Russia's Prospects in Asia
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
These three chapters originated in an SSI conference in January 2010 and go to the heart of a question of vital significance for both Asia and Russia, namely what are Russia’s prospects in Asia. The three chapters outline the challenges Russia faces in Asia, the nature of the dynamic and complex Asian security environment, and the extent to which Russia is or is not meeting those challenges.
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Monday, December 13, 2010
Friday, March 27, 2009
Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation
Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Russia, despite claims made for and against its importance, remains, by any objective standard, a key player in world affairs. Russia is an important barometer of trends in world politics, e.g., the course of democratization in the world. Furthermore, Russia, if it were so disposed, could be the abettor and/or supporter of a host of negative trends in the world today. Even so, if U.S. policymakers and analysts see Russia more as a spoiler than as a constructive partner (whether rightly or wrongly), the fact remains that during the Cold War the Soviet Union was an active supporter of threats to world order such as international terrorism, and carried on a global arms race with the West. We negotiated productively with it on issues like arms control and proliferation. Today, no matter how bad Russo-American or East-West relations may be, no such threats are present or immediately discernible on the horizon. But ultimately, given Russia’s power, standing, and nuclear capability, dialogue and cooperation will be resumed at some point in the future. Therefore, an analysis of the prospects for and conditions favoring such cooperation is an urgent and important task that cries out for clarification precisely because current U.S.-Russian relations are so difficult.
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Russia, despite claims made for and against its importance, remains, by any objective standard, a key player in world affairs. Russia is an important barometer of trends in world politics, e.g., the course of democratization in the world. Furthermore, Russia, if it were so disposed, could be the abettor and/or supporter of a host of negative trends in the world today. Even so, if U.S. policymakers and analysts see Russia more as a spoiler than as a constructive partner (whether rightly or wrongly), the fact remains that during the Cold War the Soviet Union was an active supporter of threats to world order such as international terrorism, and carried on a global arms race with the West. We negotiated productively with it on issues like arms control and proliferation. Today, no matter how bad Russo-American or East-West relations may be, no such threats are present or immediately discernible on the horizon. But ultimately, given Russia’s power, standing, and nuclear capability, dialogue and cooperation will be resumed at some point in the future. Therefore, an analysis of the prospects for and conditions favoring such cooperation is an urgent and important task that cries out for clarification precisely because current U.S.-Russian relations are so difficult.
Tuesday, November 4, 2008
Russian–American Security Relations After Georgia
Russian–American Security Relations After Georgia
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
From press release:
The crisis in Georgia bluntly revealed the failure by the United States and Russia to create a closer working relationship after the Cold War. With both countries now in presidential transition, the potential for new misunderstandings and tensions grows even greater.
Established and well-understood treaties and agreements, which have previously inspired at least predictability and confidence in the bilateral relationship, could help establish a new book of rules both countries can embrace, explains Rose Gottemoeller in a new policy brief.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
From press release:
The crisis in Georgia bluntly revealed the failure by the United States and Russia to create a closer working relationship after the Cold War. With both countries now in presidential transition, the potential for new misunderstandings and tensions grows even greater.
Established and well-understood treaties and agreements, which have previously inspired at least predictability and confidence in the bilateral relationship, could help establish a new book of rules both countries can embrace, explains Rose Gottemoeller in a new policy brief.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Backgrounder: Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict
Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict
Source: Institute for the Study of War
Analysis
• Russia has announced a unilateral ceasefire because its operations have achieved their aims.
• Medvedev and Sarkozy have drafted a document that encapsulates all of Russia’s demands in return for a ceasefire—but not a final settlement, which must still be negotiated. Sarkozy is discussing that deal with Saakashvili right now.
• So the situation on the ground now legally is that there are two unilateral ceasefires, although the Georgians claim that Russian forces continue their attacks, and the Russian military has laid the predicate for those and further attacks in public statements today. The Russian military has also made plain that if a formal ceasefire agreement is not reached, then Russian forces will not withdraw from Ossetia or Abkhazia.
• The Russian military has clearly stated that the objective of its operations was to reduce Georgia’s overall military capability so that Georgia could not again conduct an operation similar to the one it launched in South Ossetia, and for that reason has been attacking targets throughout Georgia.
• Russian leaders repeatedly say that they will not deal with Saakashvili.
• The Russian Attorney General has announced that Russian law permits the trial of Saakashvili for crimes under the Russian Federation Criminal Code.
• The Russian Foreign Minister has called for an investigation of Georgian war crimes and the punishment of those ultimately responsible by international tribunals, and has said that Russian citizens victimized by Georgians will be bringing individual actions in appropriate European human rights courts.
• The Russian aim is to force Saakashvili from power, preferably using international legal maneuvers (a la Milosevic), but possibly using Russian law instead or in addition.
• The Russians are maintaining their excessive forces in South Ossetia, and continuing to control Georgia’s airspace and conduct periodic attacks in a flagrant effort to compel an immediate Georgian agreement to their armistice terms, conveyed by Sarkozy.
• Russia will not permit South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to Georgian control, and will move one way or the other to have their independence recognized, and probably soon.
Source: Institute for the Study of War
Analysis
• Russia has announced a unilateral ceasefire because its operations have achieved their aims.
• Medvedev and Sarkozy have drafted a document that encapsulates all of Russia’s demands in return for a ceasefire—but not a final settlement, which must still be negotiated. Sarkozy is discussing that deal with Saakashvili right now.
• So the situation on the ground now legally is that there are two unilateral ceasefires, although the Georgians claim that Russian forces continue their attacks, and the Russian military has laid the predicate for those and further attacks in public statements today. The Russian military has also made plain that if a formal ceasefire agreement is not reached, then Russian forces will not withdraw from Ossetia or Abkhazia.
• The Russian military has clearly stated that the objective of its operations was to reduce Georgia’s overall military capability so that Georgia could not again conduct an operation similar to the one it launched in South Ossetia, and for that reason has been attacking targets throughout Georgia.
• Russian leaders repeatedly say that they will not deal with Saakashvili.
• The Russian Attorney General has announced that Russian law permits the trial of Saakashvili for crimes under the Russian Federation Criminal Code.
• The Russian Foreign Minister has called for an investigation of Georgian war crimes and the punishment of those ultimately responsible by international tribunals, and has said that Russian citizens victimized by Georgians will be bringing individual actions in appropriate European human rights courts.
• The Russian aim is to force Saakashvili from power, preferably using international legal maneuvers (a la Milosevic), but possibly using Russian law instead or in addition.
• The Russians are maintaining their excessive forces in South Ossetia, and continuing to control Georgia’s airspace and conduct periodic attacks in a flagrant effort to compel an immediate Georgian agreement to their armistice terms, conveyed by Sarkozy.
• Russia will not permit South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to Georgian control, and will move one way or the other to have their independence recognized, and probably soon.
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies
The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.
Monday, October 22, 2007
Russian Defence Procurement in 2007
Russian Defence Procurement in 2007
Source: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)
In 2007 Russia’s national defence procurement (NDP) amounted to 302.7 billion rubles (app. $11.6 billion), which marks an increase of 27.9% over 2006. Of this sum, $5.6 billion (47.9%) will be spent on purchases of new equipment, $2.3 billion (19.8%) on repairs and modernization, and $3.7 billion (32.2%) on R&D. Appropriations for purchases, repairs and modernization, and R&D grew by 25.5%, 23.6% and 34.4%, respectively.
NDP-2007 includes purchases of new equipment and the continuation of long-term programs begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter consists mostly of Navy projects, given their high cost and relatively long production cycles, when compared to the equipment of other services. Published data tends to support official statements that mass purchases of serially-produced items are planned, especially with regard to the Navy, though the scale of such purchases remains rather low.
Significant sums (41% of the sum, reserved for purchasing of the new equipment) have also been allocated to repairs and modernization. Given the Defence Ministry’s tradition of procuring new equipment for its strategic nuclear forces, most of funds assigned to repairs and modernization will be devoted to conventional weaponry. In 2007, the strategic forces will acquire 17 land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) - a post-Soviet record, according to published information - finance the construction of three ballistic nuclear missile submarines and acquire new strategic bomber.
Source: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)
In 2007 Russia’s national defence procurement (NDP) amounted to 302.7 billion rubles (app. $11.6 billion), which marks an increase of 27.9% over 2006. Of this sum, $5.6 billion (47.9%) will be spent on purchases of new equipment, $2.3 billion (19.8%) on repairs and modernization, and $3.7 billion (32.2%) on R&D. Appropriations for purchases, repairs and modernization, and R&D grew by 25.5%, 23.6% and 34.4%, respectively.
NDP-2007 includes purchases of new equipment and the continuation of long-term programs begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter consists mostly of Navy projects, given their high cost and relatively long production cycles, when compared to the equipment of other services. Published data tends to support official statements that mass purchases of serially-produced items are planned, especially with regard to the Navy, though the scale of such purchases remains rather low.
Significant sums (41% of the sum, reserved for purchasing of the new equipment) have also been allocated to repairs and modernization. Given the Defence Ministry’s tradition of procuring new equipment for its strategic nuclear forces, most of funds assigned to repairs and modernization will be devoted to conventional weaponry. In 2007, the strategic forces will acquire 17 land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) - a post-Soviet record, according to published information - finance the construction of three ballistic nuclear missile submarines and acquire new strategic bomber.
Friday, June 29, 2007
U.S. - Russian Relations: The Kennebunkport Agenda
U.S. - Russian Relations: The Kennebunkport Agenda
Source: Hudson Institute
From press release:
On the eve of the Bush-Putin summit meeting in Kennebunkport, four members of a Russian-American study group organized by the Hudson Institute said today that the present Russian regime is moving toward “a durable system of anti-Western authoritarian rule” and called on the U.S. to counteract this tendency by demonstrating strict fidelity to democratic principles.
Zeyno Baran, a senior fellow at Hudson, Evgeny Kiselyev, a well known Russian radio and television personality, Richard Pipes, a professor emeritus of Russian history at Harvard, and David Satter, a senior fellow at Hudson and research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford said in the joint statement that “Russia is reverting to patterns of behavior characteristic of the Soviet Union.”
Source: Hudson Institute
From press release:
On the eve of the Bush-Putin summit meeting in Kennebunkport, four members of a Russian-American study group organized by the Hudson Institute said today that the present Russian regime is moving toward “a durable system of anti-Western authoritarian rule” and called on the U.S. to counteract this tendency by demonstrating strict fidelity to democratic principles.
Zeyno Baran, a senior fellow at Hudson, Evgeny Kiselyev, a well known Russian radio and television personality, Richard Pipes, a professor emeritus of Russian history at Harvard, and David Satter, a senior fellow at Hudson and research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford said in the joint statement that “Russia is reverting to patterns of behavior characteristic of the Soviet Union.”
Monday, June 25, 2007
Russia’s Strategic Choices
Russia’s Strategic Choices
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
After decades of economic and political turmoil, Russia today finds itself revived – its economy fueled by high energy prices, its territorial integrity secured, and its international role as a major world power restored. With new found self-confidence, Russia’s recent foreign policy has taken on a combative tone, exemplified by Russian President Vladmir Putin’s speech in Munich—and U.S.-Russian relations have plummeted to their lowest level since the end of the Soviet-era.
In this policy brief, Russia’s Strategic Choices, Dmitri Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that Russia newfound status presents its leaders with a number of fundamental choices that the nation has yet to confront and raises key questions that it must resolve to form a cohesive and strategic foreign policy strategy.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
After decades of economic and political turmoil, Russia today finds itself revived – its economy fueled by high energy prices, its territorial integrity secured, and its international role as a major world power restored. With new found self-confidence, Russia’s recent foreign policy has taken on a combative tone, exemplified by Russian President Vladmir Putin’s speech in Munich—and U.S.-Russian relations have plummeted to their lowest level since the end of the Soviet-era.
In this policy brief, Russia’s Strategic Choices, Dmitri Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that Russia newfound status presents its leaders with a number of fundamental choices that the nation has yet to confront and raises key questions that it must resolve to form a cohesive and strategic foreign policy strategy.
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