Eurostat regional yearbook 2008
Source: Eurostat
Eurostat regional yearbook 2008 offers a wealth of information on life in the European regions in the 27 Member States of the European Union and this year also in the candidate countries and EFTA countries. The texts are written by specialists in the different statistical domains and are accompanied by statistical maps, figures and tables on each subject. A broad set of regional data are presented on the following themes: population, urban statistics, gross domestic product, household accounts, structural business statistics, labour market, sectoral productivity, labour cost, transport, tourism, science, technology and innovation, health and agriculture. The publication is available in German, English and French.
Tuesday, December 2, 2008
Tuesday, November 25, 2008
Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise
Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise
Source: RAND Corporation
China’s economic, military, and diplomatic power has been on the rise, and many worry that it is nudging aside U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region. To explore this issue, the authors examined six specific U.S. allies and partners — Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. From extensive in-country interviews, trade and poll data, etc., they examined the responses in each nation to China’s rise and assessed the implications for U.S. regional security interests. The six nations see China primarily as a source of economic opportunity, but many have concerns about China’s regional goals. They want China to be engaged regionally in productive ways but do not want to allow it to become dominant. They find U.S. security commitments reassuring, bolstering their ability to engage China with confidence. The six nations clearly want U.S. involvement in the region to continue — but sometimes only in certain ways, at certain times, and on particular issues. Thus, they are pulling China closer for the economic opportunities it offers and the United States closer for the general reassurance its long-standing power and influence provide.
Source: RAND Corporation
China’s economic, military, and diplomatic power has been on the rise, and many worry that it is nudging aside U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region. To explore this issue, the authors examined six specific U.S. allies and partners — Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. From extensive in-country interviews, trade and poll data, etc., they examined the responses in each nation to China’s rise and assessed the implications for U.S. regional security interests. The six nations see China primarily as a source of economic opportunity, but many have concerns about China’s regional goals. They want China to be engaged regionally in productive ways but do not want to allow it to become dominant. They find U.S. security commitments reassuring, bolstering their ability to engage China with confidence. The six nations clearly want U.S. involvement in the region to continue — but sometimes only in certain ways, at certain times, and on particular issues. Thus, they are pulling China closer for the economic opportunities it offers and the United States closer for the general reassurance its long-standing power and influence provide.
Friday, November 7, 2008
Presidential Transition Website: Change.gov
Change.gov
Throughout the Presidential Transition Project, this website will be your source for the latest news, events, and announcements so that you can follow the setting up of the Obama Administration. And just as this historic campaign was, from the beginning, about you — the transition process will offer you opportunities to participate in redefining our government.
Throughout the Presidential Transition Project, this website will be your source for the latest news, events, and announcements so that you can follow the setting up of the Obama Administration. And just as this historic campaign was, from the beginning, about you — the transition process will offer you opportunities to participate in redefining our government.
Thursday, November 6, 2008
Defense Imperatives for the New Administration
Defense Imperatives for the New Administration
Source: Defense Science Board
The incoming leadership must be prepared to deal with the most pressing issues facing the Department of Defense today. The pressing issues described herein are daunting and may seem all-inclusive, but they are only a fraction of the defense challenges facing the new administration. This report describes just those issues that the next Secretary of Defense should place at the top of the agenda — issues that will require the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, and, if left unresolved, could lead to future military failure.
This report offers recommendations drawn from reports prepared by the Defense Science Board, an advisory body to the Secretary of Defense, which address topics at the confluence of technology, policy, and management.
Source: Defense Science Board
The incoming leadership must be prepared to deal with the most pressing issues facing the Department of Defense today. The pressing issues described herein are daunting and may seem all-inclusive, but they are only a fraction of the defense challenges facing the new administration. This report describes just those issues that the next Secretary of Defense should place at the top of the agenda — issues that will require the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, and, if left unresolved, could lead to future military failure.
This report offers recommendations drawn from reports prepared by the Defense Science Board, an advisory body to the Secretary of Defense, which address topics at the confluence of technology, policy, and management.
Tuesday, November 4, 2008
Russian–American Security Relations After Georgia
Russian–American Security Relations After Georgia
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
From press release:
The crisis in Georgia bluntly revealed the failure by the United States and Russia to create a closer working relationship after the Cold War. With both countries now in presidential transition, the potential for new misunderstandings and tensions grows even greater.
Established and well-understood treaties and agreements, which have previously inspired at least predictability and confidence in the bilateral relationship, could help establish a new book of rules both countries can embrace, explains Rose Gottemoeller in a new policy brief.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
From press release:
The crisis in Georgia bluntly revealed the failure by the United States and Russia to create a closer working relationship after the Cold War. With both countries now in presidential transition, the potential for new misunderstandings and tensions grows even greater.
Established and well-understood treaties and agreements, which have previously inspired at least predictability and confidence in the bilateral relationship, could help establish a new book of rules both countries can embrace, explains Rose Gottemoeller in a new policy brief.
Monday, October 27, 2008
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Efforts to re-invigorate a movement to abolish nuclear weapons are rising on the international agenda, made clear in statements by the U.S. presidential candidates, British and Indian leaders, and a campaign led by former U.S. officials. For states without weapons, talk of nuclear disarmament is embraced as a welcome change, but viewed with skepticism. The next U.S. president should emphasize the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, explains George Perkovich in a new report.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Efforts to re-invigorate a movement to abolish nuclear weapons are rising on the international agenda, made clear in statements by the U.S. presidential candidates, British and Indian leaders, and a campaign led by former U.S. officials. For states without weapons, talk of nuclear disarmament is embraced as a welcome change, but viewed with skepticism. The next U.S. president should emphasize the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, explains George Perkovich in a new report.
Strategic Counterterrorism
Strategic Counterterrorism
Source: The Brookings Institution
Terrorism is a real and urgent threat to the American people and our interests; a threat that could become far more dangerous if terrorists acquire nuclear or biological weapons. An effective counterterrorism policy must go beyond uncompromising efforts to thwart those who seek to harm us today—we must engage other countries whose cooperation is essential to meet this threat, and we must ensure that new terrorist recruits do not come to take the place of those we have defeated.
The policies pursued by the Bush administration have too often been counterproductive and self-defeating. In the name of an “offensive” strategy, they have undermined the values and principles that made the United States a model for the world, dismayed our friends around the world and jeopardized their cooperation with us, and provided ammunition for terrorist recruitment in the Middle East and beyond.
To achieve our long-term objective we must go beyond narrow counterterrorism policies to embed counterterrorism in an overarching national security strategy designed to restore American leadership and respect in the world. This leadership must be based on a strong commitment to our values and to building the structures of international cooperation that are needed not only to fight terrorists, but also to meet other key challenges of our time: proliferation; climate change and energy security; the danger of pandemic disease; and the need to sustain a vibrant global economy that lifts the lives of people everywhere.
Source: The Brookings Institution
Terrorism is a real and urgent threat to the American people and our interests; a threat that could become far more dangerous if terrorists acquire nuclear or biological weapons. An effective counterterrorism policy must go beyond uncompromising efforts to thwart those who seek to harm us today—we must engage other countries whose cooperation is essential to meet this threat, and we must ensure that new terrorist recruits do not come to take the place of those we have defeated.
The policies pursued by the Bush administration have too often been counterproductive and self-defeating. In the name of an “offensive” strategy, they have undermined the values and principles that made the United States a model for the world, dismayed our friends around the world and jeopardized their cooperation with us, and provided ammunition for terrorist recruitment in the Middle East and beyond.
To achieve our long-term objective we must go beyond narrow counterterrorism policies to embed counterterrorism in an overarching national security strategy designed to restore American leadership and respect in the world. This leadership must be based on a strong commitment to our values and to building the structures of international cooperation that are needed not only to fight terrorists, but also to meet other key challenges of our time: proliferation; climate change and energy security; the danger of pandemic disease; and the need to sustain a vibrant global economy that lifts the lives of people everywhere.
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable?
Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable?
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
If the United States and other countries with nuclear weapons take action toward further disarmament, they hope that countries without them will support additional efforts to prevent the further spread and use of nuclear weapons.
But non–nuclear-weapon states take a different view. Citing the unfulfilled promises of nuclear-weapon states, they declare such a bargain to be unfair and a misreading of the political landscape.
A better understanding of the views of non–nuclear-weapon states would provide the next U.S. administration with a serious opportunity to lead the rebuilding of a dangerously damaged nonproliferation regime, explains Deepti Choubey in a new report.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
If the United States and other countries with nuclear weapons take action toward further disarmament, they hope that countries without them will support additional efforts to prevent the further spread and use of nuclear weapons.
But non–nuclear-weapon states take a different view. Citing the unfulfilled promises of nuclear-weapon states, they declare such a bargain to be unfair and a misreading of the political landscape.
A better understanding of the views of non–nuclear-weapon states would provide the next U.S. administration with a serious opportunity to lead the rebuilding of a dangerously damaged nonproliferation regime, explains Deepti Choubey in a new report.
Monday, October 6, 2008
Guide to the Global Economic Crisis
Guide to the Global Economic Crisis
By Robert J. Tiess, Reference Department, Middletown (NY) Thrall Library
Web resource guide which includes key information on the current economic crisis, related concepts and initiatives, as well as recent U.S. Government statements and actions concerning the situation.
By Robert J. Tiess, Reference Department, Middletown (NY) Thrall Library
Web resource guide which includes key information on the current economic crisis, related concepts and initiatives, as well as recent U.S. Government statements and actions concerning the situation.
Monday, September 29, 2008
More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World
More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World
Source: RAND Corporation
In the wake of September 11 through the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a key tenet of U.S. foreign policy has been that promoting democracy in the Arab world is an important strategy in reducing terrorism; at the same time, some policymakers and analysts have held that democracy has nothing to do with terrorism — or even that the growth of democracy in the Middle East may exacerbate political violence. However, scant empirical evidence links democracy to terrorism, positively or negatively. This study examines whether such links exist by exploring the effects of liberalization processes on political violence in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco from 1991 to 2006. Drawing on data on the incidence of terrorist violence, extensive fieldwork and interviews in each of the six countries, and primary and secondary literature from and about each country, Kaye et al. find that political reforms have, in some instances, helped to marginalize and undercut extremist actors, but that these effects tend to be short-lived if reforms fail to produce tangible results. Moreover, when regimes backtrack on even limited openings, the risks of instability and violence increase.
Source: RAND Corporation
In the wake of September 11 through the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a key tenet of U.S. foreign policy has been that promoting democracy in the Arab world is an important strategy in reducing terrorism; at the same time, some policymakers and analysts have held that democracy has nothing to do with terrorism — or even that the growth of democracy in the Middle East may exacerbate political violence. However, scant empirical evidence links democracy to terrorism, positively or negatively. This study examines whether such links exist by exploring the effects of liberalization processes on political violence in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco from 1991 to 2006. Drawing on data on the incidence of terrorist violence, extensive fieldwork and interviews in each of the six countries, and primary and secondary literature from and about each country, Kaye et al. find that political reforms have, in some instances, helped to marginalize and undercut extremist actors, but that these effects tend to be short-lived if reforms fail to produce tangible results. Moreover, when regimes backtrack on even limited openings, the risks of instability and violence increase.
Monday, September 15, 2008
Search across more than 30 homeland security blogs and bloggers
The librarians at the Homeland Security Digital Library created this custom search engine to help blog readers find postings on topics of interest in the growing community of Homeland Security bloggers.
Monday, September 8, 2008
Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries
Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
This report serves as a primer toward understanding security sector reform (SSR) in societies emerging from conflict—a rapidly expanding field of urgent importance. The report provides background on SSR today. It is based on statements by panelists at a public forum held at the United States Institute of Peace on May 22, 2008, and on interviews conducted by the author with government agencies, commercial contract firms, international organizations, and host governments that participate in the SSR programs.
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
This report serves as a primer toward understanding security sector reform (SSR) in societies emerging from conflict—a rapidly expanding field of urgent importance. The report provides background on SSR today. It is based on statements by panelists at a public forum held at the United States Institute of Peace on May 22, 2008, and on interviews conducted by the author with government agencies, commercial contract firms, international organizations, and host governments that participate in the SSR programs.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Backgrounder: Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict
Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict
Source: Institute for the Study of War
Analysis
• Russia has announced a unilateral ceasefire because its operations have achieved their aims.
• Medvedev and Sarkozy have drafted a document that encapsulates all of Russia’s demands in return for a ceasefire—but not a final settlement, which must still be negotiated. Sarkozy is discussing that deal with Saakashvili right now.
• So the situation on the ground now legally is that there are two unilateral ceasefires, although the Georgians claim that Russian forces continue their attacks, and the Russian military has laid the predicate for those and further attacks in public statements today. The Russian military has also made plain that if a formal ceasefire agreement is not reached, then Russian forces will not withdraw from Ossetia or Abkhazia.
• The Russian military has clearly stated that the objective of its operations was to reduce Georgia’s overall military capability so that Georgia could not again conduct an operation similar to the one it launched in South Ossetia, and for that reason has been attacking targets throughout Georgia.
• Russian leaders repeatedly say that they will not deal with Saakashvili.
• The Russian Attorney General has announced that Russian law permits the trial of Saakashvili for crimes under the Russian Federation Criminal Code.
• The Russian Foreign Minister has called for an investigation of Georgian war crimes and the punishment of those ultimately responsible by international tribunals, and has said that Russian citizens victimized by Georgians will be bringing individual actions in appropriate European human rights courts.
• The Russian aim is to force Saakashvili from power, preferably using international legal maneuvers (a la Milosevic), but possibly using Russian law instead or in addition.
• The Russians are maintaining their excessive forces in South Ossetia, and continuing to control Georgia’s airspace and conduct periodic attacks in a flagrant effort to compel an immediate Georgian agreement to their armistice terms, conveyed by Sarkozy.
• Russia will not permit South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to Georgian control, and will move one way or the other to have their independence recognized, and probably soon.
Source: Institute for the Study of War
Analysis
• Russia has announced a unilateral ceasefire because its operations have achieved their aims.
• Medvedev and Sarkozy have drafted a document that encapsulates all of Russia’s demands in return for a ceasefire—but not a final settlement, which must still be negotiated. Sarkozy is discussing that deal with Saakashvili right now.
• So the situation on the ground now legally is that there are two unilateral ceasefires, although the Georgians claim that Russian forces continue their attacks, and the Russian military has laid the predicate for those and further attacks in public statements today. The Russian military has also made plain that if a formal ceasefire agreement is not reached, then Russian forces will not withdraw from Ossetia or Abkhazia.
• The Russian military has clearly stated that the objective of its operations was to reduce Georgia’s overall military capability so that Georgia could not again conduct an operation similar to the one it launched in South Ossetia, and for that reason has been attacking targets throughout Georgia.
• Russian leaders repeatedly say that they will not deal with Saakashvili.
• The Russian Attorney General has announced that Russian law permits the trial of Saakashvili for crimes under the Russian Federation Criminal Code.
• The Russian Foreign Minister has called for an investigation of Georgian war crimes and the punishment of those ultimately responsible by international tribunals, and has said that Russian citizens victimized by Georgians will be bringing individual actions in appropriate European human rights courts.
• The Russian aim is to force Saakashvili from power, preferably using international legal maneuvers (a la Milosevic), but possibly using Russian law instead or in addition.
• The Russians are maintaining their excessive forces in South Ossetia, and continuing to control Georgia’s airspace and conduct periodic attacks in a flagrant effort to compel an immediate Georgian agreement to their armistice terms, conveyed by Sarkozy.
• Russia will not permit South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to Georgian control, and will move one way or the other to have their independence recognized, and probably soon.
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order
The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
There have been many attempts by the international community to impose order in the Middle East. The reality is that Arab states must themselves overcome divisive ideologies, prioritize common interests, and develop a cooperative political and security architecture if a new regional order is to come to fruition, argues Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
In The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order, Salem identifies patterns and trends in the dynamic history between the countries of the Middle East—through the collapse of Ottoman rule, European mandates, and the post-World War II developments in the region—that help to understand how Arab states, as well as Turkey and Iran, have shaped their policies, particularly after 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The paper introduces a series of country-by-country studies that will examine how key players in the Middle East—namely Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—have responded.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
There have been many attempts by the international community to impose order in the Middle East. The reality is that Arab states must themselves overcome divisive ideologies, prioritize common interests, and develop a cooperative political and security architecture if a new regional order is to come to fruition, argues Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
In The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order, Salem identifies patterns and trends in the dynamic history between the countries of the Middle East—through the collapse of Ottoman rule, European mandates, and the post-World War II developments in the region—that help to understand how Arab states, as well as Turkey and Iran, have shaped their policies, particularly after 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The paper introduces a series of country-by-country studies that will examine how key players in the Middle East—namely Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—have responded.
Friday, August 1, 2008
A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare, Where They Strike
A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare, Where They Strike
Source: National Institute of Justice
Although we know a great deal about the behavior of traditional criminals, little information has been available about terrorists. Are they much different from conventional criminals, who tend to commit their crimes close to home? Research has shown that traditional criminals are spontaneous, but terrorists seem to go to great lengths preparing for their attacks — and may commit other crimes while doing so. How long does this planning take? And do different types of terrorist groups vary in preparation time?
To help answer these questions, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) launched a series of projects to explore patterns of terrorist behavior. In the first of these projects, a panel of experts was assembled to examine 60 case studies involving terrorist incidents in the U.S. during the past 25 years. These cases involved the four major types of U.S. terrorist groups: left wing, right wing, single issue and international. The panel — including this author — looked at the homes of the terrorists, the locations of planning and preparation, and the sites of the terrorist incidents to discover whether any patterns emerged.
What we learned was intriguing: The cases of McVeigh, the Sept. 11 hijackers and Rudolph are actually unusual. In fact, we found that most terrorists live close to their selected targets, and they engage in a great deal of preparation — some over the course of months or even years — that has the potential of coming to the attention of local law enforcement.
Source: National Institute of Justice
Although we know a great deal about the behavior of traditional criminals, little information has been available about terrorists. Are they much different from conventional criminals, who tend to commit their crimes close to home? Research has shown that traditional criminals are spontaneous, but terrorists seem to go to great lengths preparing for their attacks — and may commit other crimes while doing so. How long does this planning take? And do different types of terrorist groups vary in preparation time?
To help answer these questions, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) launched a series of projects to explore patterns of terrorist behavior. In the first of these projects, a panel of experts was assembled to examine 60 case studies involving terrorist incidents in the U.S. during the past 25 years. These cases involved the four major types of U.S. terrorist groups: left wing, right wing, single issue and international. The panel — including this author — looked at the homes of the terrorists, the locations of planning and preparation, and the sites of the terrorist incidents to discover whether any patterns emerged.
What we learned was intriguing: The cases of McVeigh, the Sept. 11 hijackers and Rudolph are actually unusual. In fact, we found that most terrorists live close to their selected targets, and they engage in a great deal of preparation — some over the course of months or even years — that has the potential of coming to the attention of local law enforcement.
Monday, July 28, 2008
The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Arab countries are undertaking diplomatic initiatives that clearly contradict U.S. policy, because they no longer trust the U.S. capacity to contend with escalating regional crises. Even Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are no longer willing to follow Washington’s lead on policies toward Iran, Lebanon, or Hamas, concludes a new paper from the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Marina Ottaway and Mohammed Herzallah assess the diplomatic efforts of Arab regimes seeking to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of a strong regime in Iraq and ineffectual U.S. policy in The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Arab countries are undertaking diplomatic initiatives that clearly contradict U.S. policy, because they no longer trust the U.S. capacity to contend with escalating regional crises. Even Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are no longer willing to follow Washington’s lead on policies toward Iran, Lebanon, or Hamas, concludes a new paper from the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Marina Ottaway and Mohammed Herzallah assess the diplomatic efforts of Arab regimes seeking to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of a strong regime in Iraq and ineffectual U.S. policy in The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Wednesday, July 9, 2008
Sources of Weapon System Cost Growth: Analysis of 35 Major Defense Acquisition Programs
Sources of Weapon System Cost Growth: Analysis of 35 Major Defense Acquisition Programs
Source: RAND Corporation
Previous studies have shown that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments have historically underestimated the cost of new weapon systems. Quantifying cost growth is important, but the larger issue is why cost growth occurs. To address that issue, this analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to examine 35 mature, but not necessarily complete, major defense acquisition programs similar to the type and complexity of those typically managed by the Air Force. The programs are first examined as a complete set, then Air Force and non-Air Force programs are analyzed separately to determine whether the causes of cost growth in the two groups differ. Four major sources of cost growth were identified: (1) errors in estimation and scheduling, (2) decisions made by the government, (3) financial matters, and (4) miscellaneous sources. Total (development plus procurement) cost growth, when measured as simple averages among the program set, is dominated by decisions, which account for more than two-thirds of the growth. Most decisions-related cost growth involves quantity changes (22 percent), requirements growth (13 percent), and schedule changes (9 percent). Cost estimation (10 percent) is the only large contributor in the errors category. Less than 4 percent of the overall cost growth is due to financial and miscellaneous causes. Because decisions involving changes in requirements, quantities, and production schedules dominate cost growth, program managers, service leadership, and Congress should look for ways to reduce changes in these areas.
Source: RAND Corporation
Previous studies have shown that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments have historically underestimated the cost of new weapon systems. Quantifying cost growth is important, but the larger issue is why cost growth occurs. To address that issue, this analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to examine 35 mature, but not necessarily complete, major defense acquisition programs similar to the type and complexity of those typically managed by the Air Force. The programs are first examined as a complete set, then Air Force and non-Air Force programs are analyzed separately to determine whether the causes of cost growth in the two groups differ. Four major sources of cost growth were identified: (1) errors in estimation and scheduling, (2) decisions made by the government, (3) financial matters, and (4) miscellaneous sources. Total (development plus procurement) cost growth, when measured as simple averages among the program set, is dominated by decisions, which account for more than two-thirds of the growth. Most decisions-related cost growth involves quantity changes (22 percent), requirements growth (13 percent), and schedule changes (9 percent). Cost estimation (10 percent) is the only large contributor in the errors category. Less than 4 percent of the overall cost growth is due to financial and miscellaneous causes. Because decisions involving changes in requirements, quantities, and production schedules dominate cost growth, program managers, service leadership, and Congress should look for ways to reduce changes in these areas.
Monday, June 16, 2008
Mullahs, Money, and Militias: How Iran Exerts Its Influence in the Middle East
Mullahs, Money, and Militias: How Iran Exerts Its Influence in the Middle East
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
To achieve its goals, Iran exerts influence in three major ways: through ties with Shiite clerics, or mullahs, financial aid for humanitarian and political causes, and weapons and training supplied to militant groups. Much of this support pales in comparison with U.S. contributions to American allies and with other resources available to Iran’s partners, although Iran appears to get (literally) more bang for its bucks. Recipients of Iranian largesse, especially the Lebanese group Hezbollah, are not mere proxies and appear to have considerable tactical autonomy and influence on Iranian policies. Many Iraqis, including Shiite groups close to Iran, are trying to hedge their ties with Tehran by maintaining links to the United States. To contain harmful Iranian influence, the United States may have to act on a number of fronts, working to stabilize Iraq and Lebanon and to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict without magnifying its own confrontation with Iran. The U.S. government should consider direct talks with Iran to try to constrain Iran’s motivation to further destabilize the region and should establish contacts, if possible, with some of Iran’s partners to increase U.S. options, knowledge, and flexibility.
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
To achieve its goals, Iran exerts influence in three major ways: through ties with Shiite clerics, or mullahs, financial aid for humanitarian and political causes, and weapons and training supplied to militant groups. Much of this support pales in comparison with U.S. contributions to American allies and with other resources available to Iran’s partners, although Iran appears to get (literally) more bang for its bucks. Recipients of Iranian largesse, especially the Lebanese group Hezbollah, are not mere proxies and appear to have considerable tactical autonomy and influence on Iranian policies. Many Iraqis, including Shiite groups close to Iran, are trying to hedge their ties with Tehran by maintaining links to the United States. To contain harmful Iranian influence, the United States may have to act on a number of fronts, working to stabilize Iraq and Lebanon and to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict without magnifying its own confrontation with Iran. The U.S. government should consider direct talks with Iran to try to constrain Iran’s motivation to further destabilize the region and should establish contacts, if possible, with some of Iran’s partners to increase U.S. options, knowledge, and flexibility.
Thursday, June 12, 2008
The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
As a Muslim-majority country that is also a secular democratic state, a member of NATO, a candidate for membership in the European Union, a long-standing U.S. ally, and the host of Incirlik Air Base (a key hub for logistical support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq), Turkey is pivotal to U.S. and Western security interests in a critical area of the world. It also provides an example of the coexistence of Islam with secular democracy, globalization, and modernity. However, having a ruling party with Islamic roots — the Justice and Development Party (AKP) — within a framework of strict secularism has generated controversy over the boundaries between secularity and religion in the public sphere. This monograph describes the politico-religious landscape in Turkey and the relationship between the state and religion, and it evaluates how the balance between secular and religious forces — and between the Kemalist elites and new emerging social groups — has changed over the past decade. The study also assesses the new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy in the changed Turkish political environment and identifies specific actions the United States may take to advance the U.S. interest in a stable, democratic, and friendly Turkey and, more broadly, in the worldwide dissemination of liberal and pluralistic interpretations of Islam.
As a Muslim-majority country that is also a secular democratic state, a member of NATO, a candidate for membership in the European Union, a long-standing U.S. ally, and the host of Incirlik Air Base (a key hub for logistical support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq), Turkey is pivotal to U.S. and Western security interests in a critical area of the world. It also provides an example of the coexistence of Islam with secular democracy, globalization, and modernity. However, having a ruling party with Islamic roots — the Justice and Development Party (AKP) — within a framework of strict secularism has generated controversy over the boundaries between secularity and religion in the public sphere. This monograph describes the politico-religious landscape in Turkey and the relationship between the state and religion, and it evaluates how the balance between secular and religious forces — and between the Kemalist elites and new emerging social groups — has changed over the past decade. The study also assesses the new challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy in the changed Turkish political environment and identifies specific actions the United States may take to advance the U.S. interest in a stable, democratic, and friendly Turkey and, more broadly, in the worldwide dissemination of liberal and pluralistic interpretations of Islam.
Monday, June 9, 2008
Energy in Danger: Iran, Oil, and the West
Energy in Danger: Iran, Oil, and the West
Source: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Every day, nearly 40 percent of the world’s internationally traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow channel over which Iran holds distinct military advantages. Given that the global economy is predicted to become even more dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies in the coming decades, Iran’s potentially critical influence on the flow of these supplies must be addressed. How might Tehran exert this influence in the event of a confrontation? And what can the international community do to avoid such scenarios?
In this entry in The Washington Institute’s “Agenda: Iran” series, Gulf expert Simon Henderson analyzes how the United States and its allies can loosen, or even bypass, the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Using detailed maps, he shows how existing and potential pipeline networks could be used as alternative routes for Gulf energy exports. He also discusses various means of pressuring Iran and its trading partners — not just through current financial sanctions, but via new measures that exploit the regime’s vulnerabilities in the energy sector. Such efforts must be accelerated if Washington hopes to keep the strait from becoming a serious clog in the world economy.
Source: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Every day, nearly 40 percent of the world’s internationally traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow channel over which Iran holds distinct military advantages. Given that the global economy is predicted to become even more dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies in the coming decades, Iran’s potentially critical influence on the flow of these supplies must be addressed. How might Tehran exert this influence in the event of a confrontation? And what can the international community do to avoid such scenarios?
In this entry in The Washington Institute’s “Agenda: Iran” series, Gulf expert Simon Henderson analyzes how the United States and its allies can loosen, or even bypass, the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Using detailed maps, he shows how existing and potential pipeline networks could be used as alternative routes for Gulf energy exports. He also discusses various means of pressuring Iran and its trading partners — not just through current financial sanctions, but via new measures that exploit the regime’s vulnerabilities in the energy sector. Such efforts must be accelerated if Washington hopes to keep the strait from becoming a serious clog in the world economy.
The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism
The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism
Source: The Brookings Institution
The U.S. approach toward state sponsorship of terrorism rests on a flawed understanding of the problem and an even more flawed policy response. The U.S. Department of State’s current formal list of state sponsors includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. But Cuba and North Korea have done almost nothing in this area in recent years, and Sudan has changed its ways enough that elsewhere the Bush administration credits Sudan as a “strong partner in the War on Terror.” Of those on the list, only Syria and Iran remain problems, and in both cases their involvement in traditional international terrorism is down considerably from their peaks in the 1980s.
What seems like a brilliant policy success, however, is really an artifact of bad list management, because much of the problem of state sponsorship today involves countries that are not on the list at all. Pakistan has long aided a range of terrorist groups fighting against India in Kashmir and is a major sponsor of Taliban forces fighting the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. Hugo Chavez’s government in Venezuela is a major supporter of the FARC. And several other governments, such as those in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian territories, create problems by deliberately looking the other way when their citizens back terrorist groups.
These new state sponsors are actually more dangerous to the United States and its interests than the remaining traditional state sponsors, because some of them are tied to Sunni jihadist groups such as al-Qa‘ida— currently the greatest terrorist threat facing the United States. The nightmare of a terrorist group acquiring nuclear weapons is far more likely to involve Pakistan than it is Iran or North Korea.
Source: The Brookings Institution
The U.S. approach toward state sponsorship of terrorism rests on a flawed understanding of the problem and an even more flawed policy response. The U.S. Department of State’s current formal list of state sponsors includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. But Cuba and North Korea have done almost nothing in this area in recent years, and Sudan has changed its ways enough that elsewhere the Bush administration credits Sudan as a “strong partner in the War on Terror.” Of those on the list, only Syria and Iran remain problems, and in both cases their involvement in traditional international terrorism is down considerably from their peaks in the 1980s.
What seems like a brilliant policy success, however, is really an artifact of bad list management, because much of the problem of state sponsorship today involves countries that are not on the list at all. Pakistan has long aided a range of terrorist groups fighting against India in Kashmir and is a major sponsor of Taliban forces fighting the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. Hugo Chavez’s government in Venezuela is a major supporter of the FARC. And several other governments, such as those in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian territories, create problems by deliberately looking the other way when their citizens back terrorist groups.
These new state sponsors are actually more dangerous to the United States and its interests than the remaining traditional state sponsors, because some of them are tied to Sunni jihadist groups such as al-Qa‘ida— currently the greatest terrorist threat facing the United States. The nightmare of a terrorist group acquiring nuclear weapons is far more likely to involve Pakistan than it is Iran or North Korea.
Monday, May 5, 2008
Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates: Current Outlook
Direct to Full Text Report
The country’s more than 72,000 grantmaking foundations increased their giving to $42.9 billion in 2007, according to Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates: Current Outlook (2008 Edition), released today by the Foundation Center. This estimated 10 percent gain followed a 7.1 percent increase in 2006.
Contributing to this rise was close to 12 percent growth in foundation assets in 2006 - the first double-digit gain in assets recorded since 1999. The establishment of new foundations, while occurring more slowly than in the late 1990s and early 2000s, also helped to raise the level of foundation giving.
Key estimates reported include:
Independent and family foundations - which represent almost nine out of 10 foundations - raised their giving by 12.7 percent in 2007, up from an increase of 9 percent in 2006.
Corporate foundation giving rose 6.6 percent in 2007, following a modest 2.6 percent increase in 2006.
Community foundations raised their giving by 13.9 percent in 2007, up from 11.8 percent growth in 2006 - the fourth consecutive year of double-digit increases.
Although the current economic downturn makes projections difficult, findings from the Foundation Center’s 2008 “Foundation Giving Forecast Survey” suggest that prospects for growth in giving this year remain modestly positive. Just over half of the survey’s respondents expect to increase their giving in 2008, with the biggest foundations being most likely to expect increased giving. An estimated 9 percent rise in foundation assets in 2007 to a record $670 billion also points to foundations continuing to show positive, albeit more modest, growth in giving in the current year.
The country’s more than 72,000 grantmaking foundations increased their giving to $42.9 billion in 2007, according to Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates: Current Outlook (2008 Edition), released today by the Foundation Center. This estimated 10 percent gain followed a 7.1 percent increase in 2006.
Contributing to this rise was close to 12 percent growth in foundation assets in 2006 - the first double-digit gain in assets recorded since 1999. The establishment of new foundations, while occurring more slowly than in the late 1990s and early 2000s, also helped to raise the level of foundation giving.
Key estimates reported include:
Independent and family foundations - which represent almost nine out of 10 foundations - raised their giving by 12.7 percent in 2007, up from an increase of 9 percent in 2006.
Corporate foundation giving rose 6.6 percent in 2007, following a modest 2.6 percent increase in 2006.
Community foundations raised their giving by 13.9 percent in 2007, up from 11.8 percent growth in 2006 - the fourth consecutive year of double-digit increases.
Although the current economic downturn makes projections difficult, findings from the Foundation Center’s 2008 “Foundation Giving Forecast Survey” suggest that prospects for growth in giving this year remain modestly positive. Just over half of the survey’s respondents expect to increase their giving in 2008, with the biggest foundations being most likely to expect increased giving. An estimated 9 percent rise in foundation assets in 2007 to a record $670 billion also points to foundations continuing to show positive, albeit more modest, growth in giving in the current year.
Thursday, May 1, 2008
Country Reports on Terrorism 2007
Country Reports on Terrorism 2007
Source: U.S. Department of StateFrom Strategic Assessment:
Responding to terrorist groups that have many of the characteristics of a global insurgency – propaganda campaigns, grass roots support, and political and territorial ambitions, though ill-defined, requires a comprehensive response. Successful methods include a focus on protecting and securing the population; and politically and physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted political and development measures, and conducting precise intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal collateral damage.
There were significant achievements in this area this year against terrorist leadership targets, notably the capture or killing of key terrorist leaders in Pakistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, and the Philippines. These efforts buy us time to carry out the most important elements of a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy: disrupting terrorist operations, including their communications, propaganda and subversion efforts; planning and fundraising; and eliminating the conditions that terrorists exploit. We must seek to build trusted networks of governments, multilateral institutions, business organizations, and private citizens and organizations that work collaboratively to defeat the threat from violent extremism.
Working with allies and partners across the world, we have created a less permissive operating environment for terrorists, keeping leaders on the move or in hiding, and degrading their ability to plan and mount attacks. Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Jordan, the Philippines, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many other partners played major roles in this success. Dozens of countries have passed new counterterrorism legislation or strengthened pre-existing laws that provide their law enforcement and judicial authorities with new tools to bring terrorists to justice. The United States has expanded the number of foreign partners for the sharing of terrorist screening information, which is a concrete tool for disrupting and tracking travel of known and suspected terrorists. Saudi Arabia has implemented an effective model rehabilitation program for returning jihadis to turn them against violent extremism and to reintegrate them as peaceful citizens.
Source: U.S. Department of StateFrom Strategic Assessment:
Responding to terrorist groups that have many of the characteristics of a global insurgency – propaganda campaigns, grass roots support, and political and territorial ambitions, though ill-defined, requires a comprehensive response. Successful methods include a focus on protecting and securing the population; and politically and physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted political and development measures, and conducting precise intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal collateral damage.
There were significant achievements in this area this year against terrorist leadership targets, notably the capture or killing of key terrorist leaders in Pakistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, and the Philippines. These efforts buy us time to carry out the most important elements of a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy: disrupting terrorist operations, including their communications, propaganda and subversion efforts; planning and fundraising; and eliminating the conditions that terrorists exploit. We must seek to build trusted networks of governments, multilateral institutions, business organizations, and private citizens and organizations that work collaboratively to defeat the threat from violent extremism.
Working with allies and partners across the world, we have created a less permissive operating environment for terrorists, keeping leaders on the move or in hiding, and degrading their ability to plan and mount attacks. Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Jordan, the Philippines, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many other partners played major roles in this success. Dozens of countries have passed new counterterrorism legislation or strengthened pre-existing laws that provide their law enforcement and judicial authorities with new tools to bring terrorists to justice. The United States has expanded the number of foreign partners for the sharing of terrorist screening information, which is a concrete tool for disrupting and tracking travel of known and suspected terrorists. Saudi Arabia has implemented an effective model rehabilitation program for returning jihadis to turn them against violent extremism and to reintegrate them as peaceful citizens.
SIGIR — Iraq Reconstruction Five Years On
Iraq Reconstruction Five Years On
Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
One-page graphic provides info about provincial status, troop training and security incidents, construction funding and completed projects, oil revenue and exports, security funding.
Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
One-page graphic provides info about provincial status, troop training and security incidents, construction funding and completed projects, oil revenue and exports, security funding.
Thursday, April 24, 2008
Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States
Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States
Source: United States Institute of Peace
A series of crises have strained relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States since the end of the Cold War. Included most prominently among them are the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter plane in 2001. Although none of these crises led to direct military hostilities, they have had an adverse impact on bilateral relations and portend future such crises between the two countries. To determine how best to mitigate such crises in the future, it is important to study these recent crises and identify the positive and negative responses and actions of both governments during them.
Source: United States Institute of Peace
A series of crises have strained relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States since the end of the Cold War. Included most prominently among them are the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter plane in 2001. Although none of these crises led to direct military hostilities, they have had an adverse impact on bilateral relations and portend future such crises between the two countries. To determine how best to mitigate such crises in the future, it is important to study these recent crises and identify the positive and negative responses and actions of both governments during them.
Monday, April 21, 2008
Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner
Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner
Source: RAND Corporation
Turkey has long been an important U.S. ally, but especially with the end of the Cold War, the relationship has been changing. Divergences between U.S. and Turkish interests have grown, in part because of Turkey’s relationships with its neighbors and the tension between its Western identity and its Middle Eastern orientation. Further, relations with the European Union have also deteriorated of late. As a result, Ankara has come to feel that it can no longer rely on its traditional allies, and Turkey is likely to be a more difficult and less predictable partner in the future. While Turkey will continue to want good ties to the United States, it is likely to be drawn more heavily into the Middle East by the Kurdish issue and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Consequently, the tension between Turkey’s Western identity and Middle Eastern orientation is likely to grow even more.
Source: RAND Corporation
Turkey has long been an important U.S. ally, but especially with the end of the Cold War, the relationship has been changing. Divergences between U.S. and Turkish interests have grown, in part because of Turkey’s relationships with its neighbors and the tension between its Western identity and its Middle Eastern orientation. Further, relations with the European Union have also deteriorated of late. As a result, Ankara has come to feel that it can no longer rely on its traditional allies, and Turkey is likely to be a more difficult and less predictable partner in the future. While Turkey will continue to want good ties to the United States, it is likely to be drawn more heavily into the Middle East by the Kurdish issue and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Consequently, the tension between Turkey’s Western identity and Middle Eastern orientation is likely to grow even more.
Friday, April 18, 2008
Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath
Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath
Source: Institute for National Strategic Studies (National Defense University)
To date, the war in Iraq is a classic case of failure to adopt and adapt prudent courses of action that balance ends, ways, and means. After the major combat operation, U.S. policy has been insolvent, with inadequate means for pursuing ambitious ends. It is also a case where the perceived illegitimacy of our policy has led the United States to bear a disproportionate share of the war’s burden. U.S. efforts in Iraq stand in stark contrast to the war in Afghanistan, where, to the surprise of many, U.S. friends and allies have recently taken up a larger share of the burden of that conflict. Afghanistan has become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) war, but the war in Iraq has increasingly become only a U.S. and Iraqi struggle. The British drawdown in Basra in the summer of 2007 heightened the isolation of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.
The goal of this case study is to outline how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decisionmaking process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process. The central finding of this study is that U.S. efforts in Iraq were hobbled by a set of faulty assumptions, a flawed planning effort, and a continuing inability to create security conditions in Iraq that could have fostered meaningful advances in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance. It is arguable whether the Iraqis will develop the wherewithal to create ethnic reconciliation and build a coherent national government. It is clear, however, that the United States and its partners have not done enough to create conditions in which such a development could take place. With the best of intentions, the United States toppled a vile, dangerous regime but has been unable to replace it with a stable entity. Mistakes in the Iraq operation cry out for improvements in the U.S. decisionmaking and policy execution systems. In turn, these improvements will require major changes in the legislative and executive branches, as well as in interagency processes.
Source: Institute for National Strategic Studies (National Defense University)
To date, the war in Iraq is a classic case of failure to adopt and adapt prudent courses of action that balance ends, ways, and means. After the major combat operation, U.S. policy has been insolvent, with inadequate means for pursuing ambitious ends. It is also a case where the perceived illegitimacy of our policy has led the United States to bear a disproportionate share of the war’s burden. U.S. efforts in Iraq stand in stark contrast to the war in Afghanistan, where, to the surprise of many, U.S. friends and allies have recently taken up a larger share of the burden of that conflict. Afghanistan has become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) war, but the war in Iraq has increasingly become only a U.S. and Iraqi struggle. The British drawdown in Basra in the summer of 2007 heightened the isolation of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.
The goal of this case study is to outline how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decisionmaking process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process. The central finding of this study is that U.S. efforts in Iraq were hobbled by a set of faulty assumptions, a flawed planning effort, and a continuing inability to create security conditions in Iraq that could have fostered meaningful advances in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance. It is arguable whether the Iraqis will develop the wherewithal to create ethnic reconciliation and build a coherent national government. It is clear, however, that the United States and its partners have not done enough to create conditions in which such a development could take place. With the best of intentions, the United States toppled a vile, dangerous regime but has been unable to replace it with a stable entity. Mistakes in the Iraq operation cry out for improvements in the U.S. decisionmaking and policy execution systems. In turn, these improvements will require major changes in the legislative and executive branches, as well as in interagency processes.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
General David H. Petraeus gave this testimony on Iraq before Congress on April 8, 2008. Accompanying the testimony is a separate file of charts.
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
General David H. Petraeus gave this testimony on Iraq before Congress on April 8, 2008. Accompanying the testimony is a separate file of charts.
Monday, March 31, 2008
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
Source: Brookings Institution
Since September 11, 2001, the United States and other governments have frequently asserted that threats to international peace and security often come from the world’s weakest states. Such countries can fall prey to and spawn a host of transnational security threats, including terrorism, weapons proliferation, organized crime, infectious disease, environmental degradation, and civil conflicts that spill over borders. Accordingly, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States maintains that weak and failing states “pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states.”
The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World was designed to provide policy-makers and researchers with a credible tool for analyzing and understanding the world’s most vulnerable countries. Co-directed by Brookings Senior Fellow Susan Rice and Center for Global Development Research Fellow Stewart Patrick, the Index ranks and assesses 141 developing nations according to their relative performance in four critical spheres: economic, political, security and social welfare.
Source: Brookings Institution
Since September 11, 2001, the United States and other governments have frequently asserted that threats to international peace and security often come from the world’s weakest states. Such countries can fall prey to and spawn a host of transnational security threats, including terrorism, weapons proliferation, organized crime, infectious disease, environmental degradation, and civil conflicts that spill over borders. Accordingly, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States maintains that weak and failing states “pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states.”
The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World was designed to provide policy-makers and researchers with a credible tool for analyzing and understanding the world’s most vulnerable countries. Co-directed by Brookings Senior Fellow Susan Rice and Center for Global Development Research Fellow Stewart Patrick, the Index ranks and assesses 141 developing nations according to their relative performance in four critical spheres: economic, political, security and social welfare.
Monday, March 24, 2008
Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Source: The Brookings Institution
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of violent groups over the years. Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. This support remains strong even today: the U.S. government regularly contends that Iran is tied to an array of radical groups in Iraq.
Yet despite Iran’s very real support for terrorism for more than the last 25 years and its possession of chemical weapons for over 15 years, Tehran has not transferred unconventional systems to terrorists. Iran is likely to continue this restraint and not transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, it is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation.
This article begins by reviewing how Iran has used terrorism in the past and how this has changed over the years. The article then assesses U.S. attempts to press Iran with regard to terrorism and why they have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, the article argues that, while the author believes Iranian terrorism remains a threat, Tehran is not likely to pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists. The article concludes with recommendations for decreasing Iran’s use of terrorism in general and the chances of it transferring chemical or other unconventional weapons to terrorists in particular.
Source: The Brookings Institution
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of violent groups over the years. Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. This support remains strong even today: the U.S. government regularly contends that Iran is tied to an array of radical groups in Iraq.
Yet despite Iran’s very real support for terrorism for more than the last 25 years and its possession of chemical weapons for over 15 years, Tehran has not transferred unconventional systems to terrorists. Iran is likely to continue this restraint and not transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, it is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation.
This article begins by reviewing how Iran has used terrorism in the past and how this has changed over the years. The article then assesses U.S. attempts to press Iran with regard to terrorism and why they have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, the article argues that, while the author believes Iranian terrorism remains a threat, Tehran is not likely to pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists. The article concludes with recommendations for decreasing Iran’s use of terrorism in general and the chances of it transferring chemical or other unconventional weapons to terrorists in particular.
Friday, March 14, 2008
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (March 2008)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, supported by limited but important gains on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts. Violence levels have declined since the last report and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are gradually assuming responsibility for maintain- ing law and order and promoting stability. New strides have been taken in reconciliation at the national, provincial and local levels, and the Iraqi economy is growing. However, recent security gains remain fragile, and sustained progress over the long term will depend on Iraq’s ability to address a complex set of issues associated with key political and economic objectives.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, supported by limited but important gains on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts. Violence levels have declined since the last report and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are gradually assuming responsibility for maintain- ing law and order and promoting stability. New strides have been taken in reconciliation at the national, provincial and local levels, and the Iraqi economy is growing. However, recent security gains remain fragile, and sustained progress over the long term will depend on Iraq’s ability to address a complex set of issues associated with key political and economic objectives.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment
The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment
Source: Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments
From press release :
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has released a new report, “The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment,” authored by Senior Fellow Robert C. Martinage.
The report concludes that the United States reached a high-water mark in the war on terrorism in 2003. At that time, the Taliban had been overthrown and al Qaeda stripped of its sanctuary in Afghanistan, ten of al Qaeda’s senior-most leaders had been captured or killed, dozens of jihadi cells had been rolled up, and several partner countries had significantly improved their counter- terrorism capabilities.
While the US has had many tactical victories since then, they have been offset by the metastasis of the al Qaeda organization into a global movement, the spread and intensification of Salafi- Jihadi ideology, the resurgence of Iranian influence, and growth in the number and influence of radical Islamist political parties. The threat has, on balance, intensified in Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Europe, according to Martinage.
Source: Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments
From press release :
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has released a new report, “The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment,” authored by Senior Fellow Robert C. Martinage.
The report concludes that the United States reached a high-water mark in the war on terrorism in 2003. At that time, the Taliban had been overthrown and al Qaeda stripped of its sanctuary in Afghanistan, ten of al Qaeda’s senior-most leaders had been captured or killed, dozens of jihadi cells had been rolled up, and several partner countries had significantly improved their counter- terrorism capabilities.
While the US has had many tactical victories since then, they have been offset by the metastasis of the al Qaeda organization into a global movement, the spread and intensification of Salafi- Jihadi ideology, the resurgence of Iranian influence, and growth in the number and influence of radical Islamist political parties. The threat has, on balance, intensified in Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Europe, according to Martinage.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
The New Middle East
The New Middle East
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Confrontational U.S. policy that tried to create a “New Middle East,” but ignored the realities of the region has instead exacerbated existing conflicts and created new problems, argues a new report from the Carnegie Endowment. To restore its credibility and promote positive transformation, the United States needs to abandon the illusion that it can reshape the region to suit its interests.
In The New Middle East, Carnegie Middle East experts Marina Ottaway, Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, and Paul Salem examine the new realities of the region by focusing on three critical clusters of countries—Iran–Iraq, Lebanon–Syria, Palestine–Israel, and on the three most pressing issues—nuclear proliferation, sectarianism, and the challenge of political reform—to provide a new direction for U.S. policy that engages all regional actors patiently and consistently on major conflicts to develop compromise solutions.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Confrontational U.S. policy that tried to create a “New Middle East,” but ignored the realities of the region has instead exacerbated existing conflicts and created new problems, argues a new report from the Carnegie Endowment. To restore its credibility and promote positive transformation, the United States needs to abandon the illusion that it can reshape the region to suit its interests.
In The New Middle East, Carnegie Middle East experts Marina Ottaway, Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, and Paul Salem examine the new realities of the region by focusing on three critical clusters of countries—Iran–Iraq, Lebanon–Syria, Palestine–Israel, and on the three most pressing issues—nuclear proliferation, sectarianism, and the challenge of political reform—to provide a new direction for U.S. policy that engages all regional actors patiently and consistently on major conflicts to develop compromise solutions.
Thursday, February 21, 2008
The U.S. Military Index
The U.S. Military Index
Source: Foreign Policy
In an exclusive new index, Foreign Policy and the Center for a New American Security surveyed more than 3,400 active and retired officers at the highest levels of command about the state of the U.S. military. They see a force stretched dangerously thin and a country ill-prepared for the next fight.
Source: Foreign Policy
In an exclusive new index, Foreign Policy and the Center for a New American Security surveyed more than 3,400 active and retired officers at the highest levels of command about the state of the U.S. military. They see a force stretched dangerously thin and a country ill-prepared for the next fight.
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
Economic Report of the President
Economic Report of the President
Source: Council of Economic Advisors
From Fact Sheet: The Economic Report of the President:
Today, the White House released the Economic Report of the President, an annual report to Congress on the Nation’s economic progress. The report released today reviews the state of the U.S. economy, the outlook for the next several years, and a wide variety of economic issues that underlie many of the Administration’s economic policies.…
The U.S. economy continued to grow for the sixth straight year in 2007, but we are facing a rough patch. Although real GDP growth slowed in the fourth quarter of last year, economic growth is expected to continue in 2008. Most market forecasts suggest a slower pace in the first half of 2008, followed by strengthened growth in the second half of the year.
Source: Council of Economic Advisors
From Fact Sheet: The Economic Report of the President:
Today, the White House released the Economic Report of the President, an annual report to Congress on the Nation’s economic progress. The report released today reviews the state of the U.S. economy, the outlook for the next several years, and a wide variety of economic issues that underlie many of the Administration’s economic policies.…
The U.S. economy continued to grow for the sixth straight year in 2007, but we are facing a rough patch. Although real GDP growth slowed in the fourth quarter of last year, economic growth is expected to continue in 2008. Most market forecasts suggest a slower pace in the first half of 2008, followed by strengthened growth in the second half of the year.
Monday, February 4, 2008
Budget of the United States Government, FY09
Budget of the United States Government, FY09
Issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Budget of the United States Government is a collection of documents that contains the budget message of the President, information about the President’s budget proposals for a given fiscal year, and other budgetary publications that have been issued throughout the fiscal year. Other related and supporting budget publications, such as the Economic Report of the President, are included, which may vary from year to year
Issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Budget of the United States Government is a collection of documents that contains the budget message of the President, information about the President’s budget proposals for a given fiscal year, and other budgetary publications that have been issued throughout the fiscal year. Other related and supporting budget publications, such as the Economic Report of the President, are included, which may vary from year to year
Monday, January 28, 2008
U.S. Key to Building Prosperity and Opportunity in Latin America
U.S. Key to Building Prosperity and Opportunity in Latin America
Source: International Trade Administration (USDoC)
The Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration (ITA) released new data demonstrating the United States’ contribution to prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. In conjunction with the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA), ITA issued fact sheets which highlight the trade, investment and social development provided by the U.S. to countries in the hemisphere from Mexico to Argentina.
Source: International Trade Administration (USDoC)
The Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration (ITA) released new data demonstrating the United States’ contribution to prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. In conjunction with the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA), ITA issued fact sheets which highlight the trade, investment and social development provided by the U.S. to countries in the hemisphere from Mexico to Argentina.
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
The Global “Go-To Think Tanks”: The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the World, 2007
The Global “Go-To Think Tanks”: The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the World, 2007
Source: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Gone are the days when a think tank could operate with the motto “research it, write it and they will find it”. Today, think tanks must be lean, mean, policy machines. This report summarizes the findings of a pilot project to identify some of the leading think tanks in the world, and provides lists of what might be called the “go to think tanks” in every region.
Source: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Gone are the days when a think tank could operate with the motto “research it, write it and they will find it”. Today, think tanks must be lean, mean, policy machines. This report summarizes the findings of a pilot project to identify some of the leading think tanks in the world, and provides lists of what might be called the “go to think tanks” in every region.
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Sustaining the Peace After Civil War
Sustaining the Peace After Civil War
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. For a small subset of nations civil war is a chronic condition: about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts. This book presents an analytical framework that has been used to identify a set of factors that make civil war more or less likely to recur in a nation where a civil war has recently terminated. The outcome of the previous civil war–whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement–as well as the duration and deadliness of the conflict affect the durability of the peace after civil war. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. The book closes by applying these propositions in an analysis of the civil war in Iraq: what can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. For a small subset of nations civil war is a chronic condition: about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts. This book presents an analytical framework that has been used to identify a set of factors that make civil war more or less likely to recur in a nation where a civil war has recently terminated. The outcome of the previous civil war–whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement–as well as the duration and deadliness of the conflict affect the durability of the peace after civil war. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. The book closes by applying these propositions in an analysis of the civil war in Iraq: what can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
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