Mullahs, Money, and Militias: How Iran Exerts Its Influence in the Middle East
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
To achieve its goals, Iran exerts influence in three major ways: through ties with Shiite clerics, or mullahs, financial aid for humanitarian and political causes, and weapons and training supplied to militant groups. Much of this support pales in comparison with U.S. contributions to American allies and with other resources available to Iran’s partners, although Iran appears to get (literally) more bang for its bucks. Recipients of Iranian largesse, especially the Lebanese group Hezbollah, are not mere proxies and appear to have considerable tactical autonomy and influence on Iranian policies. Many Iraqis, including Shiite groups close to Iran, are trying to hedge their ties with Tehran by maintaining links to the United States. To contain harmful Iranian influence, the United States may have to act on a number of fronts, working to stabilize Iraq and Lebanon and to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict without magnifying its own confrontation with Iran. The U.S. government should consider direct talks with Iran to try to constrain Iran’s motivation to further destabilize the region and should establish contacts, if possible, with some of Iran’s partners to increase U.S. options, knowledge, and flexibility.
Monday, June 16, 2008
Thursday, June 12, 2008
The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
As a Muslim-majority country that is also a secular democratic state, a member of NATO, a candidate for membership in the European Union, a long-standing U.S. ally, and the host of Incirlik Air Base (a key hub for logistical support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq), Turkey is pivotal to U.S. and Western security interests in a critical area of the world. It also provides an example of the coexistence of Islam with secular democracy, globalization, and modernity. However, having a ruling party with Islamic roots — the Justice and Development Party (AKP) — within a framework of strict secularism has generated controversy over the boundaries between secularity and religion in the public sphere. This monograph describes the politico-religious landscape in Turkey and the relationship between the state and religion, and it evaluates how the balance between secular and religious forces — and between the Kemalist elites and new emerging social groups — has changed over the past decade. The study also assesses the new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy in the changed Turkish political environment and identifies specific actions the United States may take to advance the U.S. interest in a stable, democratic, and friendly Turkey and, more broadly, in the worldwide dissemination of liberal and pluralistic interpretations of Islam.
As a Muslim-majority country that is also a secular democratic state, a member of NATO, a candidate for membership in the European Union, a long-standing U.S. ally, and the host of Incirlik Air Base (a key hub for logistical support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq), Turkey is pivotal to U.S. and Western security interests in a critical area of the world. It also provides an example of the coexistence of Islam with secular democracy, globalization, and modernity. However, having a ruling party with Islamic roots — the Justice and Development Party (AKP) — within a framework of strict secularism has generated controversy over the boundaries between secularity and religion in the public sphere. This monograph describes the politico-religious landscape in Turkey and the relationship between the state and religion, and it evaluates how the balance between secular and religious forces — and between the Kemalist elites and new emerging social groups — has changed over the past decade. The study also assesses the new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy in the changed Turkish political environment and identifies specific actions the United States may take to advance the U.S. interest in a stable, democratic, and friendly Turkey and, more broadly, in the worldwide dissemination of liberal and pluralistic interpretations of Islam.
Monday, June 9, 2008
Energy in Danger: Iran, Oil, and the West
Energy in Danger: Iran, Oil, and the West
Source: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Every day, nearly 40 percent of the world’s internationally traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow channel over which Iran holds distinct military advantages. Given that the global economy is predicted to become even more dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies in the coming decades, Iran’s potentially critical influence on the flow of these supplies must be addressed. How might Tehran exert this influence in the event of a confrontation? And what can the international community do to avoid such scenarios?
In this entry in The Washington Institute’s “Agenda: Iran” series, Gulf expert Simon Henderson analyzes how the United States and its allies can loosen, or even bypass, the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Using detailed maps, he shows how existing and potential pipeline networks could be used as alternative routes for Gulf energy exports. He also discusses various means of pressuring Iran and its trading partners — not just through current financial sanctions, but via new measures that exploit the regime’s vulnerabilities in the energy sector. Such efforts must be accelerated if Washington hopes to keep the strait from becoming a serious clog in the world economy.
Source: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Every day, nearly 40 percent of the world’s internationally traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow channel over which Iran holds distinct military advantages. Given that the global economy is predicted to become even more dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies in the coming decades, Iran’s potentially critical influence on the flow of these supplies must be addressed. How might Tehran exert this influence in the event of a confrontation? And what can the international community do to avoid such scenarios?
In this entry in The Washington Institute’s “Agenda: Iran” series, Gulf expert Simon Henderson analyzes how the United States and its allies can loosen, or even bypass, the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Using detailed maps, he shows how existing and potential pipeline networks could be used as alternative routes for Gulf energy exports. He also discusses various means of pressuring Iran and its trading partners — not just through current financial sanctions, but via new measures that exploit the regime’s vulnerabilities in the energy sector. Such efforts must be accelerated if Washington hopes to keep the strait from becoming a serious clog in the world economy.
The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism
The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism
Source: The Brookings Institution
The U.S. approach toward state sponsorship of terrorism rests on a flawed understanding of the problem and an even more flawed policy response. The U.S. Department of State’s current formal list of state sponsors includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. But Cuba and North Korea have done almost nothing in this area in recent years, and Sudan has changed its ways enough that elsewhere the Bush administration credits Sudan as a “strong partner in the War on Terror.” Of those on the list, only Syria and Iran remain problems, and in both cases their involvement in traditional international terrorism is down considerably from their peaks in the 1980s.
What seems like a brilliant policy success, however, is really an artifact of bad list management, because much of the problem of state sponsorship today involves countries that are not on the list at all. Pakistan has long aided a range of terrorist groups fighting against India in Kashmir and is a major sponsor of Taliban forces fighting the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. Hugo Chavez’s government in Venezuela is a major supporter of the FARC. And several other governments, such as those in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian territories, create problems by deliberately looking the other way when their citizens back terrorist groups.
These new state sponsors are actually more dangerous to the United States and its interests than the remaining traditional state sponsors, because some of them are tied to Sunni jihadist groups such as al-Qa‘ida— currently the greatest terrorist threat facing the United States. The nightmare of a terrorist group acquiring nuclear weapons is far more likely to involve Pakistan than it is Iran or North Korea.
Source: The Brookings Institution
The U.S. approach toward state sponsorship of terrorism rests on a flawed understanding of the problem and an even more flawed policy response. The U.S. Department of State’s current formal list of state sponsors includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. But Cuba and North Korea have done almost nothing in this area in recent years, and Sudan has changed its ways enough that elsewhere the Bush administration credits Sudan as a “strong partner in the War on Terror.” Of those on the list, only Syria and Iran remain problems, and in both cases their involvement in traditional international terrorism is down considerably from their peaks in the 1980s.
What seems like a brilliant policy success, however, is really an artifact of bad list management, because much of the problem of state sponsorship today involves countries that are not on the list at all. Pakistan has long aided a range of terrorist groups fighting against India in Kashmir and is a major sponsor of Taliban forces fighting the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. Hugo Chavez’s government in Venezuela is a major supporter of the FARC. And several other governments, such as those in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian territories, create problems by deliberately looking the other way when their citizens back terrorist groups.
These new state sponsors are actually more dangerous to the United States and its interests than the remaining traditional state sponsors, because some of them are tied to Sunni jihadist groups such as al-Qa‘ida— currently the greatest terrorist threat facing the United States. The nightmare of a terrorist group acquiring nuclear weapons is far more likely to involve Pakistan than it is Iran or North Korea.
Monday, May 5, 2008
Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates: Current Outlook
Direct to Full Text Report
The country’s more than 72,000 grantmaking foundations increased their giving to $42.9 billion in 2007, according to Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates: Current Outlook (2008 Edition), released today by the Foundation Center. This estimated 10 percent gain followed a 7.1 percent increase in 2006.
Contributing to this rise was close to 12 percent growth in foundation assets in 2006 - the first double-digit gain in assets recorded since 1999. The establishment of new foundations, while occurring more slowly than in the late 1990s and early 2000s, also helped to raise the level of foundation giving.
Key estimates reported include:
Independent and family foundations - which represent almost nine out of 10 foundations - raised their giving by 12.7 percent in 2007, up from an increase of 9 percent in 2006.
Corporate foundation giving rose 6.6 percent in 2007, following a modest 2.6 percent increase in 2006.
Community foundations raised their giving by 13.9 percent in 2007, up from 11.8 percent growth in 2006 - the fourth consecutive year of double-digit increases.
Although the current economic downturn makes projections difficult, findings from the Foundation Center’s 2008 “Foundation Giving Forecast Survey” suggest that prospects for growth in giving this year remain modestly positive. Just over half of the survey’s respondents expect to increase their giving in 2008, with the biggest foundations being most likely to expect increased giving. An estimated 9 percent rise in foundation assets in 2007 to a record $670 billion also points to foundations continuing to show positive, albeit more modest, growth in giving in the current year.
The country’s more than 72,000 grantmaking foundations increased their giving to $42.9 billion in 2007, according to Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates: Current Outlook (2008 Edition), released today by the Foundation Center. This estimated 10 percent gain followed a 7.1 percent increase in 2006.
Contributing to this rise was close to 12 percent growth in foundation assets in 2006 - the first double-digit gain in assets recorded since 1999. The establishment of new foundations, while occurring more slowly than in the late 1990s and early 2000s, also helped to raise the level of foundation giving.
Key estimates reported include:
Independent and family foundations - which represent almost nine out of 10 foundations - raised their giving by 12.7 percent in 2007, up from an increase of 9 percent in 2006.
Corporate foundation giving rose 6.6 percent in 2007, following a modest 2.6 percent increase in 2006.
Community foundations raised their giving by 13.9 percent in 2007, up from 11.8 percent growth in 2006 - the fourth consecutive year of double-digit increases.
Although the current economic downturn makes projections difficult, findings from the Foundation Center’s 2008 “Foundation Giving Forecast Survey” suggest that prospects for growth in giving this year remain modestly positive. Just over half of the survey’s respondents expect to increase their giving in 2008, with the biggest foundations being most likely to expect increased giving. An estimated 9 percent rise in foundation assets in 2007 to a record $670 billion also points to foundations continuing to show positive, albeit more modest, growth in giving in the current year.
Thursday, May 1, 2008
Country Reports on Terrorism 2007
Country Reports on Terrorism 2007
Source: U.S. Department of StateFrom Strategic Assessment:
Responding to terrorist groups that have many of the characteristics of a global insurgency – propaganda campaigns, grass roots support, and political and territorial ambitions, though ill-defined, requires a comprehensive response. Successful methods include a focus on protecting and securing the population; and politically and physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted political and development measures, and conducting precise intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal collateral damage.
There were significant achievements in this area this year against terrorist leadership targets, notably the capture or killing of key terrorist leaders in Pakistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, and the Philippines. These efforts buy us time to carry out the most important elements of a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy: disrupting terrorist operations, including their communications, propaganda and subversion efforts; planning and fundraising; and eliminating the conditions that terrorists exploit. We must seek to build trusted networks of governments, multilateral institutions, business organizations, and private citizens and organizations that work collaboratively to defeat the threat from violent extremism.
Working with allies and partners across the world, we have created a less permissive operating environment for terrorists, keeping leaders on the move or in hiding, and degrading their ability to plan and mount attacks. Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Jordan, the Philippines, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many other partners played major roles in this success. Dozens of countries have passed new counterterrorism legislation or strengthened pre-existing laws that provide their law enforcement and judicial authorities with new tools to bring terrorists to justice. The United States has expanded the number of foreign partners for the sharing of terrorist screening information, which is a concrete tool for disrupting and tracking travel of known and suspected terrorists. Saudi Arabia has implemented an effective model rehabilitation program for returning jihadis to turn them against violent extremism and to reintegrate them as peaceful citizens.
Source: U.S. Department of StateFrom Strategic Assessment:
Responding to terrorist groups that have many of the characteristics of a global insurgency – propaganda campaigns, grass roots support, and political and territorial ambitions, though ill-defined, requires a comprehensive response. Successful methods include a focus on protecting and securing the population; and politically and physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted political and development measures, and conducting precise intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal collateral damage.
There were significant achievements in this area this year against terrorist leadership targets, notably the capture or killing of key terrorist leaders in Pakistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, and the Philippines. These efforts buy us time to carry out the most important elements of a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy: disrupting terrorist operations, including their communications, propaganda and subversion efforts; planning and fundraising; and eliminating the conditions that terrorists exploit. We must seek to build trusted networks of governments, multilateral institutions, business organizations, and private citizens and organizations that work collaboratively to defeat the threat from violent extremism.
Working with allies and partners across the world, we have created a less permissive operating environment for terrorists, keeping leaders on the move or in hiding, and degrading their ability to plan and mount attacks. Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Jordan, the Philippines, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many other partners played major roles in this success. Dozens of countries have passed new counterterrorism legislation or strengthened pre-existing laws that provide their law enforcement and judicial authorities with new tools to bring terrorists to justice. The United States has expanded the number of foreign partners for the sharing of terrorist screening information, which is a concrete tool for disrupting and tracking travel of known and suspected terrorists. Saudi Arabia has implemented an effective model rehabilitation program for returning jihadis to turn them against violent extremism and to reintegrate them as peaceful citizens.
SIGIR — Iraq Reconstruction Five Years On
Iraq Reconstruction Five Years On
Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
One-page graphic provides info about provincial status, troop training and security incidents, construction funding and completed projects, oil revenue and exports, security funding.
Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
One-page graphic provides info about provincial status, troop training and security incidents, construction funding and completed projects, oil revenue and exports, security funding.
Thursday, April 24, 2008
Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States
Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States
Source: United States Institute of Peace
A series of crises have strained relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States since the end of the Cold War. Included most prominently among them are the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter plane in 2001. Although none of these crises led to direct military hostilities, they have had an adverse impact on bilateral relations and portend future such crises between the two countries. To determine how best to mitigate such crises in the future, it is important to study these recent crises and identify the positive and negative responses and actions of both governments during them.
Source: United States Institute of Peace
A series of crises have strained relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States since the end of the Cold War. Included most prominently among them are the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter plane in 2001. Although none of these crises led to direct military hostilities, they have had an adverse impact on bilateral relations and portend future such crises between the two countries. To determine how best to mitigate such crises in the future, it is important to study these recent crises and identify the positive and negative responses and actions of both governments during them.
Monday, April 21, 2008
Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner
Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner
Source: RAND Corporation
Turkey has long been an important U.S. ally, but especially with the end of the Cold War, the relationship has been changing. Divergences between U.S. and Turkish interests have grown, in part because of Turkey’s relationships with its neighbors and the tension between its Western identity and its Middle Eastern orientation. Further, relations with the European Union have also deteriorated of late. As a result, Ankara has come to feel that it can no longer rely on its traditional allies, and Turkey is likely to be a more difficult and less predictable partner in the future. While Turkey will continue to want good ties to the United States, it is likely to be drawn more heavily into the Middle East by the Kurdish issue and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Consequently, the tension between Turkey’s Western identity and Middle Eastern orientation is likely to grow even more.
Source: RAND Corporation
Turkey has long been an important U.S. ally, but especially with the end of the Cold War, the relationship has been changing. Divergences between U.S. and Turkish interests have grown, in part because of Turkey’s relationships with its neighbors and the tension between its Western identity and its Middle Eastern orientation. Further, relations with the European Union have also deteriorated of late. As a result, Ankara has come to feel that it can no longer rely on its traditional allies, and Turkey is likely to be a more difficult and less predictable partner in the future. While Turkey will continue to want good ties to the United States, it is likely to be drawn more heavily into the Middle East by the Kurdish issue and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Consequently, the tension between Turkey’s Western identity and Middle Eastern orientation is likely to grow even more.
Friday, April 18, 2008
Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath
Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath
Source: Institute for National Strategic Studies (National Defense University)
To date, the war in Iraq is a classic case of failure to adopt and adapt prudent courses of action that balance ends, ways, and means. After the major combat operation, U.S. policy has been insolvent, with inadequate means for pursuing ambitious ends. It is also a case where the perceived illegitimacy of our policy has led the United States to bear a disproportionate share of the war’s burden. U.S. efforts in Iraq stand in stark contrast to the war in Afghanistan, where, to the surprise of many, U.S. friends and allies have recently taken up a larger share of the burden of that conflict. Afghanistan has become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) war, but the war in Iraq has increasingly become only a U.S. and Iraqi struggle. The British drawdown in Basra in the summer of 2007 heightened the isolation of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.
The goal of this case study is to outline how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decisionmaking process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process. The central finding of this study is that U.S. efforts in Iraq were hobbled by a set of faulty assumptions, a flawed planning effort, and a continuing inability to create security conditions in Iraq that could have fostered meaningful advances in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance. It is arguable whether the Iraqis will develop the wherewithal to create ethnic reconciliation and build a coherent national government. It is clear, however, that the United States and its partners have not done enough to create conditions in which such a development could take place. With the best of intentions, the United States toppled a vile, dangerous regime but has been unable to replace it with a stable entity. Mistakes in the Iraq operation cry out for improvements in the U.S. decisionmaking and policy execution systems. In turn, these improvements will require major changes in the legislative and executive branches, as well as in interagency processes.
Source: Institute for National Strategic Studies (National Defense University)
To date, the war in Iraq is a classic case of failure to adopt and adapt prudent courses of action that balance ends, ways, and means. After the major combat operation, U.S. policy has been insolvent, with inadequate means for pursuing ambitious ends. It is also a case where the perceived illegitimacy of our policy has led the United States to bear a disproportionate share of the war’s burden. U.S. efforts in Iraq stand in stark contrast to the war in Afghanistan, where, to the surprise of many, U.S. friends and allies have recently taken up a larger share of the burden of that conflict. Afghanistan has become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) war, but the war in Iraq has increasingly become only a U.S. and Iraqi struggle. The British drawdown in Basra in the summer of 2007 heightened the isolation of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.
The goal of this case study is to outline how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decisionmaking process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process. The central finding of this study is that U.S. efforts in Iraq were hobbled by a set of faulty assumptions, a flawed planning effort, and a continuing inability to create security conditions in Iraq that could have fostered meaningful advances in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance. It is arguable whether the Iraqis will develop the wherewithal to create ethnic reconciliation and build a coherent national government. It is clear, however, that the United States and its partners have not done enough to create conditions in which such a development could take place. With the best of intentions, the United States toppled a vile, dangerous regime but has been unable to replace it with a stable entity. Mistakes in the Iraq operation cry out for improvements in the U.S. decisionmaking and policy execution systems. In turn, these improvements will require major changes in the legislative and executive branches, as well as in interagency processes.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
General David H. Petraeus gave this testimony on Iraq before Congress on April 8, 2008. Accompanying the testimony is a separate file of charts.
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
General David H. Petraeus gave this testimony on Iraq before Congress on April 8, 2008. Accompanying the testimony is a separate file of charts.
Monday, March 31, 2008
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
Source: Brookings Institution
Since September 11, 2001, the United States and other governments have frequently asserted that threats to international peace and security often come from the world’s weakest states. Such countries can fall prey to and spawn a host of transnational security threats, including terrorism, weapons proliferation, organized crime, infectious disease, environmental degradation, and civil conflicts that spill over borders. Accordingly, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States maintains that weak and failing states “pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states.”
The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World was designed to provide policy-makers and researchers with a credible tool for analyzing and understanding the world’s most vulnerable countries. Co-directed by Brookings Senior Fellow Susan Rice and Center for Global Development Research Fellow Stewart Patrick, the Index ranks and assesses 141 developing nations according to their relative performance in four critical spheres: economic, political, security and social welfare.
Source: Brookings Institution
Since September 11, 2001, the United States and other governments have frequently asserted that threats to international peace and security often come from the world’s weakest states. Such countries can fall prey to and spawn a host of transnational security threats, including terrorism, weapons proliferation, organized crime, infectious disease, environmental degradation, and civil conflicts that spill over borders. Accordingly, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States maintains that weak and failing states “pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states.”
The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World was designed to provide policy-makers and researchers with a credible tool for analyzing and understanding the world’s most vulnerable countries. Co-directed by Brookings Senior Fellow Susan Rice and Center for Global Development Research Fellow Stewart Patrick, the Index ranks and assesses 141 developing nations according to their relative performance in four critical spheres: economic, political, security and social welfare.
Monday, March 24, 2008
Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Source: The Brookings Institution
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of violent groups over the years. Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. This support remains strong even today: the U.S. government regularly contends that Iran is tied to an array of radical groups in Iraq.
Yet despite Iran’s very real support for terrorism for more than the last 25 years and its possession of chemical weapons for over 15 years, Tehran has not transferred unconventional systems to terrorists. Iran is likely to continue this restraint and not transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, it is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation.
This article begins by reviewing how Iran has used terrorism in the past and how this has changed over the years. The article then assesses U.S. attempts to press Iran with regard to terrorism and why they have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, the article argues that, while the author believes Iranian terrorism remains a threat, Tehran is not likely to pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists. The article concludes with recommendations for decreasing Iran’s use of terrorism in general and the chances of it transferring chemical or other unconventional weapons to terrorists in particular.
Source: The Brookings Institution
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of violent groups over the years. Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. This support remains strong even today: the U.S. government regularly contends that Iran is tied to an array of radical groups in Iraq.
Yet despite Iran’s very real support for terrorism for more than the last 25 years and its possession of chemical weapons for over 15 years, Tehran has not transferred unconventional systems to terrorists. Iran is likely to continue this restraint and not transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, it is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation.
This article begins by reviewing how Iran has used terrorism in the past and how this has changed over the years. The article then assesses U.S. attempts to press Iran with regard to terrorism and why they have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, the article argues that, while the author believes Iranian terrorism remains a threat, Tehran is not likely to pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists. The article concludes with recommendations for decreasing Iran’s use of terrorism in general and the chances of it transferring chemical or other unconventional weapons to terrorists in particular.
Friday, March 14, 2008
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (March 2008)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, supported by limited but important gains on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts. Violence levels have declined since the last report and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are gradually assuming responsibility for maintain- ing law and order and promoting stability. New strides have been taken in reconciliation at the national, provincial and local levels, and the Iraqi economy is growing. However, recent security gains remain fragile, and sustained progress over the long term will depend on Iraq’s ability to address a complex set of issues associated with key political and economic objectives.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, supported by limited but important gains on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts. Violence levels have declined since the last report and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are gradually assuming responsibility for maintain- ing law and order and promoting stability. New strides have been taken in reconciliation at the national, provincial and local levels, and the Iraqi economy is growing. However, recent security gains remain fragile, and sustained progress over the long term will depend on Iraq’s ability to address a complex set of issues associated with key political and economic objectives.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment
The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment
Source: Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments
From press release :
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has released a new report, “The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment,” authored by Senior Fellow Robert C. Martinage.
The report concludes that the United States reached a high-water mark in the war on terrorism in 2003. At that time, the Taliban had been overthrown and al Qaeda stripped of its sanctuary in Afghanistan, ten of al Qaeda’s senior-most leaders had been captured or killed, dozens of jihadi cells had been rolled up, and several partner countries had significantly improved their counter- terrorism capabilities.
While the US has had many tactical victories since then, they have been offset by the metastasis of the al Qaeda organization into a global movement, the spread and intensification of Salafi- Jihadi ideology, the resurgence of Iranian influence, and growth in the number and influence of radical Islamist political parties. The threat has, on balance, intensified in Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Europe, according to Martinage.
Source: Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments
From press release :
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has released a new report, “The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment,” authored by Senior Fellow Robert C. Martinage.
The report concludes that the United States reached a high-water mark in the war on terrorism in 2003. At that time, the Taliban had been overthrown and al Qaeda stripped of its sanctuary in Afghanistan, ten of al Qaeda’s senior-most leaders had been captured or killed, dozens of jihadi cells had been rolled up, and several partner countries had significantly improved their counter- terrorism capabilities.
While the US has had many tactical victories since then, they have been offset by the metastasis of the al Qaeda organization into a global movement, the spread and intensification of Salafi- Jihadi ideology, the resurgence of Iranian influence, and growth in the number and influence of radical Islamist political parties. The threat has, on balance, intensified in Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Europe, according to Martinage.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
The New Middle East
The New Middle East
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Confrontational U.S. policy that tried to create a “New Middle East,” but ignored the realities of the region has instead exacerbated existing conflicts and created new problems, argues a new report from the Carnegie Endowment. To restore its credibility and promote positive transformation, the United States needs to abandon the illusion that it can reshape the region to suit its interests.
In The New Middle East, Carnegie Middle East experts Marina Ottaway, Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, and Paul Salem examine the new realities of the region by focusing on three critical clusters of countries—Iran–Iraq, Lebanon–Syria, Palestine–Israel, and on the three most pressing issues—nuclear proliferation, sectarianism, and the challenge of political reform—to provide a new direction for U.S. policy that engages all regional actors patiently and consistently on major conflicts to develop compromise solutions.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Confrontational U.S. policy that tried to create a “New Middle East,” but ignored the realities of the region has instead exacerbated existing conflicts and created new problems, argues a new report from the Carnegie Endowment. To restore its credibility and promote positive transformation, the United States needs to abandon the illusion that it can reshape the region to suit its interests.
In The New Middle East, Carnegie Middle East experts Marina Ottaway, Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, and Paul Salem examine the new realities of the region by focusing on three critical clusters of countries—Iran–Iraq, Lebanon–Syria, Palestine–Israel, and on the three most pressing issues—nuclear proliferation, sectarianism, and the challenge of political reform—to provide a new direction for U.S. policy that engages all regional actors patiently and consistently on major conflicts to develop compromise solutions.
Thursday, February 21, 2008
The U.S. Military Index
The U.S. Military Index
Source: Foreign Policy
In an exclusive new index, Foreign Policy and the Center for a New American Security surveyed more than 3,400 active and retired officers at the highest levels of command about the state of the U.S. military. They see a force stretched dangerously thin and a country ill-prepared for the next fight.
Source: Foreign Policy
In an exclusive new index, Foreign Policy and the Center for a New American Security surveyed more than 3,400 active and retired officers at the highest levels of command about the state of the U.S. military. They see a force stretched dangerously thin and a country ill-prepared for the next fight.
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
Economic Report of the President
Economic Report of the President
Source: Council of Economic Advisors
From Fact Sheet: The Economic Report of the President:
Today, the White House released the Economic Report of the President, an annual report to Congress on the Nation’s economic progress. The report released today reviews the state of the U.S. economy, the outlook for the next several years, and a wide variety of economic issues that underlie many of the Administration’s economic policies.…
The U.S. economy continued to grow for the sixth straight year in 2007, but we are facing a rough patch. Although real GDP growth slowed in the fourth quarter of last year, economic growth is expected to continue in 2008. Most market forecasts suggest a slower pace in the first half of 2008, followed by strengthened growth in the second half of the year.
Source: Council of Economic Advisors
From Fact Sheet: The Economic Report of the President:
Today, the White House released the Economic Report of the President, an annual report to Congress on the Nation’s economic progress. The report released today reviews the state of the U.S. economy, the outlook for the next several years, and a wide variety of economic issues that underlie many of the Administration’s economic policies.…
The U.S. economy continued to grow for the sixth straight year in 2007, but we are facing a rough patch. Although real GDP growth slowed in the fourth quarter of last year, economic growth is expected to continue in 2008. Most market forecasts suggest a slower pace in the first half of 2008, followed by strengthened growth in the second half of the year.
Monday, February 4, 2008
Budget of the United States Government, FY09
Budget of the United States Government, FY09
Issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Budget of the United States Government is a collection of documents that contains the budget message of the President, information about the President’s budget proposals for a given fiscal year, and other budgetary publications that have been issued throughout the fiscal year. Other related and supporting budget publications, such as the Economic Report of the President, are included, which may vary from year to year
Issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Budget of the United States Government is a collection of documents that contains the budget message of the President, information about the President’s budget proposals for a given fiscal year, and other budgetary publications that have been issued throughout the fiscal year. Other related and supporting budget publications, such as the Economic Report of the President, are included, which may vary from year to year
Monday, January 28, 2008
U.S. Key to Building Prosperity and Opportunity in Latin America
U.S. Key to Building Prosperity and Opportunity in Latin America
Source: International Trade Administration (USDoC)
The Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration (ITA) released new data demonstrating the United States’ contribution to prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. In conjunction with the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA), ITA issued fact sheets which highlight the trade, investment and social development provided by the U.S. to countries in the hemisphere from Mexico to Argentina.
Source: International Trade Administration (USDoC)
The Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration (ITA) released new data demonstrating the United States’ contribution to prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. In conjunction with the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA), ITA issued fact sheets which highlight the trade, investment and social development provided by the U.S. to countries in the hemisphere from Mexico to Argentina.
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
The Global “Go-To Think Tanks”: The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the World, 2007
The Global “Go-To Think Tanks”: The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the World, 2007
Source: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Gone are the days when a think tank could operate with the motto “research it, write it and they will find it”. Today, think tanks must be lean, mean, policy machines. This report summarizes the findings of a pilot project to identify some of the leading think tanks in the world, and provides lists of what might be called the “go to think tanks” in every region.
Source: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Gone are the days when a think tank could operate with the motto “research it, write it and they will find it”. Today, think tanks must be lean, mean, policy machines. This report summarizes the findings of a pilot project to identify some of the leading think tanks in the world, and provides lists of what might be called the “go to think tanks” in every region.
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Sustaining the Peace After Civil War
Sustaining the Peace After Civil War
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. For a small subset of nations civil war is a chronic condition: about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts. This book presents an analytical framework that has been used to identify a set of factors that make civil war more or less likely to recur in a nation where a civil war has recently terminated. The outcome of the previous civil war–whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement–as well as the duration and deadliness of the conflict affect the durability of the peace after civil war. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. The book closes by applying these propositions in an analysis of the civil war in Iraq: what can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. For a small subset of nations civil war is a chronic condition: about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts. This book presents an analytical framework that has been used to identify a set of factors that make civil war more or less likely to recur in a nation where a civil war has recently terminated. The outcome of the previous civil war–whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement–as well as the duration and deadliness of the conflict affect the durability of the peace after civil war. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. The book closes by applying these propositions in an analysis of the civil war in Iraq: what can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
Monday, December 17, 2007
From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil
From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil
Source: Oxford Research Group
In one sense, the dangers of the Cold War were obvious, and organisations such as Oxford Research Group were able to point to those dangers as they sought engagement and dialogue. There was always the risk of going over the precipice -a global nuclear war that would set the human community back centuries. Now we are in a more difficult circumstance in that it is more like a slippery slope than a precipice.Moreover, on issues such as climate change there have to be huge changes in policy in the next five to ten years to avoid problems twenty or thirty years hence.That is something that cannot easily be embraced by most political systems and is going to require an immense increase in the engagement of civil society.It will also require intensive dialogue with political, business and military leaders.In respect of the need for such dialogue, at least, little has changed since the Cold War years.
Source: Oxford Research Group
In one sense, the dangers of the Cold War were obvious, and organisations such as Oxford Research Group were able to point to those dangers as they sought engagement and dialogue. There was always the risk of going over the precipice -a global nuclear war that would set the human community back centuries. Now we are in a more difficult circumstance in that it is more like a slippery slope than a precipice.Moreover, on issues such as climate change there have to be huge changes in policy in the next five to ten years to avoid problems twenty or thirty years hence.That is something that cannot easily be embraced by most political systems and is going to require an immense increase in the engagement of civil society.It will also require intensive dialogue with political, business and military leaders.In respect of the need for such dialogue, at least, little has changed since the Cold War years.
Monday, November 26, 2007
Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East
Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
The United States needs to undertake a strategic regional net assessment that examines the following issues as it seeks to construct a regional security strategy to protect its interests and mitigate wider threats to international security. That net assessment should include reviewing the role of security guarantees in promoting regional stability, an acknowledgement of the contradictory nature of the inter- and intra state threats and tensions, and the negative impact that the U.S. obsession with force protection is having on its ability to effectively implement strategy on the ground.
Full Paper (PDF; 285 KB)
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
The United States needs to undertake a strategic regional net assessment that examines the following issues as it seeks to construct a regional security strategy to protect its interests and mitigate wider threats to international security. That net assessment should include reviewing the role of security guarantees in promoting regional stability, an acknowledgement of the contradictory nature of the inter- and intra state threats and tensions, and the negative impact that the U.S. obsession with force protection is having on its ability to effectively implement strategy on the ground.
Full Paper (PDF; 285 KB)
A Dangerous Opportunity: American Defense Policy at a Crossroads
A Dangerous Opportunity: American Defense Policy at a Crossroads
Source: National Security Outlook (American Enterprise Institute)
America’s military policy is in disarray, but not for the reason most people think. For the first time since around 1950, there is no coherent theoretical framework for thinking about how to shape our armed forces for current and future threats. This fact presents both a danger and an opportunity. The danger is that we will either fail to develop one and therefore drift aimlessly at a troubled time, or that we will reach back to some of the tattered remnants of the theories that guided military policy until 2007. But we now have the opportunity for a serious discussion about the shape of the world today and its likely shape tomorrow.
Source: National Security Outlook (American Enterprise Institute)
America’s military policy is in disarray, but not for the reason most people think. For the first time since around 1950, there is no coherent theoretical framework for thinking about how to shape our armed forces for current and future threats. This fact presents both a danger and an opportunity. The danger is that we will either fail to develop one and therefore drift aimlessly at a troubled time, or that we will reach back to some of the tattered remnants of the theories that guided military policy until 2007. But we now have the opportunity for a serious discussion about the shape of the world today and its likely shape tomorrow.
Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisition Reports
Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisition Reports
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DoD) has released details on major defense acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance changes since the June 2007 reporting period. This information is based on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted to the Congress for the September 2007 reporting period.
SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. These reports are prepared annually in conjunction with the President’s budget. Subsequent quarterly exception reports are required only for those programs experiencing unit cost increases of at least 15 percent or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are also submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that are rebaselined at major milestone decisions.
+ SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Dollars in Millions) As Of Date: September 30, 2007 (PDF; 14 KB)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DoD) has released details on major defense acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance changes since the June 2007 reporting period. This information is based on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted to the Congress for the September 2007 reporting period.
SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. These reports are prepared annually in conjunction with the President’s budget. Subsequent quarterly exception reports are required only for those programs experiencing unit cost increases of at least 15 percent or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are also submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that are rebaselined at major milestone decisions.
+ SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Dollars in Millions) As Of Date: September 30, 2007 (PDF; 14 KB)
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
GPO Creates Its First Ever On-Line Guide To Members Of Congress
Guide to House and Senate Members
From the announcement:
The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) creates a one stop website with easy searchable information on all Members of Congress. A simple click will bring the user to a picture and biography of any current member of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. This information previously was available in separate databases, but now can be accessed from one central point. GPO worked closely with the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP), Clerk of the House and Secretary of Senate on the design and usability of this website.
From the announcement:
The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) creates a one stop website with easy searchable information on all Members of Congress. A simple click will bring the user to a picture and biography of any current member of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. This information previously was available in separate databases, but now can be accessed from one central point. GPO worked closely with the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP), Clerk of the House and Secretary of Senate on the design and usability of this website.
Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
Source: RAND Corporation
Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. This report argues that one way to fill those gaps is by building the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies. The report begins by providing a theoretical context for building partner capacity and capabilities. It then discusses seven illustrative train and equip programs (TEPs) to identify specific lessons to inform Army planning and execution of TEPs in the future. It gives insights on the importance of developing and implementing metrics for security cooperation, an essential step in ensuring that Army activities are successful. The report then identifies U.S. Army capability gaps through a review of strategic and operational guidance documents and Army and joint studies. It outlines a five-step process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner armies, which include (1) determining the relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army in specific situations, (2) considering the level of effort required to build the capability in a partner army, (3) identifying capabilities of shared interest to the U.S. Army and the partner army, (4) identifying candidate partner armies based on past participation in U.S.-led operations, and (5) determining existing partner army capabilities. The process aims to help Army planners identify which capabilities are of mutual benefit to the United States and partner nations. The report concludes with specific recommendations for Headquarters, Department of the Army, which should, at a minimum, include adopting this five-step process and focusing its efforts on those capability gaps that best support joint requirements.
Source: RAND Corporation
Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. This report argues that one way to fill those gaps is by building the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies. The report begins by providing a theoretical context for building partner capacity and capabilities. It then discusses seven illustrative train and equip programs (TEPs) to identify specific lessons to inform Army planning and execution of TEPs in the future. It gives insights on the importance of developing and implementing metrics for security cooperation, an essential step in ensuring that Army activities are successful. The report then identifies U.S. Army capability gaps through a review of strategic and operational guidance documents and Army and joint studies. It outlines a five-step process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner armies, which include (1) determining the relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army in specific situations, (2) considering the level of effort required to build the capability in a partner army, (3) identifying capabilities of shared interest to the U.S. Army and the partner army, (4) identifying candidate partner armies based on past participation in U.S.-led operations, and (5) determining existing partner army capabilities. The process aims to help Army planners identify which capabilities are of mutual benefit to the United States and partner nations. The report concludes with specific recommendations for Headquarters, Department of the Army, which should, at a minimum, include adopting this five-step process and focusing its efforts on those capability gaps that best support joint requirements.
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies
The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.
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