Economic Report of the President
Source: Council of Economic Advisors
From Fact Sheet: The Economic Report of the President:
Today, the White House released the Economic Report of the President, an annual report to Congress on the Nation’s economic progress. The report released today reviews the state of the U.S. economy, the outlook for the next several years, and a wide variety of economic issues that underlie many of the Administration’s economic policies.…
The U.S. economy continued to grow for the sixth straight year in 2007, but we are facing a rough patch. Although real GDP growth slowed in the fourth quarter of last year, economic growth is expected to continue in 2008. Most market forecasts suggest a slower pace in the first half of 2008, followed by strengthened growth in the second half of the year.
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
Monday, February 4, 2008
Budget of the United States Government, FY09
Budget of the United States Government, FY09
Issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Budget of the United States Government is a collection of documents that contains the budget message of the President, information about the President’s budget proposals for a given fiscal year, and other budgetary publications that have been issued throughout the fiscal year. Other related and supporting budget publications, such as the Economic Report of the President, are included, which may vary from year to year
Issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Budget of the United States Government is a collection of documents that contains the budget message of the President, information about the President’s budget proposals for a given fiscal year, and other budgetary publications that have been issued throughout the fiscal year. Other related and supporting budget publications, such as the Economic Report of the President, are included, which may vary from year to year
Monday, January 28, 2008
U.S. Key to Building Prosperity and Opportunity in Latin America
U.S. Key to Building Prosperity and Opportunity in Latin America
Source: International Trade Administration (USDoC)
The Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration (ITA) released new data demonstrating the United States’ contribution to prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. In conjunction with the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA), ITA issued fact sheets which highlight the trade, investment and social development provided by the U.S. to countries in the hemisphere from Mexico to Argentina.
Source: International Trade Administration (USDoC)
The Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration (ITA) released new data demonstrating the United States’ contribution to prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. In conjunction with the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA), ITA issued fact sheets which highlight the trade, investment and social development provided by the U.S. to countries in the hemisphere from Mexico to Argentina.
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
The Global “Go-To Think Tanks”: The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the World, 2007
The Global “Go-To Think Tanks”: The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the World, 2007
Source: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Gone are the days when a think tank could operate with the motto “research it, write it and they will find it”. Today, think tanks must be lean, mean, policy machines. This report summarizes the findings of a pilot project to identify some of the leading think tanks in the world, and provides lists of what might be called the “go to think tanks” in every region.
Source: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Gone are the days when a think tank could operate with the motto “research it, write it and they will find it”. Today, think tanks must be lean, mean, policy machines. This report summarizes the findings of a pilot project to identify some of the leading think tanks in the world, and provides lists of what might be called the “go to think tanks” in every region.
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Sustaining the Peace After Civil War
Sustaining the Peace After Civil War
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. For a small subset of nations civil war is a chronic condition: about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts. This book presents an analytical framework that has been used to identify a set of factors that make civil war more or less likely to recur in a nation where a civil war has recently terminated. The outcome of the previous civil war–whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement–as well as the duration and deadliness of the conflict affect the durability of the peace after civil war. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. The book closes by applying these propositions in an analysis of the civil war in Iraq: what can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. For a small subset of nations civil war is a chronic condition: about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts. This book presents an analytical framework that has been used to identify a set of factors that make civil war more or less likely to recur in a nation where a civil war has recently terminated. The outcome of the previous civil war–whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement–as well as the duration and deadliness of the conflict affect the durability of the peace after civil war. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. The book closes by applying these propositions in an analysis of the civil war in Iraq: what can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
Monday, December 17, 2007
From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil
From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil
Source: Oxford Research Group
In one sense, the dangers of the Cold War were obvious, and organisations such as Oxford Research Group were able to point to those dangers as they sought engagement and dialogue. There was always the risk of going over the precipice -a global nuclear war that would set the human community back centuries. Now we are in a more difficult circumstance in that it is more like a slippery slope than a precipice.Moreover, on issues such as climate change there have to be huge changes in policy in the next five to ten years to avoid problems twenty or thirty years hence.That is something that cannot easily be embraced by most political systems and is going to require an immense increase in the engagement of civil society.It will also require intensive dialogue with political, business and military leaders.In respect of the need for such dialogue, at least, little has changed since the Cold War years.
Source: Oxford Research Group
In one sense, the dangers of the Cold War were obvious, and organisations such as Oxford Research Group were able to point to those dangers as they sought engagement and dialogue. There was always the risk of going over the precipice -a global nuclear war that would set the human community back centuries. Now we are in a more difficult circumstance in that it is more like a slippery slope than a precipice.Moreover, on issues such as climate change there have to be huge changes in policy in the next five to ten years to avoid problems twenty or thirty years hence.That is something that cannot easily be embraced by most political systems and is going to require an immense increase in the engagement of civil society.It will also require intensive dialogue with political, business and military leaders.In respect of the need for such dialogue, at least, little has changed since the Cold War years.
Monday, November 26, 2007
Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East
Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
The United States needs to undertake a strategic regional net assessment that examines the following issues as it seeks to construct a regional security strategy to protect its interests and mitigate wider threats to international security. That net assessment should include reviewing the role of security guarantees in promoting regional stability, an acknowledgement of the contradictory nature of the inter- and intra state threats and tensions, and the negative impact that the U.S. obsession with force protection is having on its ability to effectively implement strategy on the ground.
Full Paper (PDF; 285 KB)
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
The United States needs to undertake a strategic regional net assessment that examines the following issues as it seeks to construct a regional security strategy to protect its interests and mitigate wider threats to international security. That net assessment should include reviewing the role of security guarantees in promoting regional stability, an acknowledgement of the contradictory nature of the inter- and intra state threats and tensions, and the negative impact that the U.S. obsession with force protection is having on its ability to effectively implement strategy on the ground.
Full Paper (PDF; 285 KB)
A Dangerous Opportunity: American Defense Policy at a Crossroads
A Dangerous Opportunity: American Defense Policy at a Crossroads
Source: National Security Outlook (American Enterprise Institute)
America’s military policy is in disarray, but not for the reason most people think. For the first time since around 1950, there is no coherent theoretical framework for thinking about how to shape our armed forces for current and future threats. This fact presents both a danger and an opportunity. The danger is that we will either fail to develop one and therefore drift aimlessly at a troubled time, or that we will reach back to some of the tattered remnants of the theories that guided military policy until 2007. But we now have the opportunity for a serious discussion about the shape of the world today and its likely shape tomorrow.
Source: National Security Outlook (American Enterprise Institute)
America’s military policy is in disarray, but not for the reason most people think. For the first time since around 1950, there is no coherent theoretical framework for thinking about how to shape our armed forces for current and future threats. This fact presents both a danger and an opportunity. The danger is that we will either fail to develop one and therefore drift aimlessly at a troubled time, or that we will reach back to some of the tattered remnants of the theories that guided military policy until 2007. But we now have the opportunity for a serious discussion about the shape of the world today and its likely shape tomorrow.
Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisition Reports
Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisition Reports
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DoD) has released details on major defense acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance changes since the June 2007 reporting period. This information is based on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted to the Congress for the September 2007 reporting period.
SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. These reports are prepared annually in conjunction with the President’s budget. Subsequent quarterly exception reports are required only for those programs experiencing unit cost increases of at least 15 percent or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are also submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that are rebaselined at major milestone decisions.
+ SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Dollars in Millions) As Of Date: September 30, 2007 (PDF; 14 KB)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DoD) has released details on major defense acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance changes since the June 2007 reporting period. This information is based on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted to the Congress for the September 2007 reporting period.
SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. These reports are prepared annually in conjunction with the President’s budget. Subsequent quarterly exception reports are required only for those programs experiencing unit cost increases of at least 15 percent or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are also submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that are rebaselined at major milestone decisions.
+ SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Dollars in Millions) As Of Date: September 30, 2007 (PDF; 14 KB)
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
GPO Creates Its First Ever On-Line Guide To Members Of Congress
Guide to House and Senate Members
From the announcement:
The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) creates a one stop website with easy searchable information on all Members of Congress. A simple click will bring the user to a picture and biography of any current member of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. This information previously was available in separate databases, but now can be accessed from one central point. GPO worked closely with the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP), Clerk of the House and Secretary of Senate on the design and usability of this website.
From the announcement:
The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) creates a one stop website with easy searchable information on all Members of Congress. A simple click will bring the user to a picture and biography of any current member of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. This information previously was available in separate databases, but now can be accessed from one central point. GPO worked closely with the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP), Clerk of the House and Secretary of Senate on the design and usability of this website.
Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
Source: RAND Corporation
Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. This report argues that one way to fill those gaps is by building the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies. The report begins by providing a theoretical context for building partner capacity and capabilities. It then discusses seven illustrative train and equip programs (TEPs) to identify specific lessons to inform Army planning and execution of TEPs in the future. It gives insights on the importance of developing and implementing metrics for security cooperation, an essential step in ensuring that Army activities are successful. The report then identifies U.S. Army capability gaps through a review of strategic and operational guidance documents and Army and joint studies. It outlines a five-step process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner armies, which include (1) determining the relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army in specific situations, (2) considering the level of effort required to build the capability in a partner army, (3) identifying capabilities of shared interest to the U.S. Army and the partner army, (4) identifying candidate partner armies based on past participation in U.S.-led operations, and (5) determining existing partner army capabilities. The process aims to help Army planners identify which capabilities are of mutual benefit to the United States and partner nations. The report concludes with specific recommendations for Headquarters, Department of the Army, which should, at a minimum, include adopting this five-step process and focusing its efforts on those capability gaps that best support joint requirements.
Source: RAND Corporation
Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. This report argues that one way to fill those gaps is by building the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies. The report begins by providing a theoretical context for building partner capacity and capabilities. It then discusses seven illustrative train and equip programs (TEPs) to identify specific lessons to inform Army planning and execution of TEPs in the future. It gives insights on the importance of developing and implementing metrics for security cooperation, an essential step in ensuring that Army activities are successful. The report then identifies U.S. Army capability gaps through a review of strategic and operational guidance documents and Army and joint studies. It outlines a five-step process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner armies, which include (1) determining the relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army in specific situations, (2) considering the level of effort required to build the capability in a partner army, (3) identifying capabilities of shared interest to the U.S. Army and the partner army, (4) identifying candidate partner armies based on past participation in U.S.-led operations, and (5) determining existing partner army capabilities. The process aims to help Army planners identify which capabilities are of mutual benefit to the United States and partner nations. The report concludes with specific recommendations for Headquarters, Department of the Army, which should, at a minimum, include adopting this five-step process and focusing its efforts on those capability gaps that best support joint requirements.
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies
The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
Nicolas Sarkozy: The Hyperpresident
Nicolas Sarkozy: The Hyperpresident
Source: The Brookings Institution
Sarkozy’s honeymoon, of course, will not last forever. The vested interests who oppose change will resist and try to sabotage his reforms, the government will inevitably make mistakes, and, eventually, the opposition will find its feet (and new leaders). Most important, if recent signs that the French economy is slowing bear out, the government’s popularity—and its abilityto implement its promised reforms—will take a severe hit, as unemployment and budget deficits mount. Even so, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that something significant has happened in France. The French have elected a leader who has promised to break with thirty years of welfare-state stasis at home and conventional risk-averse diplomacy abroad, and whose energy, dynamism and ambition have not been seen since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1 958. Sarkozy’s success in reforming France over the next five years is far from guaranteed. More certain is that this determined hyperprésident is going to try, and that France will never be the same again.
Source: The Brookings Institution
Sarkozy’s honeymoon, of course, will not last forever. The vested interests who oppose change will resist and try to sabotage his reforms, the government will inevitably make mistakes, and, eventually, the opposition will find its feet (and new leaders). Most important, if recent signs that the French economy is slowing bear out, the government’s popularity—and its abilityto implement its promised reforms—will take a severe hit, as unemployment and budget deficits mount. Even so, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that something significant has happened in France. The French have elected a leader who has promised to break with thirty years of welfare-state stasis at home and conventional risk-averse diplomacy abroad, and whose energy, dynamism and ambition have not been seen since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1 958. Sarkozy’s success in reforming France over the next five years is far from guaranteed. More certain is that this determined hyperprésident is going to try, and that France will never be the same again.
Women and Human Security: The Case of Post Conflict Afghanistan
Women and Human Security: The Case of Post Conflict Afghanistan
Source: WIIS Words (via RAND Corporation)
A study recently conducted by the RAND Corporation looked at the role of women in post-conflict nation-building, with particular focus on Afghanistan. Our findings suggest that a stronger emphasis on the broader concept of human security from the earliest phases of the nation-building effort; a focus on establishing governance on the principles of equity and consistent rule of law from the start; and, as a component of both of these things, women’s earliest inclusion in reconstruction activities are likely to improve the outcomes of post-conflict nation-building.
Source: WIIS Words (via RAND Corporation)
A study recently conducted by the RAND Corporation looked at the role of women in post-conflict nation-building, with particular focus on Afghanistan. Our findings suggest that a stronger emphasis on the broader concept of human security from the earliest phases of the nation-building effort; a focus on establishing governance on the principles of equity and consistent rule of law from the start; and, as a component of both of these things, women’s earliest inclusion in reconstruction activities are likely to improve the outcomes of post-conflict nation-building.
Monday, October 22, 2007
Russian Defence Procurement in 2007
Russian Defence Procurement in 2007
Source: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)
In 2007 Russia’s national defence procurement (NDP) amounted to 302.7 billion rubles (app. $11.6 billion), which marks an increase of 27.9% over 2006. Of this sum, $5.6 billion (47.9%) will be spent on purchases of new equipment, $2.3 billion (19.8%) on repairs and modernization, and $3.7 billion (32.2%) on R&D. Appropriations for purchases, repairs and modernization, and R&D grew by 25.5%, 23.6% and 34.4%, respectively.
NDP-2007 includes purchases of new equipment and the continuation of long-term programs begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter consists mostly of Navy projects, given their high cost and relatively long production cycles, when compared to the equipment of other services. Published data tends to support official statements that mass purchases of serially-produced items are planned, especially with regard to the Navy, though the scale of such purchases remains rather low.
Significant sums (41% of the sum, reserved for purchasing of the new equipment) have also been allocated to repairs and modernization. Given the Defence Ministry’s tradition of procuring new equipment for its strategic nuclear forces, most of funds assigned to repairs and modernization will be devoted to conventional weaponry. In 2007, the strategic forces will acquire 17 land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) - a post-Soviet record, according to published information - finance the construction of three ballistic nuclear missile submarines and acquire new strategic bomber.
Source: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)
In 2007 Russia’s national defence procurement (NDP) amounted to 302.7 billion rubles (app. $11.6 billion), which marks an increase of 27.9% over 2006. Of this sum, $5.6 billion (47.9%) will be spent on purchases of new equipment, $2.3 billion (19.8%) on repairs and modernization, and $3.7 billion (32.2%) on R&D. Appropriations for purchases, repairs and modernization, and R&D grew by 25.5%, 23.6% and 34.4%, respectively.
NDP-2007 includes purchases of new equipment and the continuation of long-term programs begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter consists mostly of Navy projects, given their high cost and relatively long production cycles, when compared to the equipment of other services. Published data tends to support official statements that mass purchases of serially-produced items are planned, especially with regard to the Navy, though the scale of such purchases remains rather low.
Significant sums (41% of the sum, reserved for purchasing of the new equipment) have also been allocated to repairs and modernization. Given the Defence Ministry’s tradition of procuring new equipment for its strategic nuclear forces, most of funds assigned to repairs and modernization will be devoted to conventional weaponry. In 2007, the strategic forces will acquire 17 land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) - a post-Soviet record, according to published information - finance the construction of three ballistic nuclear missile submarines and acquire new strategic bomber.
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World
Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World
Source: The Brookings Institution
After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance democratic change in the Middle East than the continuation of policies that do not take into account how governance in the Arab world is being transformed. Two openings hold out particular promise:
First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;
Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.
Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies.
Source: The Brookings Institution
After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance democratic change in the Middle East than the continuation of policies that do not take into account how governance in the Arab world is being transformed. Two openings hold out particular promise:
First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;
Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.
Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies.
Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations
Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations
Source: RAND Corporation
Understanding how terrorists conduct successful operations is critical to countering them. Terrorist organizations use a wide range of network technologies as they plan and stage attacks. This book explores the role that these communications and computer technologies play and the net effect of their use, the purpose and manner in which the technology is used, the operational actions of terrorists and possible responses of security forces. The authors conclude that future network technologies modestly improve terrorist group efficiency, particularly for their supporting activities, but do not dramatically improve their attack operations. Precluding terrorists from getting the technology they want is impractical; developing direct counters is unlikely to yield high payoffs. Instead, exploiting the technologies and the information such technologies use to enable more direct security force operations are more promising options.
Source: RAND Corporation
Understanding how terrorists conduct successful operations is critical to countering them. Terrorist organizations use a wide range of network technologies as they plan and stage attacks. This book explores the role that these communications and computer technologies play and the net effect of their use, the purpose and manner in which the technology is used, the operational actions of terrorists and possible responses of security forces. The authors conclude that future network technologies modestly improve terrorist group efficiency, particularly for their supporting activities, but do not dramatically improve their attack operations. Precluding terrorists from getting the technology they want is impractical; developing direct counters is unlikely to yield high payoffs. Instead, exploiting the technologies and the information such technologies use to enable more direct security force operations are more promising options.
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept
Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.
Our adversaries will pursue IW strategies, employing a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic capabilities to undermine and erode the influence and will of the United States and our strategic partners. Meeting these challenges and combating this approach will require the concerted efforts of all available instruments of US national power.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.
Our adversaries will pursue IW strategies, employing a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic capabilities to undermine and erode the influence and will of the United States and our strategic partners. Meeting these challenges and combating this approach will require the concerted efforts of all available instruments of US national power.
Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006
Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006
Source: Congressional Research Service (via OpenCRS)
This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales transactions. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers.
Source: Congressional Research Service (via OpenCRS)
This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales transactions. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers.
Friday, September 28, 2007
Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency
Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency
Source: The Brookings Institution
The recent incident involving Blackwater contractors in Iraq has brought to light a series of questions surrounding the legal status, oversight, management, and accountability of the private military force in Iraq. This for-hire force numbers more than 160,000, more than the number of uniformed military personnel in Iraq, and it is a good thing that attention is finally being paid to the consequences of our outsourcing critical tasks to private firms.
An underlying question, though, is largely being ignored: whether it made sense to have civilians in this role in the first place. Regardless of whether the Blackwater contractors were right or wrong in the recent shootings, or even whether there is proper jurisdiction to ensure their accountability or not, there is a crucial problem.
The use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction. If we judge by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can’t win with them, but can’t go to war without them.
Source: The Brookings Institution
The recent incident involving Blackwater contractors in Iraq has brought to light a series of questions surrounding the legal status, oversight, management, and accountability of the private military force in Iraq. This for-hire force numbers more than 160,000, more than the number of uniformed military personnel in Iraq, and it is a good thing that attention is finally being paid to the consequences of our outsourcing critical tasks to private firms.
An underlying question, though, is largely being ignored: whether it made sense to have civilians in this role in the first place. Regardless of whether the Blackwater contractors were right or wrong in the recent shootings, or even whether there is proper jurisdiction to ensure their accountability or not, there is a crucial problem.
The use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction. If we judge by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can’t win with them, but can’t go to war without them.
Thursday, September 20, 2007
Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritization and Sequencing of Policies in Post-Conflict Countries
Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritization and Sequencing of Policies in Post-Conflict Countries
Source: RAND Corporation
One of the most pressing issues of post-conflict reconstruction is how to prioritize and sequence political, social, and economic policies to enable post-conflict countries to sustain peace and reduce the risk of violence reoccurring. This dissertation analyzes three cases of post-conflict reconstruction, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Haiti, surveys expert opinions of 30 academicians and practitioners, identifies major reconstruction policies, outlines the preferred way to prioritize and sequence them, and develops a framework to help policymakers better navigate the complexities and challenges of forming appropriate policies It finds that security and development are interdependent. However, in the early stages of reconstruction, security must be achieved first. After security, important policy priorities should be building effective, accountable, and inclusive governance institutions, institutionalizing democracy at the national and local levels through free, fair, participatory, and inclusive elections. Similarly, economic stabilization is needed to revive market, attract investment, generate employment opportunity, and create an environment for economic recovery and stability.
Source: RAND Corporation
One of the most pressing issues of post-conflict reconstruction is how to prioritize and sequence political, social, and economic policies to enable post-conflict countries to sustain peace and reduce the risk of violence reoccurring. This dissertation analyzes three cases of post-conflict reconstruction, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Haiti, surveys expert opinions of 30 academicians and practitioners, identifies major reconstruction policies, outlines the preferred way to prioritize and sequence them, and develops a framework to help policymakers better navigate the complexities and challenges of forming appropriate policies It finds that security and development are interdependent. However, in the early stages of reconstruction, security must be achieved first. After security, important policy priorities should be building effective, accountable, and inclusive governance institutions, institutionalizing democracy at the national and local levels through free, fair, participatory, and inclusive elections. Similarly, economic stabilization is needed to revive market, attract investment, generate employment opportunity, and create an environment for economic recovery and stability.
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
Is the “Surge” Working? Some New Facts
Is the “Surge” Working? Some New Facts
Source: The Brookings Institution
There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military “Surge” on conditions in Iraq and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound. Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important, but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper applies modern statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge’s impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of the Iraqi state (including civilian casualties); military casualties; and financial markets’ assessment of Iraq’s future. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about future strategy.
Source: The Brookings Institution
There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military “Surge” on conditions in Iraq and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound. Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important, but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper applies modern statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge’s impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of the Iraqi state (including civilian casualties); military casualties; and financial markets’ assessment of Iraq’s future. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about future strategy.
Thursday, September 13, 2007
Potentially Constructive Implications of Disaster in Iraq
Potentially Constructive Implications of Disaster in Iraq
Source: Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland
It now appears likely that the invasion of Iraq will prove to be a seminal event in the evolution of international security generally. Legal order has evidently collapsed throughout the country, and the occupying forces have not been able to control the resulting pattern of predatory violence. The central reason is that the United States forfeited at the outset the critical asset of legitimacy necessary to establish and maintain consensual rule, and its continued presence undermines the indigenous institutions it is attempting to nurture. Similar breakdowns have occurred in other parts of the world, and the consequences have been tolerated over extended periods of time. Because of timing, location and the entanglement of the United States, however, intractable violence in Iraq can be expected to have much stronger global resonance. American forces alone are not likely to be able to master the situation but neither can they be withdrawn without intensifying internal violence and extending it into an already volatile region. The potential consequences of that dilemma are ominous, but for that reason the situation presents opportunity as well as danger. Calamity is sometimes a catalyst for greater wisdom.
Source: Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland
It now appears likely that the invasion of Iraq will prove to be a seminal event in the evolution of international security generally. Legal order has evidently collapsed throughout the country, and the occupying forces have not been able to control the resulting pattern of predatory violence. The central reason is that the United States forfeited at the outset the critical asset of legitimacy necessary to establish and maintain consensual rule, and its continued presence undermines the indigenous institutions it is attempting to nurture. Similar breakdowns have occurred in other parts of the world, and the consequences have been tolerated over extended periods of time. Because of timing, location and the entanglement of the United States, however, intractable violence in Iraq can be expected to have much stronger global resonance. American forces alone are not likely to be able to master the situation but neither can they be withdrawn without intensifying internal violence and extending it into an already volatile region. The potential consequences of that dilemma are ominous, but for that reason the situation presents opportunity as well as danger. Calamity is sometimes a catalyst for greater wisdom.
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq
Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq
Source: The Brookings Institution
Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Congo, Mozambique, Northern Ireland and countless other conflicts have shown that civil wars require a political solution. In civil wars, military forces can keep a lid on the violence to make a political solution possible, but force alone will not translate into sustainable peace. Understanding this reality gives even greater urgency to understanding Iraq as a failed state. U.S. political strategy for Iraq has amounted to setting political benchmarks demanding that a failed Iraqi nation ensnared in a sectarian civil war fix itself. That will not happen, no matter how much pressure we apply. Nor will Iraq rebuild itself under conditions of war. If the United States could not successfully disburse the $18 billion Congress appropriated for reconstruction in 2003, we should not expect a dysfunctional Iraqi state to meet President Bush’s benchmarks on reconstruction, political reconciliation, and security.
If anything has been demonstrated by the Bush administration’s surge strategy, it is that a high concentration of American troops in the relatively small area of Baghdad can nominally improve security in that area. Yet all other indicators on political reconciliation and capacity building give no sense of confidence that nominal security improvements can be extended elsewhere without a comparable American force presence, while also maintaining increased force levels in Baghdad. U.S. domestic politics and the strain on American forces make any such scenario untenable.
Source: The Brookings Institution
Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Congo, Mozambique, Northern Ireland and countless other conflicts have shown that civil wars require a political solution. In civil wars, military forces can keep a lid on the violence to make a political solution possible, but force alone will not translate into sustainable peace. Understanding this reality gives even greater urgency to understanding Iraq as a failed state. U.S. political strategy for Iraq has amounted to setting political benchmarks demanding that a failed Iraqi nation ensnared in a sectarian civil war fix itself. That will not happen, no matter how much pressure we apply. Nor will Iraq rebuild itself under conditions of war. If the United States could not successfully disburse the $18 billion Congress appropriated for reconstruction in 2003, we should not expect a dysfunctional Iraqi state to meet President Bush’s benchmarks on reconstruction, political reconciliation, and security.
If anything has been demonstrated by the Bush administration’s surge strategy, it is that a high concentration of American troops in the relatively small area of Baghdad can nominally improve security in that area. Yet all other indicators on political reconciliation and capacity building give no sense of confidence that nominal security improvements can be extended elsewhere without a comparable American force presence, while also maintaining increased force levels in Baghdad. U.S. domestic politics and the strain on American forces make any such scenario untenable.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Iraq: Time for a Change
Iraq: Time for a Change
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
War in Iraq has lasted more than four years. It has required far greater resources than anticipated. The longer-term goals are still far from realization. The price the United States and Iraq are paying in blood and treasure continues to mount. The time has come to chart a clearer path forward, taking into account the regional and global contexts. Americans want an approach that protects U.S. vital interests and can therefore be supported across a wide range of the political spectrum.
As Washington prepares for a critical debate in Congress this fall on what should be done in Iraq, the United States Institute of Peace convened over the summer a group of experts with many different political affiliations to consider next steps over a three-year time horizon. This USIPeace Briefing, prepared by Daniel Serwer, USIP vice president for peace and stability operations, describes their main conclusions. Areas of serious disagreement are noted. Those participants in the discussions wishing to be identified are listed at the end.
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
War in Iraq has lasted more than four years. It has required far greater resources than anticipated. The longer-term goals are still far from realization. The price the United States and Iraq are paying in blood and treasure continues to mount. The time has come to chart a clearer path forward, taking into account the regional and global contexts. Americans want an approach that protects U.S. vital interests and can therefore be supported across a wide range of the political spectrum.
As Washington prepares for a critical debate in Congress this fall on what should be done in Iraq, the United States Institute of Peace convened over the summer a group of experts with many different political affiliations to consider next steps over a three-year time horizon. This USIPeace Briefing, prepared by Daniel Serwer, USIP vice president for peace and stability operations, describes their main conclusions. Areas of serious disagreement are noted. Those participants in the discussions wishing to be identified are listed at the end.
Thursday, September 6, 2007
U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush
U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Despite sweeping rhetoric about the global spread of democracy, the Bush Administration has significantly damaged U.S. democracy promotion efforts and increased the number of close ties with “friendly tyrants,” concludes a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Security interests, such as the war on terrorism, and U.S. energy needs have led the Bush Administration to maintain friendly, unchallenged relations with more than half of the forty-five “non-free” countries in the world.
Carnegie Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers argues in his new report, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush, that the main U.S. presidential candidates have voiced support for democracy promotion, but not yet outlined plans to put it back on track. Carothers analyzes the Bush Administration’s record on democracy promotion and its effect on democracy worldwide, and then presents fresh ideas about the role democracy promotion can and should play in future U.S. policies.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Despite sweeping rhetoric about the global spread of democracy, the Bush Administration has significantly damaged U.S. democracy promotion efforts and increased the number of close ties with “friendly tyrants,” concludes a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Security interests, such as the war on terrorism, and U.S. energy needs have led the Bush Administration to maintain friendly, unchallenged relations with more than half of the forty-five “non-free” countries in the world.
Carnegie Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers argues in his new report, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush, that the main U.S. presidential candidates have voiced support for democracy promotion, but not yet outlined plans to put it back on track. Carothers analyzes the Bush Administration’s record on democracy promotion and its effect on democracy worldwide, and then presents fresh ideas about the role democracy promotion can and should play in future U.S. policies.
The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq
The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq
Source: Iraqi Security Forces Independent Assessment Commission
ISF Overall Assessment: The Commission finds that in general, the Iraqi Security Forces, military and police, have made uneven progress, but that there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security of Iraq. With regard to external dangers, the evidence indicates that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military threats in the near term.
While severely deficient in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the Army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from the Coalition forces. In any event, the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months.
Note: Redacted for public release.
Source: Iraqi Security Forces Independent Assessment Commission
ISF Overall Assessment: The Commission finds that in general, the Iraqi Security Forces, military and police, have made uneven progress, but that there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security of Iraq. With regard to external dangers, the evidence indicates that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military threats in the near term.
While severely deficient in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the Army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from the Coalition forces. In any event, the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months.
Note: Redacted for public release.
Tuesday, September 4, 2007
Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military
Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
This volume addresses how the leadership of China and the PLA view what size of PLA best meets China’s requirements. Among other things, this analytical process makes important new contributions on the question of PLA transparency, long an issue among PLA watchers. A great deal of emphasis has been put on understanding not only how, but also why a military modernizes itself. Some of the determining factors are national policies and strategy, doctrine, organizational structure, missions, and service cultures. While this list is not exhaustive, it does begin to paint a picture of just how broad and deep military interests run. It is important when we look at the structure and strategy for growth within the Chinese military that we see the world as China sees it. We need to see a world in which the “Taiwan issue” as well as that of North Korea and others are not viewed as short-term concerns, but fit into how China sees itself in a long-term leadership role in the region and in the world.
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
This volume addresses how the leadership of China and the PLA view what size of PLA best meets China’s requirements. Among other things, this analytical process makes important new contributions on the question of PLA transparency, long an issue among PLA watchers. A great deal of emphasis has been put on understanding not only how, but also why a military modernizes itself. Some of the determining factors are national policies and strategy, doctrine, organizational structure, missions, and service cultures. While this list is not exhaustive, it does begin to paint a picture of just how broad and deep military interests run. It is important when we look at the structure and strategy for growth within the Chinese military that we see the world as China sees it. We need to see a world in which the “Taiwan issue” as well as that of North Korea and others are not viewed as short-term concerns, but fit into how China sees itself in a long-term leadership role in the region and in the world.
Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination
Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination
Source: Brookings Institution
Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, millions of Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes. They have fled from coalition military operations, widespread sectarian violence, and fear. Today there are around 2 million Iraqis displaced inside their country and another 2 million displaced beyond the national borders, the bulk of them in Syria and Jordan. As the security situation continues to deteriorate inside Iraq, human displacement escalates to levels unparalleled in the region since the Palestinian displacement nearly sixty years ago.…
This study examines the relationship between security and displacement in Iraq by first exploring implications of the large-scale displacement on Iraq’s domestic security. It then considers the impact of the external displacement on the security of two of Iraq’s neighbors: Jordan and Syria.
Source: Brookings Institution
Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, millions of Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes. They have fled from coalition military operations, widespread sectarian violence, and fear. Today there are around 2 million Iraqis displaced inside their country and another 2 million displaced beyond the national borders, the bulk of them in Syria and Jordan. As the security situation continues to deteriorate inside Iraq, human displacement escalates to levels unparalleled in the region since the Palestinian displacement nearly sixty years ago.…
This study examines the relationship between security and displacement in Iraq by first exploring implications of the large-scale displacement on Iraq’s domestic security. It then considers the impact of the external displacement on the security of two of Iraq’s neighbors: Jordan and Syria.
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