqi state to meet President Bush’s benchmarks on reconstruction, political reconciliation, and security.

If anything has been demonstrated by the Bush administration’s surge strategy, it is that a high concentration of American troops in the relatively small area of Baghdad can nominally improve security in that area. Yet all other indicators on political reconciliation and capacity building give no sense of confidence that nominal security improvements can be extended elsewhere without a comparable American force presence, while also maintaining increased force levels in Baghdad. U.S. domestic politics and the strain on American forces make any such scenario untenable.

Iraq: Time for a Change

Iraq: Time for a Change

Source: U.S. Institute of Peace

War in Iraq has lasted more than four years. It has required far greater resources than anticipated. The longer-term goals are still far from realization. The price the United States and Iraq are paying in blood and treasure continues to mount. The time has come to chart a clearer path forward, taking into account the regional and global contexts. Americans want an approach that protects U.S. vital interests and can therefore be supported across a wide range of the political spectrum.

As Washington prepares for a critical debate in Congress this fall on what should be done in Iraq, the United States Institute of Peace convened over the summer a group of experts with many different political affiliations to consider next steps over a three-year time horizon. This USIPeace Briefing, prepared by Daniel Serwer, USIP vice president for peace and stability operations, describes their main conclusions. Areas of serious disagreement are noted. Those participants in the discussions wishing to be identified are listed at the end.

The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq

The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq

Source: Iraqi Security Forces Independent Assessment Commission

ISF Overall Assessment: The Commission finds that in general, the Iraqi Security Forces, military and police, have made uneven progress, but that there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security of Iraq. With regard to external dangers, the evidence indicates that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military threats in the near term.
While severely deficient in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the Army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from the Coalition forces. In any event, the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months.

Note: Redacted for public release.

Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination

Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination

Source: Brookings Institution

Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, millions of Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes. They have fled from coalition military operations, widespread sectarian violence, and fear. Today there are around 2 million Iraqis displaced inside their country and another 2 million displaced beyond the national borders, the bulk of them in Syria and Jordan. As the security situation continues to deteriorate inside Iraq, human displacement escalates to levels unparalleled in the region since the Palestinian displacement nearly sixty years ago.…

This study examines the relationship between security and displacement in Iraq by first exploring implications of the large-scale displacement on Iraq’s domestic security. It then considers the impact of the external displacement on the security of two of Iraq’s neighbors: Jordan and Syria.

National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability but Political Reconciliation Elusive

National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive

Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (via Think Progress)

Driven largely by the accelerating pace of tribal engagement and the increasing tempo of Coalition operations, developments in Iraq are unfolding more rapidly and with greater complexity today than when we completed our January NIE. Regional variations in security and political circumstances are great and becoming increasingly more distinct–for example, intra-Shia violence in southern Iraq is very different from patterns of violence elsewhere. The intelligence assessments contained in this NIE largely focus on only a short period of the Iraqi conflict–the last six months–and in circumscribed areas–primarily the central provinces, which contain the center of gravity for Iraq’s security prospects and in which we have a greater Coalition presence and therefore more information. The unfolding pace and scope of security and political realities in Iraq, combined with our necessarily limited focus of analysis, contain risks: our uncertainties are greater, and our future projections subject to greater chances of error. These issues, combined with the challenges of acquiring accurate data on trends in violence and continued gaps in our information about levels of violence and political trends in areas of Iraq without a substantial Coalition presence and where Intelligence Community collectors have difficulty operating, heighten our caution. Nonetheless, we stand by these judgments as our best collective assessment of security and political conditions in Iraq today and as likely to unfold during the next six to 12 months.

Iraq Trip Report

Iraq Trip Report

Source: Brookings Institution

From July 17-25 we travelled extensively in central, western and northern Iraq. The trip was sponsored by the Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF-I) command and so afforded unparalleled access to U.S. and Iraqi military personnel. We spoke at length with the four principal American division commands in those sectors, as well as nearly half of the brigade commanders and their staffs, as well as several battalion and even company commanders. We also met with senior U.S. personnel from the Detainee Forces command, and from the training command known as MNSTCI, as well as a number of Iraqi police and army officers. Similarly, MNF-I saw to it that we were able to meet with key civilian personnel in a variety of PRTs/EPRTs, the U.S. Ambassador, the President’s Special Envoy, the CIA station, the US AID mission, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq. Both through our own contacts and those of the military, we also were able to meet with a number of the seniormost members of the current Iraqi government (including President Talabani, Vice President ‘Abd al-Mahdi, Foreign Minister Zebari, Deputy Prime Minister Salih, and National Security Adviser ar-Rubaie).

Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq

Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq

Source: Project on Defense Alternatives

A Phased Transition plan is necessary for Iraq. The Bush administration should end its current “surge” of U.S. troops and launch a transition process that focuses U.S. forces on an advisory role and reduces our military presence in Iraq from approximately 160,000 today to about 60,000 by the end of 2008. At the same time that it implements the first phase, it should begin planning for subsequent phases and working to achieve a bipartisan consensus in the United States.

Iraq - U.S. Policy Documents

Iraq - U.S. Policy Documents

Source: Military Education Research Library Network (MERLN)

A central repository of publicly available U.S. policy documents. Includes documents from the White House, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, Other Policy Sources. Searchable.

Released Today — Iraq: Initial Benchmark Assessment Report

Initial Benchmark Assessment Report

Source: The White House

This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the “Act”). It includes an assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. This is the first of two reports to be submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander of United States Central Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.