From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil

From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil

Source: Oxford Research Group

In one sense, the dangers of the Cold War were obvious, and organisations such as Oxford Research Group were able to point to those dangers as they sought engagement and dialogue. There was always the risk of going over the precipice -a global nuclear war that would set the human community back centuries. Now we are in a more difficult circumstance in that it is more like a slippery slope than a precipice.Moreover, on issues such as climate change there have to be huge changes in policy in the next five to ten years to avoid problems twenty or thirty years hence.That is something that cannot easily be embraced by most political systems and is going to require an immense increase in the engagement of civil society.It will also require intensive dialogue with political, business and military leaders.In respect of the need for such dialogue, at least, little has changed since the Cold War years.

Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East

Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

The United States needs to undertake a strategic regional net assessment that examines the following issues as it seeks to construct a regional security strategy to protect its interests and mitigate wider threats to international security. That net assessment should include reviewing the role of security guarantees in promoting regional stability, an acknowledgement of the contradictory nature of the inter- and intra state threats and tensions, and the negative impact that the U.S. obsession with force protection is having on its ability to effectively implement strategy on the ground.

Full Paper (PDF; 285 KB)

A Dangerous Opportunity: American Defense Policy at a Crossroads

A Dangerous Opportunity: American Defense Policy at a Crossroads

Source: National Security Outlook (American Enterprise Institute)

America’s military policy is in disarray, but not for the reason most people think. For the first time since around 1950, there is no coherent theoretical framework for thinking about how to shape our armed forces for current and future threats. This fact presents both a danger and an opportunity. The danger is that we will either fail to develop one and therefore drift aimlessly at a troubled time, or that we will reach back to some of the tattered remnants of the theories that guided military policy until 2007. But we now have the opportunity for a serious discussion about the shape of the world today and its likely shape tomorrow.

Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisition Reports

Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisition Reports

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DoD) has released details on major defense acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance changes since the June 2007 reporting period. This information is based on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted to the Congress for the September 2007 reporting period.

SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. These reports are prepared annually in conjunction with the President’s budget. Subsequent quarterly exception reports are required only for those programs experiencing unit cost increases of at least 15 percent or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are also submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that are rebaselined at major milestone decisions.

+ SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Dollars in Millions) As Of Date: September 30, 2007 (PDF; 14 KB)

GPO Creates Its First Ever On-Line Guide To Members Of Congress

Guide to House and Senate Members

From the announcement:

The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) creates a one stop website with easy searchable information on all Members of Congress. A simple click will bring the user to a picture and biography of any current member of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. This information previously was available in separate databases, but now can be accessed from one central point. GPO worked closely with the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP), Clerk of the House and Secretary of Senate on the design and usability of this website.

Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations

Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations

Source: RAND Corporation

Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. This report argues that one way to fill those gaps is by building the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies. The report begins by providing a theoretical context for building partner capacity and capabilities. It then discusses seven illustrative train and equip programs (TEPs) to identify specific lessons to inform Army planning and execution of TEPs in the future. It gives insights on the importance of developing and implementing metrics for security cooperation, an essential step in ensuring that Army activities are successful. The report then identifies U.S. Army capability gaps through a review of strategic and operational guidance documents and Army and joint studies. It outlines a five-step process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner armies, which include (1) determining the relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army in specific situations, (2) considering the level of effort required to build the capability in a partner army, (3) identifying capabilities of shared interest to the U.S. Army and the partner army, (4) identifying candidate partner armies based on past participation in U.S.-led operations, and (5) determining existing partner army capabilities. The process aims to help Army planners identify which capabilities are of mutual benefit to the United States and partner nations. The report concludes with specific recommendations for Headquarters, Department of the Army, which should, at a minimum, include adopting this five-step process and focusing its efforts on those capability gaps that best support joint requirements.

The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies

The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.

Nicolas Sarkozy: The Hyperpresident

Nicolas Sarkozy: The Hyperpresident

Source: The Brookings Institution

Sarkozy’s honeymoon, of course, will not last forever. The vested interests who oppose change will resist and try to sabotage his reforms, the government will inevitably make mistakes, and, eventually, the opposition will find its feet (and new leaders). Most important, if recent signs that the French economy is slowing bear out, the government’s popularity—and its abilityto implement its promised reforms—will take a severe hit, as unemployment and budget deficits mount. Even so, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that something significant has happened in France. The French have elected a leader who has promised to break with thirty years of welfare-state stasis at home and conventional risk-averse diplomacy abroad, and whose energy, dynamism and ambition have not been seen since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1 958. Sarkozy’s success in reforming France over the next five years is far from guaranteed. More certain is that this determined hyperprésident is going to try, and that France will never be the same again.

Women and Human Security: The Case of Post Conflict Afghanistan

Women and Human Security: The Case of Post Conflict Afghanistan

Source: WIIS Words (via RAND Corporation)

A study recently conducted by the RAND Corporation looked at the role of women in post-conflict nation-building, with particular focus on Afghanistan. Our findings suggest that a stronger emphasis on the broader concept of human security from the earliest phases of the nation-building effort; a focus on establishing governance on the principles of equity and consistent rule of law from the start; and, as a component of both of these things, women’s earliest inclusion in reconstruction activities are likely to improve the outcomes of post-conflict nation-building.

Russian Defence Procurement in 2007

Russian Defence Procurement in 2007

Source: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)

In 2007 Russia’s national defence procurement (NDP) amounted to 302.7 billion rubles (app. $11.6 billion), which marks an increase of 27.9% over 2006. Of this sum, $5.6 billion (47.9%) will be spent on purchases of new equipment, $2.3 billion (19.8%) on repairs and modernization, and $3.7 billion (32.2%) on R&D. Appropriations for purchases, repairs and modernization, and R&D grew by 25.5%, 23.6% and 34.4%, respectively.

NDP-2007 includes purchases of new equipment and the continuation of long-term programs begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter consists mostly of Navy projects, given their high cost and relatively long production cycles, when compared to the equipment of other services. Published data tends to support official statements that mass purchases of serially-produced items are planned, especially with regard to the Navy, though the scale of such purchases remains rather low.

Significant sums (41% of the sum, reserved for purchasing of the new equipment) have also been allocated to repairs and modernization. Given the Defence Ministry’s tradition of procuring new equipment for its strategic nuclear forces, most of funds assigned to repairs and modernization will be devoted to conventional weaponry. In 2007, the strategic forces will acquire 17 land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) - a post-Soviet record, according to published information - finance the construction of three ballistic nuclear missile submarines and acquire new strategic bomber.

Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World

Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World

Source: The Brookings Institution

After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance democratic change in the Middle East than the continuation of policies that do not take into account how governance in the Arab world is being transformed. Two openings hold out particular promise:

First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;

Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.

Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies.

Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations

Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations

Source: RAND Corporation

Understanding how terrorists conduct successful operations is critical to countering them. Terrorist organizations use a wide range of network technologies as they plan and stage attacks. This book explores the role that these communications and computer technologies play and the net effect of their use, the purpose and manner in which the technology is used, the operational actions of terrorists and possible responses of security forces. The authors conclude that future network technologies modestly improve terrorist group efficiency, particularly for their supporting activities, but do not dramatically improve their attack operations. Precluding terrorists from getting the technology they want is impractical; developing direct counters is unlikely to yield high payoffs. Instead, exploiting the technologies and the information such technologies use to enable more direct security force operations are more promising options.

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.

Our adversaries will pursue IW strategies, employing a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic capabilities to undermine and erode the influence and will of the United States and our strategic partners. Meeting these challenges and combating this approach will require the concerted efforts of all available instruments of US national power.

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006

Source: Congressional Research Service (via OpenCRS)

This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales transactions. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers.

Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency

Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency

Source: The Brookings Institution

The recent incident involving Blackwater contractors in Iraq has brought to light a series of questions surrounding the legal status, oversight, management, and accountability of the private military force in Iraq. This for-hire force numbers more than 160,000, more than the number of uniformed military personnel in Iraq, and it is a good thing that attention is finally being paid to the consequences of our outsourcing critical tasks to private firms.

An underlying question, though, is largely being ignored: whether it made sense to have civilians in this role in the first place. Regardless of whether the Blackwater contractors were right or wrong in the recent shootings, or even whether there is proper jurisdiction to ensure their accountability or not, there is a crucial problem.

The use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction. If we judge by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can’t win with them, but can’t go to war without them.

Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritization and Sequencing of Policies in Post-Conflict Countries

Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritization and Sequencing of Policies in Post-Conflict Countries

Source: RAND Corporation

One of the most pressing issues of post-conflict reconstruction is how to prioritize and sequence political, social, and economic policies to enable post-conflict countries to sustain peace and reduce the risk of violence reoccurring. This dissertation analyzes three cases of post-conflict reconstruction, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Haiti, surveys expert opinions of 30 academicians and practitioners, identifies major reconstruction policies, outlines the preferred way to prioritize and sequence them, and develops a framework to help policymakers better navigate the complexities and challenges of forming appropriate policies It finds that security and development are interdependent. However, in the early stages of reconstruction, security must be achieved first. After security, important policy priorities should be building effective, accountable, and inclusive governance institutions, institutionalizing democracy at the national and local levels through free, fair, participatory, and inclusive elections. Similarly, economic stabilization is needed to revive market, attract investment, generate employment opportunity, and create an environment for economic recovery and stability.

Is the “Surge” Working? Some New Facts

Is the “Surge” Working? Some New Facts

Source: The Brookings Institution

There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military “Surge” on conditions in Iraq and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound. Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important, but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper applies modern statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge’s impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of the Iraqi state (including civilian casualties); military casualties; and financial markets’ assessment of Iraq’s future. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about future strategy.

Potentially Constructive Implications of Disaster in Iraq

Potentially Constructive Implications of Disaster in Iraq

Source: Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland

It now appears likely that the invasion of Iraq will prove to be a seminal event in the evolution of international security generally. Legal order has evidently collapsed throughout the country, and the occupying forces have not been able to control the resulting pattern of predatory violence. The central reason is that the United States forfeited at the outset the critical asset of legitimacy necessary to establish and maintain consensual rule, and its continued presence undermines the indigenous institutions it is attempting to nurture. Similar breakdowns have occurred in other parts of the world, and the consequences have been tolerated over extended periods of time. Because of timing, location and the entanglement of the United States, however, intractable violence in Iraq can be expected to have much stronger global resonance. American forces alone are not likely to be able to master the situation but neither can they be withdrawn without intensifying internal violence and extending it into an already volatile region. The potential consequences of that dilemma are ominous, but for that reason the situation presents opportunity as well as danger. Calamity is sometimes a catalyst for greater wisdom.

Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq

Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq

Source: The Brookings Institution

Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Congo, Mozambique, Northern Ireland and countless other conflicts have shown that civil wars require a political solution. In civil wars, military forces can keep a lid on the violence to make a political solution possible, but force alone will not translate into sustainable peace. Understanding this reality gives even greater urgency to understanding Iraq as a failed state. U.S. political strategy for Iraq has amounted to setting political benchmarks demanding that a failed Iraqi nation ensnared in a sectarian civil war fix itself. That will not happen, no matter how much pressure we apply. Nor will Iraq rebuild itself under conditions of war. If the United States could not successfully disburse the $18 billion Congress appropriated for reconstruction in 2003, we should not expect a dysfunctional Iraqi state to meet President Bush’s benchmarks on reconstruction, political reconciliation, and security.

If anything has been demonstrated by the Bush administration’s surge strategy, it is that a high concentration of American troops in the relatively small area of Baghdad can nominally improve security in that area. Yet all other indicators on political reconciliation and capacity building give no sense of confidence that nominal security improvements can be extended elsewhere without a comparable American force presence, while also maintaining increased force levels in Baghdad. U.S. domestic politics and the strain on American forces make any such scenario untenable.

Iraq: Time for a Change

Iraq: Time for a Change

Source: U.S. Institute of Peace

War in Iraq has lasted more than four years. It has required far greater resources than anticipated. The longer-term goals are still far from realization. The price the United States and Iraq are paying in blood and treasure continues to mount. The time has come to chart a clearer path forward, taking into account the regional and global contexts. Americans want an approach that protects U.S. vital interests and can therefore be supported across a wide range of the political spectrum.

As Washington prepares for a critical debate in Congress this fall on what should be done in Iraq, the United States Institute of Peace convened over the summer a group of experts with many different political affiliations to consider next steps over a three-year time horizon. This USIPeace Briefing, prepared by Daniel Serwer, USIP vice president for peace and stability operations, describes their main conclusions. Areas of serious disagreement are noted. Those participants in the discussions wishing to be identified are listed at the end.

U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush

U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Despite sweeping rhetoric about the global spread of democracy, the Bush Administration has significantly damaged U.S. democracy promotion efforts and increased the number of close ties with “friendly tyrants,” concludes a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Security interests, such as the war on terrorism, and U.S. energy needs have led the Bush Administration to maintain friendly, unchallenged relations with more than half of the forty-five “non-free” countries in the world.

Carnegie Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers argues in his new report, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush, that the main U.S. presidential candidates have voiced support for democracy promotion, but not yet outlined plans to put it back on track. Carothers analyzes the Bush Administration’s record on democracy promotion and its effect on democracy worldwide, and then presents fresh ideas about the role democracy promotion can and should play in future U.S. policies.

The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq

The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq

Source: Iraqi Security Forces Independent Assessment Commission

ISF Overall Assessment: The Commission finds that in general, the Iraqi Security Forces, military and police, have made uneven progress, but that there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security of Iraq. With regard to external dangers, the evidence indicates that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military threats in the near term.
While severely deficient in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the Army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from the Coalition forces. In any event, the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months.

Note: Redacted for public release.

Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military

Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

This volume addresses how the leadership of China and the PLA view what size of PLA best meets China’s requirements. Among other things, this analytical process makes important new contributions on the question of PLA transparency, long an issue among PLA watchers. A great deal of emphasis has been put on understanding not only how, but also why a military modernizes itself. Some of the determining factors are national policies and strategy, doctrine, organizational structure, missions, and service cultures. While this list is not exhaustive, it does begin to paint a picture of just how broad and deep military interests run. It is important when we look at the structure and strategy for growth within the Chinese military that we see the world as China sees it. We need to see a world in which the “Taiwan issue” as well as that of North Korea and others are not viewed as short-term concerns, but fit into how China sees itself in a long-term leadership role in the region and in the world.

Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination

Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination

Source: Brookings Institution

Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, millions of Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes. They have fled from coalition military operations, widespread sectarian violence, and fear. Today there are around 2 million Iraqis displaced inside their country and another 2 million displaced beyond the national borders, the bulk of them in Syria and Jordan. As the security situation continues to deteriorate inside Iraq, human displacement escalates to levels unparalleled in the region since the Palestinian displacement nearly sixty years ago.…

This study examines the relationship between security and displacement in Iraq by first exploring implications of the large-scale displacement on Iraq’s domestic security. It then considers the impact of the external displacement on the security of two of Iraq’s neighbors: Jordan and Syria.

Foreign Relations of the United States

Foreign Relations of the United States

The Foreign Relations of the United States series is the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions that have been declassified and edited for publication. The series is produced by the State Department's Office of the Historian and printed volumes are available from the Government Printing Office.

FRUS begins with the administration of Abraham Lincoln in 1861. There are two cumulative indexes covering 1861-1899 and 1900-1918. The organization of FRUS is generally chronological, but the dates of the volumes do not necessarily reflect the dates of documentary history. For example, the volumes for 1900-1918 do not include the records dealing with World War I or the Russian Revolution. Each volume has a subject and author index. There is also typically a table of sources and abbreviations at the beginning of each volume.

Many volumes published since 1960 are available online on the State Department website that is maintained by the University of Illinois at Chicago. A full description of Foreign Relations of the United States, including a listing of the online FRUS volumes, is available from the Office of the Historian website.

Latin America’s New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez

Latin America’s New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

In 2005, Dr. Manwaring wrote a monograph entitled Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare. It came at a time when the United States and Venezuela were accelerating a verbal sparing match regarding which country was destabilizing Latin America more. President Chavez shows no sign of standing down; he slowly and deliberately centralizes his power in Venezuela, and carefully and adroitly articulates his Bolivarian dream (the idea of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. economic and political imperialism). Yet, most North Americans dismiss Chavez as a “nut case,” or—even if he is a threat to the security and stability of the Hemisphere—the possibilities of that threat coming to fruition are too far into the future to worry about. Dr. Manwaring’s intent is to explain in greater depth what President Chavez is doing and how he is doing it.

First, he explains that Hugo Chavez’s threat is straightforward, and that it is being translated into a consistent, subtle, ambiguous, and ambitious struggle for power that is beginning to insinuate itself into political life in much of the Western Hemisphere. Second, he shows how President Chavez is encouraging his Venezuelan and other followers to pursue a confrontational, populist, and nationalistic agenda that will be achieved only by (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state—and other Latin American states—to that of “direct” (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroying North American hegemony throughout all of Latin America by conducting an irregular Fourth-Generation War “Super Insurgency”; and, (3) country-by-country, building a great new Bolivarian state out of a phased Program for the Liberation of Latin America.

The Terrorism Index

The Terrorism Index

Source: Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress

Surveying more than 100 of America’s top foreign-policy experts—Republicans and Democrats alike—the Foreign Policy/Center for American Progress Terrorism Index is the only comprehensive, nonpartisan effort to mine the highest echelons of the nation’s foreign-policy establishment for its assessment of how the United States is fighting the war on terror. First released in July 2006, and again last February, the index attempts to draw definitive conclusions about the war’s priorities, policies, and progress. Its participants include people who have served as secretary of state, national security advisor, senior White House aides, top commanders in the U.S. military, seasoned intelligence professionals, and distinguished academics. Eighty percent of the experts have served in the U.S. government—including more than half in the Executive Branch, 32 percent in the military, and 21 percent in the intelligence community.

National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability but Political Reconciliation Elusive

National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive

Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (via Think Progress)

Driven largely by the accelerating pace of tribal engagement and the increasing tempo of Coalition operations, developments in Iraq are unfolding more rapidly and with greater complexity today than when we completed our January NIE. Regional variations in security and political circumstances are great and becoming increasingly more distinct–for example, intra-Shia violence in southern Iraq is very different from patterns of violence elsewhere. The intelligence assessments contained in this NIE largely focus on only a short period of the Iraqi conflict–the last six months–and in circumscribed areas–primarily the central provinces, which contain the center of gravity for Iraq’s security prospects and in which we have a greater Coalition presence and therefore more information. The unfolding pace and scope of security and political realities in Iraq, combined with our necessarily limited focus of analysis, contain risks: our uncertainties are greater, and our future projections subject to greater chances of error. These issues, combined with the challenges of acquiring accurate data on trends in violence and continued gaps in our information about levels of violence and political trends in areas of Iraq without a substantial Coalition presence and where Intelligence Community collectors have difficulty operating, heighten our caution. Nonetheless, we stand by these judgments as our best collective assessment of security and political conditions in Iraq today and as likely to unfold during the next six to 12 months.

Iraq Trip Report

Iraq Trip Report

Source: Brookings Institution

From July 17-25 we travelled extensively in central, western and northern Iraq. The trip was sponsored by the Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF-I) command and so afforded unparalleled access to U.S. and Iraqi military personnel. We spoke at length with the four principal American division commands in those sectors, as well as nearly half of the brigade commanders and their staffs, as well as several battalion and even company commanders. We also met with senior U.S. personnel from the Detainee Forces command, and from the training command known as MNSTCI, as well as a number of Iraqi police and army officers. Similarly, MNF-I saw to it that we were able to meet with key civilian personnel in a variety of PRTs/EPRTs, the U.S. Ambassador, the President’s Special Envoy, the CIA station, the US AID mission, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq. Both through our own contacts and those of the military, we also were able to meet with a number of the seniormost members of the current Iraqi government (including President Talabani, Vice President ‘Abd al-Mahdi, Foreign Minister Zebari, Deputy Prime Minister Salih, and National Security Adviser ar-Rubaie).

An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security

An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

Theater strategy and theater security cooperation are two of the most important tools available in attaining national security. They offer an effective means for geographic Combatant Commanders to engage other countries, deter aggression, or resolve crises. However, there is little current, concise, and comprehensive guidance on how they are planned and implemented. This paper explains what theater strategy is, its basis, how it is formulated, and how it is executed with emphasis on theater security cooperation. The author illustrates the role in national affairs of theater strategy and security cooperation through examples from a case study leading up to and during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.