Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture (PDF)

Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture (PDF)

Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (National Intelligence Council)

The United States’ National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) have joined forces to produce this assessment of the long-term prospects for global governance frameworks.

Command and control? Planning for EU military operations

Command and control? Planning for EU military operations
Source: Institute for Security Studies

Summary:This paper assesses the effectiveness of the European Union’s capability for the planning and conduct of military operations. Given the fact that the planning and conduct phases of an operation can never be fully isolated from each other, the paper does include some references to the conduct dimension, i.e. command and control (C2). However, it is with planning issues that this paper is most directly concerned. It argues that the lack of a permanent planning and conduct capability cripples the Union’s planning and C2 performance as well as the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) more broadly. This capability, though, need not adopt the form of a fully-fledged Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The paper explains that the nature and evolution of the Union’s planning and C2 capability is largely the result of compromises between France, Britain and Germany (the Union’s ‘Big Three’) and argues that a coincidence in British-German objectives – the ‘awkward alignment’ – is particularly responsible for the continuing absence of a permanent military planning and C2 capability.

In its policy recommendations, the paper attempts to reconcile the need to address the existing deficiencies in the realms of planning (no flexibility and lack of advance planning capacity) and C2 (the unreliability of the Union’s Communications and Information Systems infrastructure and the lack of situational awareness) with prevailing political caveats – principally, the general resistance to the creation of a fully-fledged and permanent military OHQ. It proposes strengthening the Military Assessment on Planning Branch (currently placed within the EU Military Staff) by setting up a planning skeleton (composed of some 50 officials) devoted to improving the Union’s advance planning performance and increasing flexibility in the Union’s planning process. This skeleton would be inserted within the future Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) structure. Additionally, an ad hoc group of national augmentees (drawn from a wider pool of some 80 to 100 pre-identified augmentees) could join a detachment from the skeleton and plug onto the existing OpsCentre or a national OHQ for operational planning and conduct purposes.

The paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter explains ESDP’s planning cycle and describes the evolution of the Union’s planning and C2 capability. The second chapter proceeds to assess the planning and C2 performance of three military operations; EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR DRC in the Democratic Republic of Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA in Chad and the Central African Republic. The third and last chapter presents the study’s conclusions and offers practical policy recommendations aimed at improving the Union’s planning and conduct capability.

Eurostat regional yearbook 2008

Eurostat regional yearbook 2008

Source: Eurostat

Eurostat regional yearbook 2008 offers a wealth of information on life in the European regions in the 27 Member States of the European Union and this year also in the candidate countries and EFTA countries. The texts are written by specialists in the different statistical domains and are accompanied by statistical maps, figures and tables on each subject. A broad set of regional data are presented on the following themes: population, urban statistics, gross domestic product, household accounts, structural business statistics, labour market, sectoral productivity, labour cost, transport, tourism, science, technology and innovation, health and agriculture. The publication is available in German, English and French.

Backgrounder: Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict

Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Analysis

• Russia has announced a unilateral ceasefire because its operations have achieved their aims.
• Medvedev and Sarkozy have drafted a document that encapsulates all of Russia’s demands in return for a ceasefire—but not a final settlement, which must still be negotiated. Sarkozy is discussing that deal with Saakashvili right now.
• So the situation on the ground now legally is that there are two unilateral ceasefires, although the Georgians claim that Russian forces continue their attacks, and the Russian military has laid the predicate for those and further attacks in public statements today. The Russian military has also made plain that if a formal ceasefire agreement is not reached, then Russian forces will not withdraw from Ossetia or Abkhazia.
• The Russian military has clearly stated that the objective of its operations was to reduce Georgia’s overall military capability so that Georgia could not again conduct an operation similar to the one it launched in South Ossetia, and for that reason has been attacking targets throughout Georgia.
• Russian leaders repeatedly say that they will not deal with Saakashvili.
• The Russian Attorney General has announced that Russian law permits the trial of Saakashvili for crimes under the Russian Federation Criminal Code.
• The Russian Foreign Minister has called for an investigation of Georgian war crimes and the punishment of those ultimately responsible by international tribunals, and has said that Russian citizens victimized by Georgians will be bringing individual actions in appropriate European human rights courts.
• The Russian aim is to force Saakashvili from power, preferably using international legal maneuvers (a la Milosevic), but possibly using Russian law instead or in addition.
• The Russians are maintaining their excessive forces in South Ossetia, and continuing to control Georgia’s airspace and conduct periodic attacks in a flagrant effort to compel an immediate Georgian agreement to their armistice terms, conveyed by Sarkozy.
• Russia will not permit South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to Georgian control, and will move one way or the other to have their independence recognized, and probably soon.

The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey

The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey

As a Muslim-majority country that is also a secular democratic state, a member of NATO, a candidate for membership in the European Union, a long-standing U.S. ally, and the host of Incirlik Air Base (a key hub for logistical support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq), Turkey is pivotal to U.S. and Western security interests in a critical area of the world. It also provides an example of the coexistence of Islam with secular democracy, globalization, and modernity. However, having a ruling party with Islamic roots — the Justice and Development Party (AKP) — within a framework of strict secularism has generated controversy over the boundaries between secularity and religion in the public sphere. This monograph describes the politico-religious landscape in Turkey and the relationship between the state and religion, and it evaluates how the balance between secular and religious forces — and between the Kemalist elites and new emerging social groups — has changed over the past decade. The study also assesses the new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy in the changed Turkish political environment and identifies specific actions the United States may take to advance the U.S. interest in a stable, democratic, and friendly Turkey and, more broadly, in the worldwide dissemination of liberal and pluralistic interpretations of Islam.

Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner

Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner

Source: RAND Corporation

Turkey has long been an important U.S. ally, but especially with the end of the Cold War, the relationship has been changing. Divergences between U.S. and Turkish interests have grown, in part because of Turkey’s relationships with its neighbors and the tension between its Western identity and its Middle Eastern orientation. Further, relations with the European Union have also deteriorated of late. As a result, Ankara has come to feel that it can no longer rely on its traditional allies, and Turkey is likely to be a more difficult and less predictable partner in the future. While Turkey will continue to want good ties to the United States, it is likely to be drawn more heavily into the Middle East by the Kurdish issue and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Consequently, the tension between Turkey’s Western identity and Middle Eastern orientation is likely to grow even more.

The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies

The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.

Nicolas Sarkozy: The Hyperpresident

Nicolas Sarkozy: The Hyperpresident

Source: The Brookings Institution

Sarkozy’s honeymoon, of course, will not last forever. The vested interests who oppose change will resist and try to sabotage his reforms, the government will inevitably make mistakes, and, eventually, the opposition will find its feet (and new leaders). Most important, if recent signs that the French economy is slowing bear out, the government’s popularity—and its abilityto implement its promised reforms—will take a severe hit, as unemployment and budget deficits mount. Even so, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that something significant has happened in France. The French have elected a leader who has promised to break with thirty years of welfare-state stasis at home and conventional risk-averse diplomacy abroad, and whose energy, dynamism and ambition have not been seen since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1 958. Sarkozy’s success in reforming France over the next five years is far from guaranteed. More certain is that this determined hyperprésident is going to try, and that France will never be the same again.

Is The United States Losing Turkey?

Is The United States Losing Turkey?

Source: Hudson Institute

The alliance between the United States and Turkey, which has endured since the 1947 Truman Doctrine and has contributed to the security of both countries, is now in serious trouble. What is worse, neither side is facing up to this reality, let alone taking serious remedial measures, nor even making concerted efforts to understand the new political currents within each other’s societies.

If this neglect continues, the price paid by both sides will be steep. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington and Ankara see the world and define their interests in divergent ways. If allowed to continue, this trend could well undo the alliance. The good news is that there is still time to act, providing senior leaders on both sides move with dispatch. It is urgent that they do so, for despite the end of the Cold War, which provided a clear rationale for their alliance for four decades, Ankara and Washington still need each other, perhaps more so because they now face multiple and unfamiliar threats, not least those posed by terrorism.

The most important source of discord between Turkey and the United States is the war in Iraq. Ankara fears that Iraq will break up as a result of the war and that a separate Kurdish state will arise, creating even greater disorder and stoking separatist sentiment in Turkey’s southeast, and increasing paramilitary and terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist organization, the PKK. Washington, for its part, feels betrayed by the Turkish parliament’s rejection of its request to open a second front from Turkey’s territory against Saddam Hussein’s army in the run-up to the 2003 war. But more fundamentally, the Bush administration is preoccupied by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and seems to have relegated Turkey to the back burner—or so it appears to many Turks.