Iraq - U.S. Policy Documents
Source: Military Education Research Library Network (MERLN)
A central repository of publicly available U.S. policy documents. Includes documents from the White House, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, Other Policy Sources. Searchable.
Monday, July 23, 2007
Thursday, July 19, 2007
Military: 2007 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)
U.S. Military: 2007 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)
Edited by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, II.
Source: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
The Key Strategic Issues List gives researchers, whether military professionals or civilian scholars, a ready reference of those issues of particular interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. Its focus is strategic, rather than operational or tactical. Every year, the KSIL helps guide research efforts to the mutual benefit of the defense community and individual researchers.
Edited by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, II.
Source: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
The Key Strategic Issues List gives researchers, whether military professionals or civilian scholars, a ready reference of those issues of particular interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. Its focus is strategic, rather than operational or tactical. Every year, the KSIL helps guide research efforts to the mutual benefit of the defense community and individual researchers.
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
U.S.-China Relations After Resolution of Taiwan’s Status
U.S.-China Relations After Resolution of Taiwan’s Status
Source: RAND Corporation
Although the question of Taiwan’s status is unlikely to be resolved soon, considering the various possible outcomes and how they might affect U.S.–China relations is useful. A total of ten distinct trajectories for the resolution of the cross-strait relationship can be identified, with greatly varying implications for U.S.-China relations. Unsurprisingly, the impact of peaceful outcomes, including continued peaceful irresolution, is both more predictable and generally better for relations between Washington and Beijing. If China uses force against Taiwan, however, subsequent U.S.–China relations could fall anywhere from close cooperation to hostile cold war. Both how the Taiwan issue is resolved and the nature of subsequent U.S.–China relations will largely be determined by the nature of China’s government: a democratic, or, at least, highly pragmatic Chinese government is more likely to achieve a peaceful resolution; a government still controlled by the Chinese Communist Party is less likely to do so. As China’s military capabilities grow, it will become increasingly difficult but also increasingly more important to prevent Beijing from using force to bring about unification.
Source: RAND Corporation
Although the question of Taiwan’s status is unlikely to be resolved soon, considering the various possible outcomes and how they might affect U.S.–China relations is useful. A total of ten distinct trajectories for the resolution of the cross-strait relationship can be identified, with greatly varying implications for U.S.-China relations. Unsurprisingly, the impact of peaceful outcomes, including continued peaceful irresolution, is both more predictable and generally better for relations between Washington and Beijing. If China uses force against Taiwan, however, subsequent U.S.–China relations could fall anywhere from close cooperation to hostile cold war. Both how the Taiwan issue is resolved and the nature of subsequent U.S.–China relations will largely be determined by the nature of China’s government: a democratic, or, at least, highly pragmatic Chinese government is more likely to achieve a peaceful resolution; a government still controlled by the Chinese Communist Party is less likely to do so. As China’s military capabilities grow, it will become increasingly difficult but also increasingly more important to prevent Beijing from using force to bring about unification.
National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland
National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland
Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al- Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.
We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11. These measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11.
* We are concerned, however, that this level of international cooperation may wane as 9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge.
Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.
* As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat environment.
Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al- Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.
We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11. These measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11.
* We are concerned, however, that this level of international cooperation may wane as 9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge.
Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.
* As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat environment.
Friday, July 13, 2007
The End of Democratic Solidarity in the Americas?
The End of Democratic Solidarity in the Americas?
Source: Latin American Outlook, American Enterprise Institute
Not long ago, the governments of the Americas recognized the value of working together to consolidate the historic, promising trend toward democracy. Now, with democracy being dismantled in several nations and being assailed by authoritarian Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez Frías, Latin American countries seem to have abandoned the fraternal ideal of inter-American solidarity. The United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) can both do more to salvage the regional commitment to democracy, but unless Latin American and Caribbean governments are willing to stand together to defend their principles, the end of democratic solidarity is in sight.
Source: Latin American Outlook, American Enterprise Institute
Not long ago, the governments of the Americas recognized the value of working together to consolidate the historic, promising trend toward democracy. Now, with democracy being dismantled in several nations and being assailed by authoritarian Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez Frías, Latin American countries seem to have abandoned the fraternal ideal of inter-American solidarity. The United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) can both do more to salvage the regional commitment to democracy, but unless Latin American and Caribbean governments are willing to stand together to defend their principles, the end of democratic solidarity is in sight.
Thursday, July 12, 2007
Released Today — Iraq: Initial Benchmark Assessment Report
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report
Source: The White House
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the “Act”). It includes an assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. This is the first of two reports to be submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander of United States Central Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.
Source: The White House
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the “Act”). It includes an assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. This is the first of two reports to be submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander of United States Central Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.
Wednesday, July 11, 2007
Iraq Four Years after the U.S.-Led Invasion: Assessing the Crisis and Searching for a Way Forward
Iraq Four Years after the U.S.-Led Invasion: Assessing the Crisis and Searching for a Way Forward
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
As the U.S. “surge” in Iraq enters its sixth month, a new Carnegie Policy Outlook reflects on the full history of the Iraq war and examines the viability of the current strategy.
The invasion and occupation of Iraq constituted the greatest nation-building challenge the United States has faced since World War II. As has become painfully clear, however, the realities of Iraq proved far more challenging than military planners had expected. Wars and sanctions only served to exacerbate stresses and tensions inherent under Saddam Hussein—there were no social forces to act as agents of change and no regional environment supportive of such change. The announcement of the surge in January 2007 revealed a sober recognition of how far U.S. strategy was removed from hard realities.
While this new U.S. strategy may have seemed plausible, it suffers from the same flawed assumptions and challenges that have plagued the entire war. The resolution of the Iraqi crisis can only come about through the construction of an inclusive, pluralistic, and federal polity with broad participation and strong political and security institutions. The Iraqi government must wean itself from U.S. military support, reinforce its own institutional and law-enforcement capacities, and take seriously the need for inclusive representational and decision-making institutions.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
As the U.S. “surge” in Iraq enters its sixth month, a new Carnegie Policy Outlook reflects on the full history of the Iraq war and examines the viability of the current strategy.
The invasion and occupation of Iraq constituted the greatest nation-building challenge the United States has faced since World War II. As has become painfully clear, however, the realities of Iraq proved far more challenging than military planners had expected. Wars and sanctions only served to exacerbate stresses and tensions inherent under Saddam Hussein—there were no social forces to act as agents of change and no regional environment supportive of such change. The announcement of the surge in January 2007 revealed a sober recognition of how far U.S. strategy was removed from hard realities.
While this new U.S. strategy may have seemed plausible, it suffers from the same flawed assumptions and challenges that have plagued the entire war. The resolution of the Iraqi crisis can only come about through the construction of an inclusive, pluralistic, and federal polity with broad participation and strong political and security institutions. The Iraqi government must wean itself from U.S. military support, reinforce its own institutional and law-enforcement capacities, and take seriously the need for inclusive representational and decision-making institutions.
Tuesday, July 10, 2007
Opportunity ‘08: Homeland Security
Opportunity ‘08: Homeland Security
Source: The Brookings Institution
“Homeland security”—both the term and the policy—were effectively born amid the crisis of September 11, 2001. The policy started with a simple purpose: to prevent further terrorist attacks on American soil. It once made sense to take measures that responded to the circumstances of that attack and reassured a nervous public. But more than five years into the apparently endless war on terrorism, homeland security should evolve from a set of emergency policies into a permanent field of important government policy that, like any other, must justify its allocation of taxpayer funds through solid analysis.
Source: The Brookings Institution
“Homeland security”—both the term and the policy—were effectively born amid the crisis of September 11, 2001. The policy started with a simple purpose: to prevent further terrorist attacks on American soil. It once made sense to take measures that responded to the circumstances of that attack and reassured a nervous public. But more than five years into the apparently endless war on terrorism, homeland security should evolve from a set of emergency policies into a permanent field of important government policy that, like any other, must justify its allocation of taxpayer funds through solid analysis.
America and the Use of Force: Sources of Legitimacy
America and the Use of Force: Sources of Legitimacy
Source: The Brookings Institution
Many American and foreign observers believe that the painful and so far unsuccessful intervention in Iraq will make the United States more reluctant to go to war in the future. Three powerful factors, however, suggest that, to the contrary, the United States may resort to military action more, not less, often in the future. The character of US foreign policy, manifested over two centuries, is that of a nation willing to use force with relative frequency on behalf of both principles and tangible interests and generally believing in the justness and appropriateness of military action in international affairs. The distribution of power in the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union—not very different today, despite the rise of powers such as China and India—invites military intervention by a dominant military power unchecked by the deterrent power of any nation or grouping of nations with roughly equal strength. Finally, the contemporary international system presents an array of circumstances in which the use of force will be seen as both necessary and proper. Indeed, the number of such challenges—be they to curb proliferation, counter terrorists, curtail gross human rights violations, or counter some other threat requiring military action—is likely to increase, not decrease, in the years ahead.
Source: The Brookings Institution
Many American and foreign observers believe that the painful and so far unsuccessful intervention in Iraq will make the United States more reluctant to go to war in the future. Three powerful factors, however, suggest that, to the contrary, the United States may resort to military action more, not less, often in the future. The character of US foreign policy, manifested over two centuries, is that of a nation willing to use force with relative frequency on behalf of both principles and tangible interests and generally believing in the justness and appropriateness of military action in international affairs. The distribution of power in the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union—not very different today, despite the rise of powers such as China and India—invites military intervention by a dominant military power unchecked by the deterrent power of any nation or grouping of nations with roughly equal strength. Finally, the contemporary international system presents an array of circumstances in which the use of force will be seen as both necessary and proper. Indeed, the number of such challenges—be they to curb proliferation, counter terrorists, curtail gross human rights violations, or counter some other threat requiring military action—is likely to increase, not decrease, in the years ahead.
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