Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict
Source: Institute for the Study of War
Analysis
• Russia has announced a unilateral ceasefire because its operations have achieved their aims.
• Medvedev and Sarkozy have drafted a document that encapsulates all of Russia’s demands in return for a ceasefire—but not a final settlement, which must still be negotiated. Sarkozy is discussing that deal with Saakashvili right now.
• So the situation on the ground now legally is that there are two unilateral ceasefires, although the Georgians claim that Russian forces continue their attacks, and the Russian military has laid the predicate for those and further attacks in public statements today. The Russian military has also made plain that if a formal ceasefire agreement is not reached, then Russian forces will not withdraw from Ossetia or Abkhazia.
• The Russian military has clearly stated that the objective of its operations was to reduce Georgia’s overall military capability so that Georgia could not again conduct an operation similar to the one it launched in South Ossetia, and for that reason has been attacking targets throughout Georgia.
• Russian leaders repeatedly say that they will not deal with Saakashvili.
• The Russian Attorney General has announced that Russian law permits the trial of Saakashvili for crimes under the Russian Federation Criminal Code.
• The Russian Foreign Minister has called for an investigation of Georgian war crimes and the punishment of those ultimately responsible by international tribunals, and has said that Russian citizens victimized by Georgians will be bringing individual actions in appropriate European human rights courts.
• The Russian aim is to force Saakashvili from power, preferably using international legal maneuvers (a la Milosevic), but possibly using Russian law instead or in addition.
• The Russians are maintaining their excessive forces in South Ossetia, and continuing to control Georgia’s airspace and conduct periodic attacks in a flagrant effort to compel an immediate Georgian agreement to their armistice terms, conveyed by Sarkozy.
• Russia will not permit South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to Georgian control, and will move one way or the other to have their independence recognized, and probably soon.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order
The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
There have been many attempts by the international community to impose order in the Middle East. The reality is that Arab states must themselves overcome divisive ideologies, prioritize common interests, and develop a cooperative political and security architecture if a new regional order is to come to fruition, argues Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
In The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order, Salem identifies patterns and trends in the dynamic history between the countries of the Middle East—through the collapse of Ottoman rule, European mandates, and the post-World War II developments in the region—that help to understand how Arab states, as well as Turkey and Iran, have shaped their policies, particularly after 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The paper introduces a series of country-by-country studies that will examine how key players in the Middle East—namely Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—have responded.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
There have been many attempts by the international community to impose order in the Middle East. The reality is that Arab states must themselves overcome divisive ideologies, prioritize common interests, and develop a cooperative political and security architecture if a new regional order is to come to fruition, argues Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
In The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order, Salem identifies patterns and trends in the dynamic history between the countries of the Middle East—through the collapse of Ottoman rule, European mandates, and the post-World War II developments in the region—that help to understand how Arab states, as well as Turkey and Iran, have shaped their policies, particularly after 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The paper introduces a series of country-by-country studies that will examine how key players in the Middle East—namely Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—have responded.
Friday, August 1, 2008
A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare, Where They Strike
A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare, Where They Strike
Source: National Institute of Justice
Although we know a great deal about the behavior of traditional criminals, little information has been available about terrorists. Are they much different from conventional criminals, who tend to commit their crimes close to home? Research has shown that traditional criminals are spontaneous, but terrorists seem to go to great lengths preparing for their attacks — and may commit other crimes while doing so. How long does this planning take? And do different types of terrorist groups vary in preparation time?
To help answer these questions, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) launched a series of projects to explore patterns of terrorist behavior. In the first of these projects, a panel of experts was assembled to examine 60 case studies involving terrorist incidents in the U.S. during the past 25 years. These cases involved the four major types of U.S. terrorist groups: left wing, right wing, single issue and international. The panel — including this author — looked at the homes of the terrorists, the locations of planning and preparation, and the sites of the terrorist incidents to discover whether any patterns emerged.
What we learned was intriguing: The cases of McVeigh, the Sept. 11 hijackers and Rudolph are actually unusual. In fact, we found that most terrorists live close to their selected targets, and they engage in a great deal of preparation — some over the course of months or even years — that has the potential of coming to the attention of local law enforcement.
Source: National Institute of Justice
Although we know a great deal about the behavior of traditional criminals, little information has been available about terrorists. Are they much different from conventional criminals, who tend to commit their crimes close to home? Research has shown that traditional criminals are spontaneous, but terrorists seem to go to great lengths preparing for their attacks — and may commit other crimes while doing so. How long does this planning take? And do different types of terrorist groups vary in preparation time?
To help answer these questions, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) launched a series of projects to explore patterns of terrorist behavior. In the first of these projects, a panel of experts was assembled to examine 60 case studies involving terrorist incidents in the U.S. during the past 25 years. These cases involved the four major types of U.S. terrorist groups: left wing, right wing, single issue and international. The panel — including this author — looked at the homes of the terrorists, the locations of planning and preparation, and the sites of the terrorist incidents to discover whether any patterns emerged.
What we learned was intriguing: The cases of McVeigh, the Sept. 11 hijackers and Rudolph are actually unusual. In fact, we found that most terrorists live close to their selected targets, and they engage in a great deal of preparation — some over the course of months or even years — that has the potential of coming to the attention of local law enforcement.
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