Nicolas Sarkozy: The Hyperpresident
Source: The Brookings Institution
Sarkozy’s honeymoon, of course, will not last forever. The vested interests who oppose change will resist and try to sabotage his reforms, the government will inevitably make mistakes, and, eventually, the opposition will find its feet (and new leaders). Most important, if recent signs that the French economy is slowing bear out, the government’s popularity—and its abilityto implement its promised reforms—will take a severe hit, as unemployment and budget deficits mount. Even so, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that something significant has happened in France. The French have elected a leader who has promised to break with thirty years of welfare-state stasis at home and conventional risk-averse diplomacy abroad, and whose energy, dynamism and ambition have not been seen since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1 958. Sarkozy’s success in reforming France over the next five years is far from guaranteed. More certain is that this determined hyperprésident is going to try, and that France will never be the same again.
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
Women and Human Security: The Case of Post Conflict Afghanistan
Women and Human Security: The Case of Post Conflict Afghanistan
Source: WIIS Words (via RAND Corporation)
A study recently conducted by the RAND Corporation looked at the role of women in post-conflict nation-building, with particular focus on Afghanistan. Our findings suggest that a stronger emphasis on the broader concept of human security from the earliest phases of the nation-building effort; a focus on establishing governance on the principles of equity and consistent rule of law from the start; and, as a component of both of these things, women’s earliest inclusion in reconstruction activities are likely to improve the outcomes of post-conflict nation-building.
Source: WIIS Words (via RAND Corporation)
A study recently conducted by the RAND Corporation looked at the role of women in post-conflict nation-building, with particular focus on Afghanistan. Our findings suggest that a stronger emphasis on the broader concept of human security from the earliest phases of the nation-building effort; a focus on establishing governance on the principles of equity and consistent rule of law from the start; and, as a component of both of these things, women’s earliest inclusion in reconstruction activities are likely to improve the outcomes of post-conflict nation-building.
Monday, October 22, 2007
Russian Defence Procurement in 2007
Russian Defence Procurement in 2007
Source: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)
In 2007 Russia’s national defence procurement (NDP) amounted to 302.7 billion rubles (app. $11.6 billion), which marks an increase of 27.9% over 2006. Of this sum, $5.6 billion (47.9%) will be spent on purchases of new equipment, $2.3 billion (19.8%) on repairs and modernization, and $3.7 billion (32.2%) on R&D. Appropriations for purchases, repairs and modernization, and R&D grew by 25.5%, 23.6% and 34.4%, respectively.
NDP-2007 includes purchases of new equipment and the continuation of long-term programs begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter consists mostly of Navy projects, given their high cost and relatively long production cycles, when compared to the equipment of other services. Published data tends to support official statements that mass purchases of serially-produced items are planned, especially with regard to the Navy, though the scale of such purchases remains rather low.
Significant sums (41% of the sum, reserved for purchasing of the new equipment) have also been allocated to repairs and modernization. Given the Defence Ministry’s tradition of procuring new equipment for its strategic nuclear forces, most of funds assigned to repairs and modernization will be devoted to conventional weaponry. In 2007, the strategic forces will acquire 17 land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) - a post-Soviet record, according to published information - finance the construction of three ballistic nuclear missile submarines and acquire new strategic bomber.
Source: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)
In 2007 Russia’s national defence procurement (NDP) amounted to 302.7 billion rubles (app. $11.6 billion), which marks an increase of 27.9% over 2006. Of this sum, $5.6 billion (47.9%) will be spent on purchases of new equipment, $2.3 billion (19.8%) on repairs and modernization, and $3.7 billion (32.2%) on R&D. Appropriations for purchases, repairs and modernization, and R&D grew by 25.5%, 23.6% and 34.4%, respectively.
NDP-2007 includes purchases of new equipment and the continuation of long-term programs begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter consists mostly of Navy projects, given their high cost and relatively long production cycles, when compared to the equipment of other services. Published data tends to support official statements that mass purchases of serially-produced items are planned, especially with regard to the Navy, though the scale of such purchases remains rather low.
Significant sums (41% of the sum, reserved for purchasing of the new equipment) have also been allocated to repairs and modernization. Given the Defence Ministry’s tradition of procuring new equipment for its strategic nuclear forces, most of funds assigned to repairs and modernization will be devoted to conventional weaponry. In 2007, the strategic forces will acquire 17 land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) - a post-Soviet record, according to published information - finance the construction of three ballistic nuclear missile submarines and acquire new strategic bomber.
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World
Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World
Source: The Brookings Institution
After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance democratic change in the Middle East than the continuation of policies that do not take into account how governance in the Arab world is being transformed. Two openings hold out particular promise:
First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;
Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.
Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies.
Source: The Brookings Institution
After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance democratic change in the Middle East than the continuation of policies that do not take into account how governance in the Arab world is being transformed. Two openings hold out particular promise:
First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;
Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.
Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies.
Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations
Network Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations
Source: RAND Corporation
Understanding how terrorists conduct successful operations is critical to countering them. Terrorist organizations use a wide range of network technologies as they plan and stage attacks. This book explores the role that these communications and computer technologies play and the net effect of their use, the purpose and manner in which the technology is used, the operational actions of terrorists and possible responses of security forces. The authors conclude that future network technologies modestly improve terrorist group efficiency, particularly for their supporting activities, but do not dramatically improve their attack operations. Precluding terrorists from getting the technology they want is impractical; developing direct counters is unlikely to yield high payoffs. Instead, exploiting the technologies and the information such technologies use to enable more direct security force operations are more promising options.
Source: RAND Corporation
Understanding how terrorists conduct successful operations is critical to countering them. Terrorist organizations use a wide range of network technologies as they plan and stage attacks. This book explores the role that these communications and computer technologies play and the net effect of their use, the purpose and manner in which the technology is used, the operational actions of terrorists and possible responses of security forces. The authors conclude that future network technologies modestly improve terrorist group efficiency, particularly for their supporting activities, but do not dramatically improve their attack operations. Precluding terrorists from getting the technology they want is impractical; developing direct counters is unlikely to yield high payoffs. Instead, exploiting the technologies and the information such technologies use to enable more direct security force operations are more promising options.
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept
Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.
Our adversaries will pursue IW strategies, employing a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic capabilities to undermine and erode the influence and will of the United States and our strategic partners. Meeting these challenges and combating this approach will require the concerted efforts of all available instruments of US national power.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.
Our adversaries will pursue IW strategies, employing a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic capabilities to undermine and erode the influence and will of the United States and our strategic partners. Meeting these challenges and combating this approach will require the concerted efforts of all available instruments of US national power.
Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006
Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006
Source: Congressional Research Service (via OpenCRS)
This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales transactions. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers.
Source: Congressional Research Service (via OpenCRS)
This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales transactions. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers.
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