Friday, March 27, 2009

Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation

Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

Russia, despite claims made for and against its importance, remains, by any objective standard, a key player in world affairs. Russia is an important barometer of trends in world politics, e.g., the course of democratization in the world. Furthermore, Russia, if it were so disposed, could be the abettor and/or supporter of a host of negative trends in the world today. Even so, if U.S. policymakers and analysts see Russia more as a spoiler than as a constructive partner (whether rightly or wrongly), the fact remains that during the Cold War the Soviet Union was an active supporter of threats to world order such as international terrorism, and carried on a global arms race with the West. We negotiated productively with it on issues like arms control and proliferation. Today, no matter how bad Russo-American or East-West relations may be, no such threats are present or immediately discernible on the horizon. But ultimately, given Russia’s power, standing, and nuclear capability, dialogue and cooperation will be resumed at some point in the future. Therefore, an analysis of the prospects for and conditions favoring such cooperation is an urgent and important task that cries out for clarification precisely because current U.S.-Russian relations are so difficult.

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

China’s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with growing global influence has significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region and the world. The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China, and encourages China to participate responsibly in world affairs by taking on a greater share of the burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system. The United States has done much over the last 30 years to encourage and facilitate China’s national development and its integration into the international system. However, much uncertainty surrounds China’s future course, particularly regarding how its expanding military power might be used.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short- duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries – an approach that China refers to as preparing for “local wars under conditions of informatization.” The pace and scope of China’s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces.

China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited, but its armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region. The PLA’s modernization vis-à-vis Taiwan has continued over the past year, including its build- up of short-range missiles opposite the island. In the near-term, China’s armed forces are rapidly developing coercive capabilities for the purpose of deterring Taiwan’s pursuit of de jure independence.

These same capabilities could in the future be used to pressure Taiwan toward a settlement of the cross-Strait dispute on Beijing’s terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict. This modernization and the threat to Taiwan continue despite significant reduction in cross-Strait tension over the last year since Taiwan elected a new president. The PLA is also developing longer range capabilities that have implications beyond Taiwan. Some of these capabilities have allowed it to contribute cooperatively to the international community’s responsibilities in areas such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-piracy. However, some of these capabilities, as well as other, more disruptive ones, could allow China to project power to ensure access to resources or enforce claims to disputed territories.

Beijing publicly asserts that China’s military modernization is “purely defensive in nature,” and aimed solely at protecting China’s security and interests. Over the past several years, China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China’s immediate territorial interests, but has left unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s evolving doctrine and capabilities. Moreover, China continues to promulgate incomplete defense expenditure figures and engage in actions that appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. The limited transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by creating uncertainty and increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. The United States continues to work with our allies and friends in the region to monitor these developments and adjust our policies accordingly.

Monday, March 23, 2009

U.S. Institute of Peace Report on “Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel” Outlines Framework for a Possible Deal on the Golan Heights

U.S. Institute of Peace Report on “Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel” Outlines Framework for a Possible Deal on the Golan Heights

Source: U.S. Institute of Peace

A new report by Frederic C. Hof commissioned by the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, provides groundbreaking ideas on facilitating a Syrian-Israel Peace.

“Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel” comes out at a critical time in the Arab-Israeli peace process as a new U.S. administration is looking for ways to move the process forward despite the recent violence in Gaza. The report also comes out during a period of renewed interest in Syria when many delegations, including one co-sponsored by the United States of Peace, are going to Damascus.

In the report, Fred Hof, who directed the field operations of the Sharm El-Sheikh (Mitchell) Fact-Finding Committee in 2001, lays out a roadmap for how to resolve the thorny issues separating Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights plateau and small tracts in the Jordan River Valley. Hof’s study focuses on creative ways and means to reconcile Syria’s boundary demand with legitimate Israeli concerns. A key element is elaboration on the concept of a Jordan Valley-Golan Heights Environmental Preserve, which attracted attention during earlier peace talks.
The issue has been known to be highly complex but Hof describes his approach as “modest, minimalist, and relatively uncomplicated.” “There are already some two-dozen parks and reserves that have been established by Israel on land that would, in accordance with the boundary under discussion, be returned to Syria,” says Hof. “As a matter of sound environmental stewardship one might hope that Syria would maintain and even expand all of these facilities, which range from Susita Nature Reserve in the south to the Hermon Reserve in the north.

Friday, March 20, 2009

Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam

Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam

Source: RAND Corporation

The often tense relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been at the center of many of the major political shifts that have occurred in the Middle East since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. This volume documents a study of how relations between the two powers have unfolded in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine from 2003 through January 2009. Wehrey et al. detail the complex and multidimensional relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran and its implications for regional stability and U.S. interests. In doing so, the authors challenge conventional thinking about Saudi-Iranian relations, arguing, for example, that Sunni-Shi’a distinctions are not the key driver in dealings between the two nations, that the two states have a tendency to engage on areas of common interest, and that the notion of a watertight bloc of Gulf Arab states opposing Iran is increasingly unrealistic. The study concludes with U.S. policy recommendations for leveraging the Saudi-Iranian relationship, particularly in the context of a U.S. drawdown in Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the Iranian nuclear issue.