Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
The United States needs to undertake a strategic regional net assessment that examines the following issues as it seeks to construct a regional security strategy to protect its interests and mitigate wider threats to international security. That net assessment should include reviewing the role of security guarantees in promoting regional stability, an acknowledgement of the contradictory nature of the inter- and intra state threats and tensions, and the negative impact that the U.S. obsession with force protection is having on its ability to effectively implement strategy on the ground.
Full Paper (PDF; 285 KB)
Monday, November 26, 2007
A Dangerous Opportunity: American Defense Policy at a Crossroads
A Dangerous Opportunity: American Defense Policy at a Crossroads
Source: National Security Outlook (American Enterprise Institute)
America’s military policy is in disarray, but not for the reason most people think. For the first time since around 1950, there is no coherent theoretical framework for thinking about how to shape our armed forces for current and future threats. This fact presents both a danger and an opportunity. The danger is that we will either fail to develop one and therefore drift aimlessly at a troubled time, or that we will reach back to some of the tattered remnants of the theories that guided military policy until 2007. But we now have the opportunity for a serious discussion about the shape of the world today and its likely shape tomorrow.
Source: National Security Outlook (American Enterprise Institute)
America’s military policy is in disarray, but not for the reason most people think. For the first time since around 1950, there is no coherent theoretical framework for thinking about how to shape our armed forces for current and future threats. This fact presents both a danger and an opportunity. The danger is that we will either fail to develop one and therefore drift aimlessly at a troubled time, or that we will reach back to some of the tattered remnants of the theories that guided military policy until 2007. But we now have the opportunity for a serious discussion about the shape of the world today and its likely shape tomorrow.
Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisition Reports
Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisition Reports
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DoD) has released details on major defense acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance changes since the June 2007 reporting period. This information is based on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted to the Congress for the September 2007 reporting period.
SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. These reports are prepared annually in conjunction with the President’s budget. Subsequent quarterly exception reports are required only for those programs experiencing unit cost increases of at least 15 percent or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are also submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that are rebaselined at major milestone decisions.
+ SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Dollars in Millions) As Of Date: September 30, 2007 (PDF; 14 KB)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DoD) has released details on major defense acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance changes since the June 2007 reporting period. This information is based on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted to the Congress for the September 2007 reporting period.
SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. These reports are prepared annually in conjunction with the President’s budget. Subsequent quarterly exception reports are required only for those programs experiencing unit cost increases of at least 15 percent or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are also submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that are rebaselined at major milestone decisions.
+ SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Dollars in Millions) As Of Date: September 30, 2007 (PDF; 14 KB)
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
GPO Creates Its First Ever On-Line Guide To Members Of Congress
Guide to House and Senate Members
From the announcement:
The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) creates a one stop website with easy searchable information on all Members of Congress. A simple click will bring the user to a picture and biography of any current member of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. This information previously was available in separate databases, but now can be accessed from one central point. GPO worked closely with the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP), Clerk of the House and Secretary of Senate on the design and usability of this website.
From the announcement:
The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) creates a one stop website with easy searchable information on all Members of Congress. A simple click will bring the user to a picture and biography of any current member of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. This information previously was available in separate databases, but now can be accessed from one central point. GPO worked closely with the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP), Clerk of the House and Secretary of Senate on the design and usability of this website.
Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations
Source: RAND Corporation
Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. This report argues that one way to fill those gaps is by building the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies. The report begins by providing a theoretical context for building partner capacity and capabilities. It then discusses seven illustrative train and equip programs (TEPs) to identify specific lessons to inform Army planning and execution of TEPs in the future. It gives insights on the importance of developing and implementing metrics for security cooperation, an essential step in ensuring that Army activities are successful. The report then identifies U.S. Army capability gaps through a review of strategic and operational guidance documents and Army and joint studies. It outlines a five-step process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner armies, which include (1) determining the relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army in specific situations, (2) considering the level of effort required to build the capability in a partner army, (3) identifying capabilities of shared interest to the U.S. Army and the partner army, (4) identifying candidate partner armies based on past participation in U.S.-led operations, and (5) determining existing partner army capabilities. The process aims to help Army planners identify which capabilities are of mutual benefit to the United States and partner nations. The report concludes with specific recommendations for Headquarters, Department of the Army, which should, at a minimum, include adopting this five-step process and focusing its efforts on those capability gaps that best support joint requirements.
Source: RAND Corporation
Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. This report argues that one way to fill those gaps is by building the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies. The report begins by providing a theoretical context for building partner capacity and capabilities. It then discusses seven illustrative train and equip programs (TEPs) to identify specific lessons to inform Army planning and execution of TEPs in the future. It gives insights on the importance of developing and implementing metrics for security cooperation, an essential step in ensuring that Army activities are successful. The report then identifies U.S. Army capability gaps through a review of strategic and operational guidance documents and Army and joint studies. It outlines a five-step process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner armies, which include (1) determining the relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army in specific situations, (2) considering the level of effort required to build the capability in a partner army, (3) identifying capabilities of shared interest to the U.S. Army and the partner army, (4) identifying candidate partner armies based on past participation in U.S.-led operations, and (5) determining existing partner army capabilities. The process aims to help Army planners identify which capabilities are of mutual benefit to the United States and partner nations. The report concludes with specific recommendations for Headquarters, Department of the Army, which should, at a minimum, include adopting this five-step process and focusing its efforts on those capability gaps that best support joint requirements.
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies
The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Without a realistic prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions that will undermine American and European strategic interests. The new members of NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and the EU, and containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The new European democracies have also endeavored to more closely involve Washington in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement as a more effective Eastern Dimension jointly pursued by the U.S., NATO, and the EU would significantly consolidate trans-Atlantic security.
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