New USIP Primer Sheds Light on Iran
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
On October 18 the United States Institute of Peace Press will release “The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy,” an online resource that provides a comprehensive but concise overview of Iran’s politics, economy, military, foreign policy and nuclear program. A print version will be available December 1.
Edited by Robin Wright, this compendium provides top-level briefings by 50 seasoned experts on Iran (both Iranian and Western authors) from some twenty foreign policy think tanks, eight universities, and six U.S. administrations. The authors present a wide range of views, offering factual information for ready reference, thoughtful analysis and context. Since Iran’s 1979 revolution, the West has struggled to understand what drives the Islamic Republic and how to deal with it. The challenge now looms even larger in the face of Iran’s controversial nuclear program, the disputed 2009 election, growing human rights violations and angry rhetoric.
Showing posts with label Middle East. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Middle East. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
Thursday, September 16, 2010
States Of Conflict: An Update on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan
States Of Conflict: An Update on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan
Source: Brookings Institution
It has been a tough summer on America’s battlefields and those of its key allies, what with political wrangling in Baghdad, violence in Afghanistan and floods in Pakistan. President Obama received a fair dose of criticism for his Aug. 31 Oval Office speech marking the end of combat operations in Iraq, but under the circumstances it was practically impossible to convey a truly uplifting message.
Source: Brookings Institution
It has been a tough summer on America’s battlefields and those of its key allies, what with political wrangling in Baghdad, violence in Afghanistan and floods in Pakistan. President Obama received a fair dose of criticism for his Aug. 31 Oval Office speech marking the end of combat operations in Iraq, but under the circumstances it was practically impossible to convey a truly uplifting message.
Friday, October 9, 2009
The Saudi Terror Problem on the Rise Since September 11
The Saudi Terror Problem on the Rise Since September 11
Source: Institute for Gulf Affairs
The Institute for Gulf Affairs issued a report today highlighting the Saudi Arabian regime’s continued support of terrorism despite the passing of eight years since September 11.
The report titled, “The Saudi Terror Problem on the Rise Since September 11,” concludes that the Saudi regime openly supports its citizens’ engagement in terrorism. The kingdom has claimed throughout the past eight years it has worked to weed out terrorism, but in reality they have supported, financed, and actively produced new recruits for Al-Qaeda and similar groups.
The Saudi government continues to be a key supporter of international terrorism. The government encourages men to contribute to terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. The effects of the Saudi regime’s support are obvious in light of the number of Saudi fighters that are operating in these countries.
After eight years of international pressure on the Saudi government to eradicate terror, contrastingly the number of Saudis involved in terrorism has increased to its highest levels. The Saudi officials give speeches and fatwas encouraging Saudis to join and fund the insurgency in Iraq. They also allow Al-Qaeda recruiters and websites to function and recruit countless numbers of young Saudis.
Saudi Arabia remains the prime source of thousands of Al-Qaeda militants and tens of millions of dollars the organization uses to fund its activities. The Taliban has also been receiving its largest funds from Saudi Arabia. However, The United State government has neglected to change Saudi policies and programs that continue to produce waves of militants and suicide bombers. This failure has resulted in the deaths of thousands of people including American soldiers and civilians.
Source: Institute for Gulf Affairs
The Institute for Gulf Affairs issued a report today highlighting the Saudi Arabian regime’s continued support of terrorism despite the passing of eight years since September 11.
The report titled, “The Saudi Terror Problem on the Rise Since September 11,” concludes that the Saudi regime openly supports its citizens’ engagement in terrorism. The kingdom has claimed throughout the past eight years it has worked to weed out terrorism, but in reality they have supported, financed, and actively produced new recruits for Al-Qaeda and similar groups.
The Saudi government continues to be a key supporter of international terrorism. The government encourages men to contribute to terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. The effects of the Saudi regime’s support are obvious in light of the number of Saudi fighters that are operating in these countries.
After eight years of international pressure on the Saudi government to eradicate terror, contrastingly the number of Saudis involved in terrorism has increased to its highest levels. The Saudi officials give speeches and fatwas encouraging Saudis to join and fund the insurgency in Iraq. They also allow Al-Qaeda recruiters and websites to function and recruit countless numbers of young Saudis.
Saudi Arabia remains the prime source of thousands of Al-Qaeda militants and tens of millions of dollars the organization uses to fund its activities. The Taliban has also been receiving its largest funds from Saudi Arabia. However, The United State government has neglected to change Saudi policies and programs that continue to produce waves of militants and suicide bombers. This failure has resulted in the deaths of thousands of people including American soldiers and civilians.
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies
Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies
Source: RAND Corporation
Since 2007, security has improved dramatically in Iraq. The U.S. and Iraqi governments — and most Iraqis — want to see both the U.S. presence there reduced and the Iraqi government and security forces assuming a greater role in providing for public security. The challenge is to effect this drawdown while preserving security and stability in the country and in the region.
In response to tasking from the U.S. Congress, RAND researchers conducted an independent study to examine drawdown schedules, risks, and mitigating strategies. They identified logistical constraints on moving equipment out of the country, assessed trends in insurgent activity and the ability of Iraqi security forces to counter it, and examined the implications for the size of the residual U.S. force and for security in Iraq and the region. This report presents alternative drawdown schedules — one consistent with the Obama administration’s stated intentions and two others, one somewhat slower and another faster — that are responsive to these factors. It also recommends steps that the United States can take to alleviate anticipated constraints, overcome likely resistance, and reduce the potential risks associated with a drawdown.
Source: RAND Corporation
Since 2007, security has improved dramatically in Iraq. The U.S. and Iraqi governments — and most Iraqis — want to see both the U.S. presence there reduced and the Iraqi government and security forces assuming a greater role in providing for public security. The challenge is to effect this drawdown while preserving security and stability in the country and in the region.
In response to tasking from the U.S. Congress, RAND researchers conducted an independent study to examine drawdown schedules, risks, and mitigating strategies. They identified logistical constraints on moving equipment out of the country, assessed trends in insurgent activity and the ability of Iraqi security forces to counter it, and examined the implications for the size of the residual U.S. force and for security in Iraq and the region. This report presents alternative drawdown schedules — one consistent with the Obama administration’s stated intentions and two others, one somewhat slower and another faster — that are responsive to these factors. It also recommends steps that the United States can take to alleviate anticipated constraints, overcome likely resistance, and reduce the potential risks associated with a drawdown.
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
The 2009 Arab Public Opinion Poll: A View from the Middle East
The 2009 Arab Public Opinion Poll: A View from the Middle East
Source: Brookings Institution
On May 19, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted the release of a new 2009 University of Maryland/Zogby International public opinion poll which reveals long-term trends and surprising revelations about perceptions of the United States and President Barack Obama in the Middle East. Shibley Telhami, Saban Center nonresident senior fellow and principal investigator of the poll, and the Anwar Sadat professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, presented his latest polling research and key findings. He was joined for a discussion of the poll results by James Zogby, founder and president of the Arab American Institute and Marc Lynch, associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University.
Source: Brookings Institution
On May 19, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted the release of a new 2009 University of Maryland/Zogby International public opinion poll which reveals long-term trends and surprising revelations about perceptions of the United States and President Barack Obama in the Middle East. Shibley Telhami, Saban Center nonresident senior fellow and principal investigator of the poll, and the Anwar Sadat professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, presented his latest polling research and key findings. He was joined for a discussion of the poll results by James Zogby, founder and president of the Arab American Institute and Marc Lynch, associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University.
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
From Within and Without: Sustainable Security in the Middle East and North Africa
From Within and Without: Sustainable Security in the Middle East and North Africa
Source: Oxford Research Group
As in much of the world, the current security discourse in the Middle East and North Africa is dominated by what might be called the ‘control paradigm’: an approach based on the premise that insecurity can be controlled through military force or balance of power politics and containment, thus maintaining the status quo. The most obvious global example of this approach has been the so-called ‘war on terror’, which essentially aims to ‘keep the lid’ on terrorism and insecurity, without addressing the root causes (an approach that has negatively impacted on the region). Such approaches to national, regional and international security are deeply flawed - particularly if not complemented by diplomatic efforts - and are distracting the world’s politicians from developing realistic and sustainable solutions to the non- traditional threats facing the world.
In contrast, this report explores an alternative approach, that of ’sustainable security’. The central premise of sustainable security is that you cannot successfully control all the consequences of insecurity, but must work to resolve the causes. In other words, ‘fighting the symptoms’ will not work, you must instead ‘cure the disease’. Such a framework must be based on an integrated analysis of security threats and a preventative approach to responses.
Source: Oxford Research Group
As in much of the world, the current security discourse in the Middle East and North Africa is dominated by what might be called the ‘control paradigm’: an approach based on the premise that insecurity can be controlled through military force or balance of power politics and containment, thus maintaining the status quo. The most obvious global example of this approach has been the so-called ‘war on terror’, which essentially aims to ‘keep the lid’ on terrorism and insecurity, without addressing the root causes (an approach that has negatively impacted on the region). Such approaches to national, regional and international security are deeply flawed - particularly if not complemented by diplomatic efforts - and are distracting the world’s politicians from developing realistic and sustainable solutions to the non- traditional threats facing the world.
In contrast, this report explores an alternative approach, that of ’sustainable security’. The central premise of sustainable security is that you cannot successfully control all the consequences of insecurity, but must work to resolve the causes. In other words, ‘fighting the symptoms’ will not work, you must instead ‘cure the disease’. Such a framework must be based on an integrated analysis of security threats and a preventative approach to responses.
Monday, March 23, 2009
U.S. Institute of Peace Report on “Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel” Outlines Framework for a Possible Deal on the Golan Heights
U.S. Institute of Peace Report on “Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel” Outlines Framework for a Possible Deal on the Golan Heights
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
A new report by Frederic C. Hof commissioned by the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, provides groundbreaking ideas on facilitating a Syrian-Israel Peace.
“Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel” comes out at a critical time in the Arab-Israeli peace process as a new U.S. administration is looking for ways to move the process forward despite the recent violence in Gaza. The report also comes out during a period of renewed interest in Syria when many delegations, including one co-sponsored by the United States of Peace, are going to Damascus.
In the report, Fred Hof, who directed the field operations of the Sharm El-Sheikh (Mitchell) Fact-Finding Committee in 2001, lays out a roadmap for how to resolve the thorny issues separating Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights plateau and small tracts in the Jordan River Valley. Hof’s study focuses on creative ways and means to reconcile Syria’s boundary demand with legitimate Israeli concerns. A key element is elaboration on the concept of a Jordan Valley-Golan Heights Environmental Preserve, which attracted attention during earlier peace talks.
The issue has been known to be highly complex but Hof describes his approach as “modest, minimalist, and relatively uncomplicated.” “There are already some two-dozen parks and reserves that have been established by Israel on land that would, in accordance with the boundary under discussion, be returned to Syria,” says Hof. “As a matter of sound environmental stewardship one might hope that Syria would maintain and even expand all of these facilities, which range from Susita Nature Reserve in the south to the Hermon Reserve in the north.
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
A new report by Frederic C. Hof commissioned by the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, provides groundbreaking ideas on facilitating a Syrian-Israel Peace.
“Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel” comes out at a critical time in the Arab-Israeli peace process as a new U.S. administration is looking for ways to move the process forward despite the recent violence in Gaza. The report also comes out during a period of renewed interest in Syria when many delegations, including one co-sponsored by the United States of Peace, are going to Damascus.
In the report, Fred Hof, who directed the field operations of the Sharm El-Sheikh (Mitchell) Fact-Finding Committee in 2001, lays out a roadmap for how to resolve the thorny issues separating Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights plateau and small tracts in the Jordan River Valley. Hof’s study focuses on creative ways and means to reconcile Syria’s boundary demand with legitimate Israeli concerns. A key element is elaboration on the concept of a Jordan Valley-Golan Heights Environmental Preserve, which attracted attention during earlier peace talks.
The issue has been known to be highly complex but Hof describes his approach as “modest, minimalist, and relatively uncomplicated.” “There are already some two-dozen parks and reserves that have been established by Israel on land that would, in accordance with the boundary under discussion, be returned to Syria,” says Hof. “As a matter of sound environmental stewardship one might hope that Syria would maintain and even expand all of these facilities, which range from Susita Nature Reserve in the south to the Hermon Reserve in the north.
Friday, March 20, 2009
Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam
Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam
Source: RAND Corporation
The often tense relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been at the center of many of the major political shifts that have occurred in the Middle East since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. This volume documents a study of how relations between the two powers have unfolded in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine from 2003 through January 2009. Wehrey et al. detail the complex and multidimensional relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran and its implications for regional stability and U.S. interests. In doing so, the authors challenge conventional thinking about Saudi-Iranian relations, arguing, for example, that Sunni-Shi’a distinctions are not the key driver in dealings between the two nations, that the two states have a tendency to engage on areas of common interest, and that the notion of a watertight bloc of Gulf Arab states opposing Iran is increasingly unrealistic. The study concludes with U.S. policy recommendations for leveraging the Saudi-Iranian relationship, particularly in the context of a U.S. drawdown in Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the Iranian nuclear issue.
Source: RAND Corporation
The often tense relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been at the center of many of the major political shifts that have occurred in the Middle East since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. This volume documents a study of how relations between the two powers have unfolded in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine from 2003 through January 2009. Wehrey et al. detail the complex and multidimensional relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran and its implications for regional stability and U.S. interests. In doing so, the authors challenge conventional thinking about Saudi-Iranian relations, arguing, for example, that Sunni-Shi’a distinctions are not the key driver in dealings between the two nations, that the two states have a tendency to engage on areas of common interest, and that the notion of a watertight bloc of Gulf Arab states opposing Iran is increasingly unrealistic. The study concludes with U.S. policy recommendations for leveraging the Saudi-Iranian relationship, particularly in the context of a U.S. drawdown in Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the Iranian nuclear issue.
Monday, January 5, 2009
Iran: Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock
Iran: Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock
Source: Chatham House
The report considers the ways in which the West can most effectively engage with Iran. It both analyses the current situation and makes a series of practical recommendations about next steps for policymakers in the US under the Obama administration, and in the UK and Europe.
The report argues that Iran’s economic and political weaknesses could provide the catalyst for a breakthrough in the nuclear dispute. It finds that Iran’s domestic politics, energy industry and regional power may not be strong enough for it to resist international demands for a serious negotiation over its nuclear programme and that, despite the triumphalist rhetoric of its leadership, the economy remains Iran’s Achilles’ heel.
Source: Chatham House
The report considers the ways in which the West can most effectively engage with Iran. It both analyses the current situation and makes a series of practical recommendations about next steps for policymakers in the US under the Obama administration, and in the UK and Europe.
The report argues that Iran’s economic and political weaknesses could provide the catalyst for a breakthrough in the nuclear dispute. It finds that Iran’s domestic politics, energy industry and regional power may not be strong enough for it to resist international demands for a serious negotiation over its nuclear programme and that, despite the triumphalist rhetoric of its leadership, the economy remains Iran’s Achilles’ heel.
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order
The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
There have been many attempts by the international community to impose order in the Middle East. The reality is that Arab states must themselves overcome divisive ideologies, prioritize common interests, and develop a cooperative political and security architecture if a new regional order is to come to fruition, argues Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
In The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order, Salem identifies patterns and trends in the dynamic history between the countries of the Middle East—through the collapse of Ottoman rule, European mandates, and the post-World War II developments in the region—that help to understand how Arab states, as well as Turkey and Iran, have shaped their policies, particularly after 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The paper introduces a series of country-by-country studies that will examine how key players in the Middle East—namely Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—have responded.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
There have been many attempts by the international community to impose order in the Middle East. The reality is that Arab states must themselves overcome divisive ideologies, prioritize common interests, and develop a cooperative political and security architecture if a new regional order is to come to fruition, argues Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
In The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order, Salem identifies patterns and trends in the dynamic history between the countries of the Middle East—through the collapse of Ottoman rule, European mandates, and the post-World War II developments in the region—that help to understand how Arab states, as well as Turkey and Iran, have shaped their policies, particularly after 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The paper introduces a series of country-by-country studies that will examine how key players in the Middle East—namely Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—have responded.
Monday, July 28, 2008
The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Arab countries are undertaking diplomatic initiatives that clearly contradict U.S. policy, because they no longer trust the U.S. capacity to contend with escalating regional crises. Even Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are no longer willing to follow Washington’s lead on policies toward Iran, Lebanon, or Hamas, concludes a new paper from the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Marina Ottaway and Mohammed Herzallah assess the diplomatic efforts of Arab regimes seeking to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of a strong regime in Iraq and ineffectual U.S. policy in The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Arab countries are undertaking diplomatic initiatives that clearly contradict U.S. policy, because they no longer trust the U.S. capacity to contend with escalating regional crises. Even Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are no longer willing to follow Washington’s lead on policies toward Iran, Lebanon, or Hamas, concludes a new paper from the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Marina Ottaway and Mohammed Herzallah assess the diplomatic efforts of Arab regimes seeking to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of a strong regime in Iraq and ineffectual U.S. policy in The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Monday, June 16, 2008
Mullahs, Money, and Militias: How Iran Exerts Its Influence in the Middle East
Mullahs, Money, and Militias: How Iran Exerts Its Influence in the Middle East
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
To achieve its goals, Iran exerts influence in three major ways: through ties with Shiite clerics, or mullahs, financial aid for humanitarian and political causes, and weapons and training supplied to militant groups. Much of this support pales in comparison with U.S. contributions to American allies and with other resources available to Iran’s partners, although Iran appears to get (literally) more bang for its bucks. Recipients of Iranian largesse, especially the Lebanese group Hezbollah, are not mere proxies and appear to have considerable tactical autonomy and influence on Iranian policies. Many Iraqis, including Shiite groups close to Iran, are trying to hedge their ties with Tehran by maintaining links to the United States. To contain harmful Iranian influence, the United States may have to act on a number of fronts, working to stabilize Iraq and Lebanon and to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict without magnifying its own confrontation with Iran. The U.S. government should consider direct talks with Iran to try to constrain Iran’s motivation to further destabilize the region and should establish contacts, if possible, with some of Iran’s partners to increase U.S. options, knowledge, and flexibility.
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
To achieve its goals, Iran exerts influence in three major ways: through ties with Shiite clerics, or mullahs, financial aid for humanitarian and political causes, and weapons and training supplied to militant groups. Much of this support pales in comparison with U.S. contributions to American allies and with other resources available to Iran’s partners, although Iran appears to get (literally) more bang for its bucks. Recipients of Iranian largesse, especially the Lebanese group Hezbollah, are not mere proxies and appear to have considerable tactical autonomy and influence on Iranian policies. Many Iraqis, including Shiite groups close to Iran, are trying to hedge their ties with Tehran by maintaining links to the United States. To contain harmful Iranian influence, the United States may have to act on a number of fronts, working to stabilize Iraq and Lebanon and to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict without magnifying its own confrontation with Iran. The U.S. government should consider direct talks with Iran to try to constrain Iran’s motivation to further destabilize the region and should establish contacts, if possible, with some of Iran’s partners to increase U.S. options, knowledge, and flexibility.
Monday, June 9, 2008
Energy in Danger: Iran, Oil, and the West
Energy in Danger: Iran, Oil, and the West
Source: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Every day, nearly 40 percent of the world’s internationally traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow channel over which Iran holds distinct military advantages. Given that the global economy is predicted to become even more dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies in the coming decades, Iran’s potentially critical influence on the flow of these supplies must be addressed. How might Tehran exert this influence in the event of a confrontation? And what can the international community do to avoid such scenarios?
In this entry in The Washington Institute’s “Agenda: Iran” series, Gulf expert Simon Henderson analyzes how the United States and its allies can loosen, or even bypass, the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Using detailed maps, he shows how existing and potential pipeline networks could be used as alternative routes for Gulf energy exports. He also discusses various means of pressuring Iran and its trading partners — not just through current financial sanctions, but via new measures that exploit the regime’s vulnerabilities in the energy sector. Such efforts must be accelerated if Washington hopes to keep the strait from becoming a serious clog in the world economy.
Source: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Every day, nearly 40 percent of the world’s internationally traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow channel over which Iran holds distinct military advantages. Given that the global economy is predicted to become even more dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies in the coming decades, Iran’s potentially critical influence on the flow of these supplies must be addressed. How might Tehran exert this influence in the event of a confrontation? And what can the international community do to avoid such scenarios?
In this entry in The Washington Institute’s “Agenda: Iran” series, Gulf expert Simon Henderson analyzes how the United States and its allies can loosen, or even bypass, the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Using detailed maps, he shows how existing and potential pipeline networks could be used as alternative routes for Gulf energy exports. He also discusses various means of pressuring Iran and its trading partners — not just through current financial sanctions, but via new measures that exploit the regime’s vulnerabilities in the energy sector. Such efforts must be accelerated if Washington hopes to keep the strait from becoming a serious clog in the world economy.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
General David H. Petraeus gave this testimony on Iraq before Congress on April 8, 2008. Accompanying the testimony is a separate file of charts.
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
General David H. Petraeus gave this testimony on Iraq before Congress on April 8, 2008. Accompanying the testimony is a separate file of charts.
Monday, March 24, 2008
Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Source: The Brookings Institution
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of violent groups over the years. Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. This support remains strong even today: the U.S. government regularly contends that Iran is tied to an array of radical groups in Iraq.
Yet despite Iran’s very real support for terrorism for more than the last 25 years and its possession of chemical weapons for over 15 years, Tehran has not transferred unconventional systems to terrorists. Iran is likely to continue this restraint and not transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, it is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation.
This article begins by reviewing how Iran has used terrorism in the past and how this has changed over the years. The article then assesses U.S. attempts to press Iran with regard to terrorism and why they have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, the article argues that, while the author believes Iranian terrorism remains a threat, Tehran is not likely to pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists. The article concludes with recommendations for decreasing Iran’s use of terrorism in general and the chances of it transferring chemical or other unconventional weapons to terrorists in particular.
Source: The Brookings Institution
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of violent groups over the years. Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. This support remains strong even today: the U.S. government regularly contends that Iran is tied to an array of radical groups in Iraq.
Yet despite Iran’s very real support for terrorism for more than the last 25 years and its possession of chemical weapons for over 15 years, Tehran has not transferred unconventional systems to terrorists. Iran is likely to continue this restraint and not transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, it is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation.
This article begins by reviewing how Iran has used terrorism in the past and how this has changed over the years. The article then assesses U.S. attempts to press Iran with regard to terrorism and why they have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, the article argues that, while the author believes Iranian terrorism remains a threat, Tehran is not likely to pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists. The article concludes with recommendations for decreasing Iran’s use of terrorism in general and the chances of it transferring chemical or other unconventional weapons to terrorists in particular.
Friday, March 14, 2008
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (March 2008)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, supported by limited but important gains on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts. Violence levels have declined since the last report and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are gradually assuming responsibility for maintain- ing law and order and promoting stability. New strides have been taken in reconciliation at the national, provincial and local levels, and the Iraqi economy is growing. However, recent security gains remain fragile, and sustained progress over the long term will depend on Iraq’s ability to address a complex set of issues associated with key political and economic objectives.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, supported by limited but important gains on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts. Violence levels have declined since the last report and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are gradually assuming responsibility for maintain- ing law and order and promoting stability. New strides have been taken in reconciliation at the national, provincial and local levels, and the Iraqi economy is growing. However, recent security gains remain fragile, and sustained progress over the long term will depend on Iraq’s ability to address a complex set of issues associated with key political and economic objectives.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
The New Middle East
The New Middle East
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Confrontational U.S. policy that tried to create a “New Middle East,” but ignored the realities of the region has instead exacerbated existing conflicts and created new problems, argues a new report from the Carnegie Endowment. To restore its credibility and promote positive transformation, the United States needs to abandon the illusion that it can reshape the region to suit its interests.
In The New Middle East, Carnegie Middle East experts Marina Ottaway, Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, and Paul Salem examine the new realities of the region by focusing on three critical clusters of countries—Iran–Iraq, Lebanon–Syria, Palestine–Israel, and on the three most pressing issues—nuclear proliferation, sectarianism, and the challenge of political reform—to provide a new direction for U.S. policy that engages all regional actors patiently and consistently on major conflicts to develop compromise solutions.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Confrontational U.S. policy that tried to create a “New Middle East,” but ignored the realities of the region has instead exacerbated existing conflicts and created new problems, argues a new report from the Carnegie Endowment. To restore its credibility and promote positive transformation, the United States needs to abandon the illusion that it can reshape the region to suit its interests.
In The New Middle East, Carnegie Middle East experts Marina Ottaway, Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, and Paul Salem examine the new realities of the region by focusing on three critical clusters of countries—Iran–Iraq, Lebanon–Syria, Palestine–Israel, and on the three most pressing issues—nuclear proliferation, sectarianism, and the challenge of political reform—to provide a new direction for U.S. policy that engages all regional actors patiently and consistently on major conflicts to develop compromise solutions.
Monday, November 26, 2007
Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East
Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
The United States needs to undertake a strategic regional net assessment that examines the following issues as it seeks to construct a regional security strategy to protect its interests and mitigate wider threats to international security. That net assessment should include reviewing the role of security guarantees in promoting regional stability, an acknowledgement of the contradictory nature of the inter- and intra state threats and tensions, and the negative impact that the U.S. obsession with force protection is having on its ability to effectively implement strategy on the ground.
Full Paper (PDF; 285 KB)
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
The United States needs to undertake a strategic regional net assessment that examines the following issues as it seeks to construct a regional security strategy to protect its interests and mitigate wider threats to international security. That net assessment should include reviewing the role of security guarantees in promoting regional stability, an acknowledgement of the contradictory nature of the inter- and intra state threats and tensions, and the negative impact that the U.S. obsession with force protection is having on its ability to effectively implement strategy on the ground.
Full Paper (PDF; 285 KB)
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World
Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World
Source: The Brookings Institution
After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance democratic change in the Middle East than the continuation of policies that do not take into account how governance in the Arab world is being transformed. Two openings hold out particular promise:
First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;
Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.
Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies.
Source: The Brookings Institution
After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance democratic change in the Middle East than the continuation of policies that do not take into account how governance in the Arab world is being transformed. Two openings hold out particular promise:
First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;
Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.
Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies.
Wednesday, August 1, 2007
Is The United States Losing Turkey?
Is The United States Losing Turkey?
Source: Hudson Institute
The alliance between the United States and Turkey, which has endured since the 1947 Truman Doctrine and has contributed to the security of both countries, is now in serious trouble. What is worse, neither side is facing up to this reality, let alone taking serious remedial measures, nor even making concerted efforts to understand the new political currents within each other’s societies.
If this neglect continues, the price paid by both sides will be steep. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington and Ankara see the world and define their interests in divergent ways. If allowed to continue, this trend could well undo the alliance. The good news is that there is still time to act, providing senior leaders on both sides move with dispatch. It is urgent that they do so, for despite the end of the Cold War, which provided a clear rationale for their alliance for four decades, Ankara and Washington still need each other, perhaps more so because they now face multiple and unfamiliar threats, not least those posed by terrorism.
The most important source of discord between Turkey and the United States is the war in Iraq. Ankara fears that Iraq will break up as a result of the war and that a separate Kurdish state will arise, creating even greater disorder and stoking separatist sentiment in Turkey’s southeast, and increasing paramilitary and terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist organization, the PKK. Washington, for its part, feels betrayed by the Turkish parliament’s rejection of its request to open a second front from Turkey’s territory against Saddam Hussein’s army in the run-up to the 2003 war. But more fundamentally, the Bush administration is preoccupied by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and seems to have relegated Turkey to the back burner—or so it appears to many Turks.
Source: Hudson Institute
The alliance between the United States and Turkey, which has endured since the 1947 Truman Doctrine and has contributed to the security of both countries, is now in serious trouble. What is worse, neither side is facing up to this reality, let alone taking serious remedial measures, nor even making concerted efforts to understand the new political currents within each other’s societies.
If this neglect continues, the price paid by both sides will be steep. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington and Ankara see the world and define their interests in divergent ways. If allowed to continue, this trend could well undo the alliance. The good news is that there is still time to act, providing senior leaders on both sides move with dispatch. It is urgent that they do so, for despite the end of the Cold War, which provided a clear rationale for their alliance for four decades, Ankara and Washington still need each other, perhaps more so because they now face multiple and unfamiliar threats, not least those posed by terrorism.
The most important source of discord between Turkey and the United States is the war in Iraq. Ankara fears that Iraq will break up as a result of the war and that a separate Kurdish state will arise, creating even greater disorder and stoking separatist sentiment in Turkey’s southeast, and increasing paramilitary and terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist organization, the PKK. Washington, for its part, feels betrayed by the Turkish parliament’s rejection of its request to open a second front from Turkey’s territory against Saddam Hussein’s army in the run-up to the 2003 war. But more fundamentally, the Bush administration is preoccupied by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and seems to have relegated Turkey to the back burner—or so it appears to many Turks.
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