Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency

Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency

Source: The Brookings Institution

The recent incident involving Blackwater contractors in Iraq has brought to light a series of questions surrounding the legal status, oversight, management, and accountability of the private military force in Iraq. This for-hire force numbers more than 160,000, more than the number of uniformed military personnel in Iraq, and it is a good thing that attention is finally being paid to the consequences of our outsourcing critical tasks to private firms.

An underlying question, though, is largely being ignored: whether it made sense to have civilians in this role in the first place. Regardless of whether the Blackwater contractors were right or wrong in the recent shootings, or even whether there is proper jurisdiction to ensure their accountability or not, there is a crucial problem.

The use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction. If we judge by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can’t win with them, but can’t go to war without them.

Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritization and Sequencing of Policies in Post-Conflict Countries

Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritization and Sequencing of Policies in Post-Conflict Countries

Source: RAND Corporation

One of the most pressing issues of post-conflict reconstruction is how to prioritize and sequence political, social, and economic policies to enable post-conflict countries to sustain peace and reduce the risk of violence reoccurring. This dissertation analyzes three cases of post-conflict reconstruction, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Haiti, surveys expert opinions of 30 academicians and practitioners, identifies major reconstruction policies, outlines the preferred way to prioritize and sequence them, and develops a framework to help policymakers better navigate the complexities and challenges of forming appropriate policies It finds that security and development are interdependent. However, in the early stages of reconstruction, security must be achieved first. After security, important policy priorities should be building effective, accountable, and inclusive governance institutions, institutionalizing democracy at the national and local levels through free, fair, participatory, and inclusive elections. Similarly, economic stabilization is needed to revive market, attract investment, generate employment opportunity, and create an environment for economic recovery and stability.

Is the “Surge” Working? Some New Facts

Is the “Surge” Working? Some New Facts

Source: The Brookings Institution

There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military “Surge” on conditions in Iraq and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound. Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important, but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper applies modern statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge’s impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of the Iraqi state (including civilian casualties); military casualties; and financial markets’ assessment of Iraq’s future. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about future strategy.

Potentially Constructive Implications of Disaster in Iraq

Potentially Constructive Implications of Disaster in Iraq

Source: Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland

It now appears likely that the invasion of Iraq will prove to be a seminal event in the evolution of international security generally. Legal order has evidently collapsed throughout the country, and the occupying forces have not been able to control the resulting pattern of predatory violence. The central reason is that the United States forfeited at the outset the critical asset of legitimacy necessary to establish and maintain consensual rule, and its continued presence undermines the indigenous institutions it is attempting to nurture. Similar breakdowns have occurred in other parts of the world, and the consequences have been tolerated over extended periods of time. Because of timing, location and the entanglement of the United States, however, intractable violence in Iraq can be expected to have much stronger global resonance. American forces alone are not likely to be able to master the situation but neither can they be withdrawn without intensifying internal violence and extending it into an already volatile region. The potential consequences of that dilemma are ominous, but for that reason the situation presents opportunity as well as danger. Calamity is sometimes a catalyst for greater wisdom.

Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq

Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq

Source: The Brookings Institution

Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Congo, Mozambique, Northern Ireland and countless other conflicts have shown that civil wars require a political solution. In civil wars, military forces can keep a lid on the violence to make a political solution possible, but force alone will not translate into sustainable peace. Understanding this reality gives even greater urgency to understanding Iraq as a failed state. U.S. political strategy for Iraq has amounted to setting political benchmarks demanding that a failed Iraqi nation ensnared in a sectarian civil war fix itself. That will not happen, no matter how much pressure we apply. Nor will Iraq rebuild itself under conditions of war. If the United States could not successfully disburse the $18 billion Congress appropriated for reconstruction in 2003, we should not expect a dysfunctional Iraqi state to meet President Bush’s benchmarks on reconstruction, political reconciliation, and security.

If anything has been demonstrated by the Bush administration’s surge strategy, it is that a high concentration of American troops in the relatively small area of Baghdad can nominally improve security in that area. Yet all other indicators on political reconciliation and capacity building give no sense of confidence that nominal security improvements can be extended elsewhere without a comparable American force presence, while also maintaining increased force levels in Baghdad. U.S. domestic politics and the strain on American forces make any such scenario untenable.

Iraq: Time for a Change

Iraq: Time for a Change

Source: U.S. Institute of Peace

War in Iraq has lasted more than four years. It has required far greater resources than anticipated. The longer-term goals are still far from realization. The price the United States and Iraq are paying in blood and treasure continues to mount. The time has come to chart a clearer path forward, taking into account the regional and global contexts. Americans want an approach that protects U.S. vital interests and can therefore be supported across a wide range of the political spectrum.

As Washington prepares for a critical debate in Congress this fall on what should be done in Iraq, the United States Institute of Peace convened over the summer a group of experts with many different political affiliations to consider next steps over a three-year time horizon. This USIPeace Briefing, prepared by Daniel Serwer, USIP vice president for peace and stability operations, describes their main conclusions. Areas of serious disagreement are noted. Those participants in the discussions wishing to be identified are listed at the end.

U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush

U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Despite sweeping rhetoric about the global spread of democracy, the Bush Administration has significantly damaged U.S. democracy promotion efforts and increased the number of close ties with “friendly tyrants,” concludes a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Security interests, such as the war on terrorism, and U.S. energy needs have led the Bush Administration to maintain friendly, unchallenged relations with more than half of the forty-five “non-free” countries in the world.

Carnegie Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers argues in his new report, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush, that the main U.S. presidential candidates have voiced support for democracy promotion, but not yet outlined plans to put it back on track. Carothers analyzes the Bush Administration’s record on democracy promotion and its effect on democracy worldwide, and then presents fresh ideas about the role democracy promotion can and should play in future U.S. policies.

The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq

The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq

Source: Iraqi Security Forces Independent Assessment Commission

ISF Overall Assessment: The Commission finds that in general, the Iraqi Security Forces, military and police, have made uneven progress, but that there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security of Iraq. With regard to external dangers, the evidence indicates that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military threats in the near term.
While severely deficient in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the Army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from the Coalition forces. In any event, the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months.

Note: Redacted for public release.

Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military

Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

This volume addresses how the leadership of China and the PLA view what size of PLA best meets China’s requirements. Among other things, this analytical process makes important new contributions on the question of PLA transparency, long an issue among PLA watchers. A great deal of emphasis has been put on understanding not only how, but also why a military modernizes itself. Some of the determining factors are national policies and strategy, doctrine, organizational structure, missions, and service cultures. While this list is not exhaustive, it does begin to paint a picture of just how broad and deep military interests run. It is important when we look at the structure and strategy for growth within the Chinese military that we see the world as China sees it. We need to see a world in which the “Taiwan issue” as well as that of North Korea and others are not viewed as short-term concerns, but fit into how China sees itself in a long-term leadership role in the region and in the world.

Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination

Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination

Source: Brookings Institution

Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, millions of Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes. They have fled from coalition military operations, widespread sectarian violence, and fear. Today there are around 2 million Iraqis displaced inside their country and another 2 million displaced beyond the national borders, the bulk of them in Syria and Jordan. As the security situation continues to deteriorate inside Iraq, human displacement escalates to levels unparalleled in the region since the Palestinian displacement nearly sixty years ago.…

This study examines the relationship between security and displacement in Iraq by first exploring implications of the large-scale displacement on Iraq’s domestic security. It then considers the impact of the external displacement on the security of two of Iraq’s neighbors: Jordan and Syria.

Foreign Relations of the United States

Foreign Relations of the United States

The Foreign Relations of the United States series is the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions that have been declassified and edited for publication. The series is produced by the State Department's Office of the Historian and printed volumes are available from the Government Printing Office.

FRUS begins with the administration of Abraham Lincoln in 1861. There are two cumulative indexes covering 1861-1899 and 1900-1918. The organization of FRUS is generally chronological, but the dates of the volumes do not necessarily reflect the dates of documentary history. For example, the volumes for 1900-1918 do not include the records dealing with World War I or the Russian Revolution. Each volume has a subject and author index. There is also typically a table of sources and abbreviations at the beginning of each volume.

Many volumes published since 1960 are available online on the State Department website that is maintained by the University of Illinois at Chicago. A full description of Foreign Relations of the United States, including a listing of the online FRUS volumes, is available from the Office of the Historian website.

Latin America’s New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez

Latin America’s New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

In 2005, Dr. Manwaring wrote a monograph entitled Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare. It came at a time when the United States and Venezuela were accelerating a verbal sparing match regarding which country was destabilizing Latin America more. President Chavez shows no sign of standing down; he slowly and deliberately centralizes his power in Venezuela, and carefully and adroitly articulates his Bolivarian dream (the idea of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. economic and political imperialism). Yet, most North Americans dismiss Chavez as a “nut case,” or—even if he is a threat to the security and stability of the Hemisphere—the possibilities of that threat coming to fruition are too far into the future to worry about. Dr. Manwaring’s intent is to explain in greater depth what President Chavez is doing and how he is doing it.

First, he explains that Hugo Chavez’s threat is straightforward, and that it is being translated into a consistent, subtle, ambiguous, and ambitious struggle for power that is beginning to insinuate itself into political life in much of the Western Hemisphere. Second, he shows how President Chavez is encouraging his Venezuelan and other followers to pursue a confrontational, populist, and nationalistic agenda that will be achieved only by (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state—and other Latin American states—to that of “direct” (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroying North American hegemony throughout all of Latin America by conducting an irregular Fourth-Generation War “Super Insurgency”; and, (3) country-by-country, building a great new Bolivarian state out of a phased Program for the Liberation of Latin America.

The Terrorism Index

The Terrorism Index

Source: Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress

Surveying more than 100 of America’s top foreign-policy experts—Republicans and Democrats alike—the Foreign Policy/Center for American Progress Terrorism Index is the only comprehensive, nonpartisan effort to mine the highest echelons of the nation’s foreign-policy establishment for its assessment of how the United States is fighting the war on terror. First released in July 2006, and again last February, the index attempts to draw definitive conclusions about the war’s priorities, policies, and progress. Its participants include people who have served as secretary of state, national security advisor, senior White House aides, top commanders in the U.S. military, seasoned intelligence professionals, and distinguished academics. Eighty percent of the experts have served in the U.S. government—including more than half in the Executive Branch, 32 percent in the military, and 21 percent in the intelligence community.

National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability but Political Reconciliation Elusive

National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive

Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (via Think Progress)

Driven largely by the accelerating pace of tribal engagement and the increasing tempo of Coalition operations, developments in Iraq are unfolding more rapidly and with greater complexity today than when we completed our January NIE. Regional variations in security and political circumstances are great and becoming increasingly more distinct–for example, intra-Shia violence in southern Iraq is very different from patterns of violence elsewhere. The intelligence assessments contained in this NIE largely focus on only a short period of the Iraqi conflict–the last six months–and in circumscribed areas–primarily the central provinces, which contain the center of gravity for Iraq’s security prospects and in which we have a greater Coalition presence and therefore more information. The unfolding pace and scope of security and political realities in Iraq, combined with our necessarily limited focus of analysis, contain risks: our uncertainties are greater, and our future projections subject to greater chances of error. These issues, combined with the challenges of acquiring accurate data on trends in violence and continued gaps in our information about levels of violence and political trends in areas of Iraq without a substantial Coalition presence and where Intelligence Community collectors have difficulty operating, heighten our caution. Nonetheless, we stand by these judgments as our best collective assessment of security and political conditions in Iraq today and as likely to unfold during the next six to 12 months.

Iraq Trip Report

Iraq Trip Report

Source: Brookings Institution

From July 17-25 we travelled extensively in central, western and northern Iraq. The trip was sponsored by the Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF-I) command and so afforded unparalleled access to U.S. and Iraqi military personnel. We spoke at length with the four principal American division commands in those sectors, as well as nearly half of the brigade commanders and their staffs, as well as several battalion and even company commanders. We also met with senior U.S. personnel from the Detainee Forces command, and from the training command known as MNSTCI, as well as a number of Iraqi police and army officers. Similarly, MNF-I saw to it that we were able to meet with key civilian personnel in a variety of PRTs/EPRTs, the U.S. Ambassador, the President’s Special Envoy, the CIA station, the US AID mission, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq. Both through our own contacts and those of the military, we also were able to meet with a number of the seniormost members of the current Iraqi government (including President Talabani, Vice President ‘Abd al-Mahdi, Foreign Minister Zebari, Deputy Prime Minister Salih, and National Security Adviser ar-Rubaie).

An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security

An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

Theater strategy and theater security cooperation are two of the most important tools available in attaining national security. They offer an effective means for geographic Combatant Commanders to engage other countries, deter aggression, or resolve crises. However, there is little current, concise, and comprehensive guidance on how they are planned and implemented. This paper explains what theater strategy is, its basis, how it is formulated, and how it is executed with emphasis on theater security cooperation. The author illustrates the role in national affairs of theater strategy and security cooperation through examples from a case study leading up to and during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.

Terrorist Threats in the Horn of Africa: A Net Assessment

Terrorist Threats in the Horn of Africa: A Net Assessment

Source: National Security Outlook (American Enterprise Institute)

The struggle against Islamist extremism has been dubbed the “Long War” by America’s military leadership, but there is no agreed-upon model to forecast the development of this conflict. The challenge of assessing the Long War is exacerbated by the differences between the adversaries: the United States and its allies form the core of the international system, while the Salafist jihadists at the extreme of radical Islam comprise an irregular transnational movement that has adaptively spread throughout the world from its Middle East base. Comparing the structure, goals, strategy, and tactics of these fundamentally asymmetric forces is a chore to which our analytic tools developed during the Cold War do not lend themselves. This National Security Outlook examines whether the “net assessment” concept might serve as an appropriate framework for understanding the Long War and predicting its likely development.

Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq

Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq

Source: Project on Defense Alternatives

A Phased Transition plan is necessary for Iraq. The Bush administration should end its current “surge” of U.S. troops and launch a transition process that focuses U.S. forces on an advisory role and reduces our military presence in Iraq from approximately 160,000 today to about 60,000 by the end of 2008. At the same time that it implements the first phase, it should begin planning for subsequent phases and working to achieve a bipartisan consensus in the United States.

Is The United States Losing Turkey?

Is The United States Losing Turkey?

Source: Hudson Institute

The alliance between the United States and Turkey, which has endured since the 1947 Truman Doctrine and has contributed to the security of both countries, is now in serious trouble. What is worse, neither side is facing up to this reality, let alone taking serious remedial measures, nor even making concerted efforts to understand the new political currents within each other’s societies.

If this neglect continues, the price paid by both sides will be steep. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington and Ankara see the world and define their interests in divergent ways. If allowed to continue, this trend could well undo the alliance. The good news is that there is still time to act, providing senior leaders on both sides move with dispatch. It is urgent that they do so, for despite the end of the Cold War, which provided a clear rationale for their alliance for four decades, Ankara and Washington still need each other, perhaps more so because they now face multiple and unfamiliar threats, not least those posed by terrorism.

The most important source of discord between Turkey and the United States is the war in Iraq. Ankara fears that Iraq will break up as a result of the war and that a separate Kurdish state will arise, creating even greater disorder and stoking separatist sentiment in Turkey’s southeast, and increasing paramilitary and terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist organization, the PKK. Washington, for its part, feels betrayed by the Turkish parliament’s rejection of its request to open a second front from Turkey’s territory against Saddam Hussein’s army in the run-up to the 2003 war. But more fundamentally, the Bush administration is preoccupied by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and seems to have relegated Turkey to the back burner—or so it appears to many Turks.

Iraq - U.S. Policy Documents

Iraq - U.S. Policy Documents

Source: Military Education Research Library Network (MERLN)

A central repository of publicly available U.S. policy documents. Includes documents from the White House, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, Other Policy Sources. Searchable.

Military: 2007 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)

U.S. Military: 2007 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)

Edited by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, II.
Source: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College

The Key Strategic Issues List gives researchers, whether military professionals or civilian scholars, a ready reference of those issues of particular interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. Its focus is strategic, rather than operational or tactical. Every year, the KSIL helps guide research efforts to the mutual benefit of the defense community and individual researchers.

U.S.-China Relations After Resolution of Taiwan’s Status

U.S.-China Relations After Resolution of Taiwan’s Status

Source: RAND Corporation

Although the question of Taiwan’s status is unlikely to be resolved soon, considering the various possible outcomes and how they might affect U.S.–China relations is useful. A total of ten distinct trajectories for the resolution of the cross-strait relationship can be identified, with greatly varying implications for U.S.-China relations. Unsurprisingly, the impact of peaceful outcomes, including continued peaceful irresolution, is both more predictable and generally better for relations between Washington and Beijing. If China uses force against Taiwan, however, subsequent U.S.–China relations could fall anywhere from close cooperation to hostile cold war. Both how the Taiwan issue is resolved and the nature of subsequent U.S.–China relations will largely be determined by the nature of China’s government: a democratic, or, at least, highly pragmatic Chinese government is more likely to achieve a peaceful resolution; a government still controlled by the Chinese Communist Party is less likely to do so. As China’s military capabilities grow, it will become increasingly difficult but also increasingly more important to prevent Beijing from using force to bring about unification.

National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland

National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland

Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence

We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al- Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.

We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11. These measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11.

* We are concerned, however, that this level of international cooperation may wane as 9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge.

Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.

* As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat environment.

The End of Democratic Solidarity in the Americas?

The End of Democratic Solidarity in the Americas?

Source: Latin American Outlook, American Enterprise Institute

Not long ago, the governments of the Americas recognized the value of working together to consolidate the historic, promising trend toward democracy. Now, with democracy being dismantled in several nations and being assailed by authoritarian Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez Frías, Latin American countries seem to have abandoned the fraternal ideal of inter-American solidarity. The United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) can both do more to salvage the regional commitment to democracy, but unless Latin American and Caribbean governments are willing to stand together to defend their principles, the end of democratic solidarity is in sight.

Released Today — Iraq: Initial Benchmark Assessment Report

Initial Benchmark Assessment Report

Source: The White House

This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the “Act”). It includes an assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. This is the first of two reports to be submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander of United States Central Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.

Iraq Four Years after the U.S.-Led Invasion: Assessing the Crisis and Searching for a Way Forward

Iraq Four Years after the U.S.-Led Invasion: Assessing the Crisis and Searching for a Way Forward

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

As the U.S. “surge” in Iraq enters its sixth month, a new Carnegie Policy Outlook reflects on the full history of the Iraq war and examines the viability of the current strategy.

The invasion and occupation of Iraq constituted the greatest nation-building challenge the United States has faced since World War II. As has become painfully clear, however, the realities of Iraq proved far more challenging than military planners had expected. Wars and sanctions only served to exacerbate stresses and tensions inherent under Saddam Hussein—there were no social forces to act as agents of change and no regional environment supportive of such change. The announcement of the surge in January 2007 revealed a sober recognition of how far U.S. strategy was removed from hard realities.

While this new U.S. strategy may have seemed plausible, it suffers from the same flawed assumptions and challenges that have plagued the entire war. The resolution of the Iraqi crisis can only come about through the construction of an inclusive, pluralistic, and federal polity with broad participation and strong political and security institutions. The Iraqi government must wean itself from U.S. military support, reinforce its own institutional and law-enforcement capacities, and take seriously the need for inclusive representational and decision-making institutions.

Opportunity ‘08: Homeland Security

Opportunity ‘08: Homeland Security

Source: The Brookings Institution

“Homeland security”—both the term and the policy—were effectively born amid the crisis of September 11, 2001. The policy started with a simple purpose: to prevent further terrorist attacks on American soil. It once made sense to take measures that responded to the circumstances of that attack and reassured a nervous public. But more than five years into the apparently endless war on terrorism, homeland security should evolve from a set of emergency policies into a permanent field of important government policy that, like any other, must justify its allocation of taxpayer funds through solid analysis.

America and the Use of Force: Sources of Legitimacy

America and the Use of Force: Sources of Legitimacy

Source: The Brookings Institution

Many American and foreign observers believe that the painful and so far unsuccessful intervention in Iraq will make the United States more reluctant to go to war in the future. Three powerful factors, however, suggest that, to the contrary, the United States may resort to military action more, not less, often in the future. The character of US foreign policy, manifested over two centuries, is that of a nation willing to use force with relative frequency on behalf of both principles and tangible interests and generally believing in the justness and appropriateness of military action in international affairs. The distribution of power in the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union—not very different today, despite the rise of powers such as China and India—invites military intervention by a dominant military power unchecked by the deterrent power of any nation or grouping of nations with roughly equal strength. Finally, the contemporary international system presents an array of circumstances in which the use of force will be seen as both necessary and proper. Indeed, the number of such challenges—be they to curb proliferation, counter terrorists, curtail gross human rights violations, or counter some other threat requiring military action—is likely to increase, not decrease, in the years ahead.

U.S. - Russian Relations: The Kennebunkport Agenda

U.S. - Russian Relations: The Kennebunkport Agenda

Source: Hudson Institute

From press release:

On the eve of the Bush-Putin summit meeting in Kennebunkport, four members of a Russian-American study group organized by the Hudson Institute said today that the present Russian regime is moving toward “a durable system of anti-Western authoritarian rule” and called on the U.S. to counteract this tendency by demonstrating strict fidelity to democratic principles.

Zeyno Baran, a senior fellow at Hudson, Evgeny Kiselyev, a well known Russian radio and television personality, Richard Pipes, a professor emeritus of Russian history at Harvard, and David Satter, a senior fellow at Hudson and research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford said in the joint statement that “Russia is reverting to patterns of behavior characteristic of the Soviet Union.”

From Red to Gray: The “Third Transition” of Aging Populations in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union

From Red to Gray: The “Third Transition” of Aging Populations in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union

Source: World BankFrom press release:

By 2025, many countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will have populations that are among the oldest in the world, posing a threat to the region’s recent economic success if pension and health care reforms are not adequately tackled and policies are not put in place to promote productivity growth.

Across the world, aging societies run the risks of severe economic consequences. Still, the Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, comprising some 28 countries from Russia to Albania, is the only region in the world facing the combined challenges of rapid aging, relatively poor populations and an incomplete transition to mature market economies, according to a new World Bank report. For these countries, the problems are heightened by their need to simultaneously accelerate their economic transition and to urgently undertake longer-term reforms addressing demographic consequences….